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1. INTRODUCTION
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
The field of econometrics seeks to give empirical content to models from eco-
nomic theory. Arguably the most frequently encountered stumbling block on this
quest is the availability of suitable data. Variables that are central for the theories
under scrutiny are often unobserved, measured with error, or simultaneously de-
termined with other relevant characteristics. A large part of econometric theory
can be characterised by searching for ways to identify and estimate the parame-
ters of interest for typical data configurations. Starting from this basis, the applied
researcher needs to match these methods with a dataset in which the correspond-
ing assumptions – some of which will be fundamentally untestable – can be made
with reasonable confidence. This data-driven view of empirical work forms the
thread that holds the five self-contained chapters of this dissertation together.
In Chapter 2, Rembrandt Scholz and I exploit a novel dataset in order to
study life expectancy differentials among elderly German men. Unlike in many
other countries, publicly available German census records do not include socio-
economic variables. It was only with the inception of the Research Data Centre of
the German Federal Pension Institute in 2004 that it became possible to analyse
data that satisfy the heavy requirements of nonparametric life table estimators.
Utilising a measure of lifetime labour income for a sample of 3.5 million pension-
ers in 2002, we can put a lower bound of six years on the life expectancy difference
at age 65 between the groups at the extremes of the lifetime earnings distribu-
tion. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the lower overall life expectancy in
the eastern part of Germany appears to be driven by a composition effect: Condi-
tional upon socio-economic status, we cannot detect any mortality differences. It
is rather the distributions of earnings that are quite distinct from each other with
relatively more persons populating the high categories in theWest than in the East.
Moving beyond a mere data description, the analysis performed in the third
chapter aims at estimating a causal effect of income on health based on a syn-
thetic cohort approach. In joint work with Jérôme Adda and James Banks, we
model both variables as stochastic processes for the population between 30 and
60 years of age. The aggregation to the cohort level is motivated by two obser-
vations. First, there are no panel data currently available that contain both health
and socio-economic variables in long enough time series as to facilitate a truly dy-
namic analysis at the individual level. Second, we argue that permanent shocks to
cohort income are driven by other factors than health innovations, allowing us to
disregard reverse-causality issues. We also present some robustness checks with
respect to deviations from this assumption. Other factors that have been shown to
influence both income and health trajectories – such as education and childhood
circumstance – will be captured by the initial conditions. Hence we are confident
that we can identify the causal effect that we aim for.
Interestingly, we find a positive and statistically significant effect on mortality,
i.e. positive income innovations lead to higher subsequent mortality. There are
3no effects of income shocks on health as measured by a host of health indicators.
The reason for the latter finding could be that causation may take more time than
three years, which is what our estimators allow for. There are few reasons for
risk behaviours to exhibit a very long causation lag. Accordingly, we consider
them as well and find that income innovations lead to more smoking and probably
also more drinking. The effects on mortality and risk behaviours are consistent
with those estimated by Ruhm (2000), who shows that macroeconomic conditions
are positively related to both outcomes. However, our results hint at a different
interpretation. In the light of no effects on health measures, it appears unlikely
that more risk-taking behaviour leads to instantaneous deaths. It is more probable
that work-related accidents are the driving force. When it comes to informing
policy, our results suggest that simple redistributionary policies would not help to
ameliorate health inequalities.
In the last three chapters of this thesis, the focus shifts from health economics
to the measurement of individual-level preferences towards risk-bearing and the
timing of events. Since such preferences are intimately linked with other vari-
ables relevant for market behaviour, they are best inferred from situations that are
largely controlled by the researcher. This is an active field of research and no con-
sensus has been reached on what is a good way to elicit this type of preferences.
Typical approaches include experiments or hypothetical choice tasks. However,
these are far from being included in household surveys as a default and question-
naires are often tailor-made for specific research questions. I have been fortunate
to be able to collaborate on these kind of data collection efforts in two specific
projects.
The analysis reported in Chapter 4 is joint work with Arthur van Soest and
Erik Wengström. It investigates the role of selection bias in experiments. The data
stem from a preference elicitation experiment which we ran on an Internet survey
that is representative of the Dutch population. Upon learning about the nature of
the experiment, subjects could choose a non-participation option. The advantage
of this dataset over previously existing ones is that we have a lot of background
information even for subjects who did not take part in the experiment. We find
that selection issues matter most for choices that cannot be rationalised by utility-
maximising behaviour, namely opting for dominated alternatives and exhibiting
non-monotonic choice patterns in similar decision tasks. First, the number of
such inconsistencies is drastically higher for the general population than for the
young and educated. Second, we find evidence for selection based on observable
characteristics within the representative sample. Respondents who are more likely
to participate in the experiment show more consistent choice patterns than those
with a lower propensity to take part in it. Both selection effects appear to be less
important for average levels of risk tolerance than for inconsistent choices.
In Chapter 5 – again with Arthur van Soest and Erik Wengström – we attempt
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to rationalise some empirical regularities in the same data by means of a structural
model. The starting point of our analysis is a canonical expected utility of income
model that we extend in two directions that have been discussed over the last thirty
years. The first of these is the incorporation of loss aversion. Since the seminal
work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it has become a widely established find-
ing that agents are more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, we introduce
scope for preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution along the lines
of the model of Kreps and Porteus (1978). In our two-period model, uncertainty
may be resolved either in the first or in the second period. Our results can be
summarised as follows. As the previous literature, we find strong effects of risk
aversion and loss aversion in homogeneous specifications of the model. Augment-
ing it by the uncertainty resolution parameter produces mixed results. However,
we can say with some confidence that a negative prospect in the outcome set sig-
nificantly reduces the attractiveness of late uncertainty resolution, something that
is well in line with earlier psychological findings. As one would expect, we find
heterogeneity in risk aversion to be very important. Interestingly, only a very
small part of the overall between-subject variation is explained by the most im-
portant demographic variables. Among these, age is associated with higher risk
aversion. Men show less risk-averse behaviour than women. Finally, education
and household income are linked with lower levels of risk aversion.
In the final chapter of this dissertation – joint with the late Angelika Eymann,
Axel Börsch-Supan, and Rob Euwals – we employ more traditional survey instru-
ments in order to measure risk attitudes and impatience. The resulting individual-
level parameters are embedded in a model of households’ choice among different
asset classes. For this purpose, we included a host of tailor-made questions in
the 2005 wave of the German SAVE survey. The motivation behind using many
different measures of the same outcome is based on the observation that each of
these can provide only an inaccurate indicator of the underlying preference pa-
rameter. We exploit factor-analytic techniques from the psychometric literature to
recover the parameters of interest. We then use these preference parameters as la-
tent traits in a structural model of household portfolio choice. Our results are very
encouraging: Using the comprehensive measurement model, we find significant
effects of individual preferences on households’ choices of portfolio allocations.
We show that such results are unlikely to emerge from analyses that employ a
single proxy variable per preference parameter. It also turns out to be important to
explicitly model dependencies among wealth, risk attitude, and impatience. We
thus conclude that there are important merits to our structural approach as it allows
to capture effects that would be hidden in reduced form strategies.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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2.1 Introduction
The international literature on socio-economic status and mortality is marked by
a persisting absence of Germany.1 This scarcity of studies is probably owed
to the lack of large high quality datasets. Luckily, the situation has changed
since the inception of the Research Data Centre of the German Pension Insurance
(Forschungsdatenzentrum der Rentenversicherung). Using these data enables us
to make a number of, albeit small, contributions to the existing literature.
Most obviously, we document mortality inequalities among elderly men in
Germany. The data permits us to compare the regions of the former GDR with the
rest of Germany. Due to the very different institutions for forty years, differences
may well be expected. In addition, the German pension system enables us to mea-
sure socio-economic status by means of a variable that we term lifetime earnings.
It is a discounted sum of pensionable earnings over the life-cycle. We argue that
this is a very broad measure of socio-economic status that is also readily usable
for the retired population. Finally, due to the large size of our dataset, we do not
need to recur to any parametric assumptions on the structure of the relationship
between lifetime earnings and mortality. Hence we are able to provide credible
estimates of life expectancies which provide a summary measure of mortality that
is readily understood in terms of meaning and magnitude, which is not the case
for many other typically used measures.
For the remaining life expectancy at age 65, our results indicate a lower bound
of six years on the difference between the lowest and the highest earnings group
considered in our study. That is a difference of almost fifty percent measured
from the lowest group. Over a sizable part of the lifetime earnings distribution,
life expectancy rises almost linearly. Despite the fact that we do find lower overall
mortality in the West than in the East, our results show similar life expectancies
within income groups. The unconditional difference hence comes from composi-
tion effects.
Our results document a pure correlation between lifetime earnings and mor-
tality. From our estimates, nothing can be said about the underlying pathways
that lead to these figures. In general, three broad channels of causality can be
imagined. Epidemiologists stress the importance of causality from income to
health (Marmot 1999). Economists are often preoccupied with quantifying the
reverse direction by which it is a low health status that impairs current and fu-
ture earnings capacity (Smith 2004). A third explanation is that there are one
or more underlying factors determining both income and health. Among many
1 See for example Mackenbach, Bos, Andersen, Cardano, Costa, Harding, Reid, Hemström,
Valkonen, and Kunst (2003) or Huisman, Kunst, Andersen, Bopp, Borgan, Borrell, Costa, De-
boosere, Desplanques, Donkin, Gadeyne, Minder, Regidor, Spadea, Valkonen, and Mackenbach
(2004) and the references cited therein.
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potential candidates are genetics, ability, intelligence social skills, networks, and
other background or early life factors such as parental income (Case, Lubotsky,
and Paxson 2002), or education (Lleras Muney 2005). We see our contribution in
documenting a strong relationship between lifetime earnings and life expectancy
in Germany that calls for more research on its origins.
The structure of this paper is the following. We first describe the data that
we use in Section 2.2, with particular emphasis on the German pension system
and the calculation of the central explanatory variable. Section 2.3 contains the
presentation of our results in three stages before turning to some international
comparisons. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Data
We use a very large dataset of administrative records from the German Public
Pension System. For reasons explained in Section 2.2.2, we consider only male
individuals. Our data cover more than eighty percent of the whole male popula-
tion born 1936 and earlier. Consider the first and fifth column of Table 2.1 in the
Appendix on page 26. These show our sample sizes and what part of the general
population is covered by our data broken down by age group and place of resi-
dence. Coverage is about three quarters in the West, but it drops substantially at
older ages to less than two thirds. Part of this may be explained by overestima-
tion of the general population in the official public records (Jdanov, Scholz, and
Shkolnikov 2005), although we use numbers from the Human Mortality Database
that already contain a correction for this issue. Another part is likely to be differ-
ential mortality – people outside the system tend to have a higher socio-economic
status. In terms of selection bias, we do not see any reason why results on dif-
ferential mortality among the pensioners covered by our data should not extend
qualitatively to the rest of the population. Numbers in the East are much nicer with
coverages of up to 98 percent. This is because in the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR), virtually everybody was insured within the state pension system.
At the same time there were exceptions for the self-employed and civil servants
(see Section 2.2.1) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that explain the
baseline difference.
In the next section we turn to the derivation of the central variable of our anal-
ysis, an internal measure of the Public Pension System that is used to calculate
pension benefits. It is called personal earnings points and serves reasonably well
as an indicator of total lifetime earnings. Section 2.2.2 presents descriptive statis-
tics on the variables used in our analysis and deals with the creation of our dataset
from several sources of the administrative records.
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2.2.1 The German Public Pension System
The German Public Pension System in the form that is relevant for the cohorts
studied in this analysis is a pay-as-you-go system based on a single tier. Benefits
are directly related to personal earnings over the life-cycle.2 This section pro-
vides a very brief introduction to those parts of the system that are relevant for
the purposes of the paper. Our description is based on Börsch-Supan and Wilke
(2004) and VDR (2004). The system covers all private and public sector employ-
ees, excluding only civil servants (about 7 percent of the workforce) and most
self-employed (about 9 percent). The latter can self-insure in the system, we will
get back to this in Section 2.2.2. Our focus is on old-age pensions which are paid
to all retirees age 65 and above. By the end of the calender year in the course of
which age 65 is completed, virtually everybody is retired.3
Key to the system are the so-called earnings points, which essentially are a
measure of the relative annual earnings position. In any given year t, the earnings
points for contribution periods (EPCP) of an individual i are calculated as:
EPCPit =
pensionable earningsit
average pensionable earningst
(2.1)
In 2002, pensionable earnings were the first 4,500 Euro of gross monthly wages if
the individual’s earnings were above the minimum earnings threshold of 325 Euro.
A subset of our data contains the sum of EPCPit over all t with relevant contributions
for each individual (we call this variable EPCPi ). Note that this variable is subject to
a difficult form of right censoring because of the annual upper limit to pensionable
income. Hence we know only a lower bound for the earnings of people with high
EPCPi . This has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. On the contrary,
the left censoring at 325 Euro is negligible. We note that because of the division
by average pensionable earnings in (2.1), the discount rate inherent to EPCPi is the
annual wage growth rate.
For administrative reasons, EPCPi is available only for individuals who retired
after 1992, the year of a major reform to the system. The measure present for
all persons in our dataset is called personal earnings points (EPpers). These are
calculated as follows:
EPpersi = (EP
CP
i + EP
NCP
i ) · AFi(2.2)
EPNCP stands for earnings points from non-contributory periods. These stem from
2 For a simple taxonomy of pension systems and an international comparison cf. OECD (2005)
3 For the 1936 cohort (the youngest included in our analysis), internal statistics of the Deutsche
Rentenversicherung show that only 0.56 percent were not retired on 1st January 2002, the starting
point of our analysis.
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spells with no contributions at all which are nonetheless relevant for some pension
benefits. These include, for example, long-term sickness or unemployment spells,
the months when disability pensions were received,4 some allowance for advanced
education, and the like. The adjustment factor AFi scales down benefits in the case
of early retirement after the 1992 reform. For our purposes it also serves to capture
a type of minimum pension benefit for low earnings (Mindestentgeltpunkte bei
geringem Arbeitsentgelt) that took place before 1992.
Individual pension payments are obtained directly from EPpersi by multiplica-
tion with the current pension value that is common for all pensioners. In 2002
it was 25.86 Euro for EPpersi earned in the FRG and 22.97 Euro for those EP
pers
i
earned in the GDR. Hence some 50 EPpers translate into a monthly gross pension
payment of 1293.00 Euro (1148.50 Euro) in the West (East). The current pension
value is adjusted annually according to complex procedures, this does not impact
upon our analysis. We only need the fact that EPCP and EPpers remain constant
once an individual receives an old-age pension. For EPpers there are some minor
qualifications to this, for example due to divorce or moving abroad. Since we
only include pensioners living in Germany (see Section 2.2.2), the latter does not
impact upon our analysis and we treat the former as negligible.5
We prefer EPCP as a measure of lifetime earnings because EPpers contains
too many items that have nothing to do with lifetime earnings but rather reflect
social policy measures. For cohorts born after 1928 we can compare both mea-
sures. Correlations are very high with ρ ' 0.95. We present the results of a
comparative analysis of mortality experiences based on both different measures
in Section 2.3.2. Our results show that the distinction is not all too important in
terms of describing the mortality experience by earnings group for ages 65 to 73.
For the calculation of life expectancies we also need the mortality experience of
older cohorts. Hence we extrapolate the similarity result and interpret EPpers as
lifetime earnings although there is larger error inherent to it. The nice feature of
these variable is that they give us a measure of long-run earnings. This is a much
nicer measure for socio-economic status than current income typically recorded
in surveys. The latter is often blurred by transitory fluctuations which are sur-
prisingly high at first glance. These may lead to serious biases as documented
in Haider and Solon (2006). Our discounted sum of lifetime earnings misses out
on some things typically included in the income definition (for example bequests,
capital income or transfers). Bearing the incompleteness in mind, we use lifetime
earnings and lifetime income as synonyms in the remainder of the paper. Another
4 Legislature on disability pensions has been subject to several changes over the years. They
are paid until age 65 and their recipients continue to accumulate earnings points. Upon passing
age 65, the disabled are treated like everybody else.
5 Calculations based on the “Versorgungsausgleichstatistik" show that changes in EPpers due to
divorce affect only 2.6% of the cases in our sample.
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large advantage of the measure is that it remains valid for retired persons – using
broader measures may lead to biases due to differences in savings behaviour at
earlier stages of the life-cycle.
This description of the pension system has focused on the FRG until 1990 and
the reunified Germany thereafter. In the GDR there was a somewhat different sys-
tem at work. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed description
but we note that accumulated earnings points are comparable in the sense that the
ones from the GDR are also based on the length of the work life and the position
in the annual earnings distribution. A detailed description of how pension entitle-
ments were transferred is contained in Stephan (1999). It is safe to say that the
amount of income needed to gain one earnings point in the GDR had much less
buying power than in the FRG. On the other hand, the pension income following
from GDR earnings points is only 13% less than the one stemming from FRG
earnings points. Hence the relative position in the earnings distribution and pen-
sion income streams are comparable while economic status during the working
life is not.
Let us close this section with a brief illustration of the monthly pensionable
income necessary to accumulate a certain amount of earnings points. In 2002,
the monthly gross wage that yielded one EPpers was about 2,400 Euro. For sim-
plicity, assume that this number remains constant over an individual’s working
life. Hence, to accumulate 50 EPpers, a person with this wage would have to work
50 years. If average earnings over the life-cycle were 3,000 Euro, 40 full years of
contribution would be sufficient to accumulate the same amount of EPpers.
2.2.2 Description of the Dataset
The administration of the German public pension system is marked by a vari-
ety of statutory bodies. Traditionally, there have been regional pension insur-
ance institutes for workers, a federal institute for salaried employees, and three
profession-specific institutes. Except for miners, legal regulations have been the
same since 1949, however. All pension insurance institutes are required by law
to report statistics of all pensioners as of the end of each year as well as statistics
of those pensioners who died during that year to their umbrella association.6 We
have access to this data.7 Because only selective characteristics of the original
6 This used to be the Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger (VDR). After a major or-
ganisational reform that took effect on 1st October 2005, its duties are fulfilled by the Deutsche
Rentenversicherung Bund, the federal pensions institute.
7 Traditionally, only aggregate statistics were published. This has changed since the beginning
of 2004 with the creation of the Research Data Centre of the Public Pension Insurance. Information
about datasets and access procedures can be found at http://www.fdz-rv.de. The process of data
collection is described in Rehfeld (2001)
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administrative records enter our dataset, some important remarks about structure
and peculiarities of the data are in order.
For one thing, there is no way to link members of the same household. Ideally,
we would want to use lifetime household income as a relevant measure to correlate
with mortality. Because of the low female labour force participation in the cohorts
relevant to our analysis, we exclude them from the analysis. It is simply unclear
what the household income position of women with low EPCP is because of the
dominance of male earnings in total household income.
For all individuals in our dataset, we have the year and month of their birth
available. We only use individuals born in 1936 and earlier because of possible
health and income differentials in early retirement. Put differently, if we were to
use younger pensioners, most likely we would not have a random sample avail-
able. A further demographic variable is the place of residence in three categories
(eastern Germany, western Germany, foreign). We exclude people with foreign
domicile (2.3%) in order to work with a subset of those recorded in official popu-
lation statistics. Including them did not cause any visible differences in the mor-
tality estimates. The data contain all deaths in 2002, these are recorded on a
monthly level. The Appendix contains descriptive statistics for the entire sample
in Table 2.2. Those restricted to pensioners born after 1928 are listed in Table 2.3.
In terms of variables related to pension payments, the two most important
ones are those described in the last section. Note that EPpers is on average about
3.1 points (6.6 percent) higher than EPCP in columns 1 and 5 of Table 2.3. We
also have the corresponding variables with respect to the length of being in-
sured. These are pension-relevant insurance periods (IPPR) and contribution pe-
riods (CP). The former are comprised of the latter and non-contributory periods
eligible for pension benefits (for examples see Section 2.2.1). Last, we use in-
formation on the type of health insurance coverage. Employees are mandatorily
covered in the public mutual funds system up to an earnings threshold that was
75% of the maximum pensionable earnings until 2003. Individuals above that
threshold, the self-employed and civil servants can either insure voluntarily in the
system or opt out to join a private insurance company. A small subgroup of pen-
sioners in our sample is insured under foreign law, these persons usually worked in
Germany only for short periods of time. The arrangement of the last employment
spell usually carries over to retirement. We can identify the three groups (manda-
torily insured / voluntarily or privately insured / insured under foreign law) in our
data.
The reason why this becomes important lies in work biographies that are not
confined to a single system of pension insurance. As an example, take somebody
who is employed for ten years and then becomes a civil servant for the rest of his
working life. If we used EPCP as a measure of his lifetime earnings, we would
make a huge error because he had large earnings outside the system. The health
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insurance variable as well as the length of pension insurance periods enable us
to (partially) control for such cases. This is why we estimate life expectancies
for four different subgroups of the population: All pensioners (“All"), individu-
als mandatorily insured within the public health insurance scheme (“HI" ), those
with more than 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods (“25Y"), both the
“HI" and “25Y" restrictions imposed (“HI25Y"). These make up the remaining
columns of Tables 2.1 to 2.3. Looking at the population coverage in Table 2.1, it
becomes clear that it drops to two thirds in the West if both restrictions are active.
The decline is particularly sharp at older ages because the differential mortality
effect is reinforced (see below in Section 2.3.1) and because there are more miss-
ing values at old ages. The only variable that is completely available is EPpers
because it is central for the pension payment. In conversations with statisticians
at the Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, we tried to evaluate the influence of
systematic effects on missing values. Except for the cases that we mention, there
is no reason to expect a missing at random assumption to be violated. In the East
the picture is much nicer again with coverage rates above ninety percent except
for the very old ages.
There are three more variables available that we do not consider in the pre-
sentation of differential mortality by lifetime earnings for clarity reasons. These
are citizenship in two categories (German/non-German), whether a pension enti-
tlement for repatriates forms part of the total pension, and whether EPpers includes
a scaling-up of raw earnings points because of low earnings before 1992 (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2.1). Confining our analysis to Germans that do not fall into either of the
last two categories did not substantially alter any results, tables and graphs are
available from the authors upon request.
2.3 Results
Our analysis is motivated by time series evidence of rising per-capita pension pay-
ments over time within cohorts. Net of changes to the current pension value (see
Section 2.2.1 for details), this can only be due to changes in cohort composition.
Once everybody is retired, differential mortality is the sole reason for this phe-
nomenon to occur, i.e. persons with less than average EPpers are dying relatively
more frequently than those with higher earnings points. Shedding more light on
this relationship by means of period life tables is the purpose of this chapter. Ide-
ally, we would prefer a cohort analysis in the spirit of this motivation. Given the
structure of the administrative records, however, there is no straightforward way
to follow cohorts over time and we confine our analysis to all cohorts in 2002. We
present our results in three parts. First, we look at the mortality experience of all
German pensioners by means of remaining life expectancy at age 65 (e65) and an-
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nual mortality rates. We compare the two earnings points measures in the second
part of the chapter. Because of data availability, the best we can do is to consider
the probability of reaching age 74, conditional on reaching age 65. Finally, we
contrast the mortality experience of persons living in the former GDR with those
residing in the western part of Germany.
Throughout the analysis, we divide the sample into eleven equally spaced
groups of earnings points. We then present statistics for each of these. Due to
the extremely large sample size, we can afford the luxury of not recurring to any
parametric assumptions in calculating mortality rates. Life tables are based on the
classic Chiang (1984) formulas, confidence intervals are calculated via a bootstrap
procedure with 1000 replications.8
2.3.1 Remaining Life Expectancy at Age 65 by EPpers
First consider the light bars in Figure 2.1. These depict e65 for the full sample
of pensioners that we use. Overall remaining life expectancy is at 15.74 years,
we postpone a comparison to estimates for the general population until the end of
this section. The mortality estimates by earnings points group range from 14.35
years (35-39 EPpers) to 18.65 years (70-74 EPpers). Between these two extremes,
life expectancy appears to rise roughly linearly over the groups. All differences
among them are statistically significant at any typical confidence level.
The most striking finding at this very first glance is that the minimum life ex-
pectancy is reached close to the middle of the table and not in the lowest income
group. At the bottom of the distribution, e65 is up to more than fifteen years again.
This is quite contrary to overwhelming international evidence which indicates a
monotone and positive relationship between income and life expectancy. Typi-
cally, the gradient found to be steepest in the lower tail (see for example Attanasio
and Hoynes (2000)). However, there is a plausible reason at hand. As explained
in the last section, we expect a very heterogeneous group at the lower end of the
distribution because of persons who were covered by the pension system only dur-
ing parts of their working life. These are typically well-earning academics who
would be at the right tail of the distribution if we were to observe their full earn-
ings history. To take a colourful example, we would expect to find production line
workers next to their company’s CEO in these groups.
A way to shed light on this issue is to exclude those for whom lifetime earnings
are not observed very well. We try to do so by selecting only those who are
mandatorily enrolled in the public mutual funds health insurance system or those
who spent at least 25 years in the system. The dark bars in Figure 2.1 indicate the
8 We are very grateful to Evgueni Andreev for sharing his VBA code for bootstrapping life-
tables.
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Fig. 2.1: Remaining Life Expectancy at Age 65 in years by EPpers
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Note: Comparison of all pensioners with the respective amount of EPpers
and those who are mandatorily insured in the public health insurance
scheme with at least 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods
(HI25Y). The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
results if we impose both restrictions. For brevity reasons we do not present the
results if selection is based upon one criterion only. Again the tables are available
upon request.
To begin with, note that overall remaining life expectancy drops substantially
by more than half a year. Hence the fourteen percent that we excluded from
the original sample must have a much higher life expectancy than the remaining
selection. While it rises slightly in the top two earnings points categories, it drops
significantly in all other subgroups. The decline is particularly pronounced in the
lowest income categories. Minimum e65 is now 13.31 years for those with 25-29
EPpers, the slight rise for the lowest income category is only borderline significant.
We suspect this differential drop to be a combination of two effects. On the one
hand, the relative size of the sample that is excluded is much higher at lower
earnings points levels (57% in the lowest category as compared to less than 10%
in the top seven classes, see Figure 2.2). On the other hand, if the excluded group
is relatively homogeneous, the differential in e65 is largest in the lower categories
under the hypothesis of a monotonic relationship between income and mortality.
We presume that this control is far from being perfect, hence we only have a
lower bound for the mortality differential. This argument is reinforced through
the right censoring of annual EPpersit – neither can we clearly identify the top nor
the bottom earners. Note that somebody in the lowest mortality group of 30-
34 EPpers still would have worked 40 years at 3/4 of average wage. If somebody
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Fig. 2.2: The distribution of EPpers by Sample Selection
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Note: “All" includes all available observations, “HI25Y" incorporates
only those mandatorily enrolled in the public health insurance scheme
with at least 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods.
was living on social assistance most of the time, he would not even enter our
dataset. However, even this lower bound on differences in life expectancy is quite
substantial. Taking the results from the “HI25Y" selection and the unconditional
e65 as a starting point, persons in the highest income group can expect to live
25 percent longer. On the other hand, if only 25-29 EPpers were accumulated, it is
12 percent less.
Looking back at the precise relationship between earnings points and life ex-
pectancy, we find that it rises almost linearly from the group with 35-39 EPpers to
the one with 60-64 EPpers. This is the region where neither top-coding nor earn-
ings outside the pension system should be a major cause of measurement error. It
is difficult to compare this linearity finding to other studies (see also Section 2.3.4)
since all those that we are aware of either use quantiles of the income/earnings dis-
tribution or impose some functional form on the data. While the linear relationship
certainly does not extrapolate to larger incomes 9 this finding shows the need to
allow for flexible functional forms which accommodate (near) linearity on parts
of the distribution.
Our results compare quite well with all-population mortality. Official statistics
indicate a remaining life expectancy at age 65 for German males in 2002 of 16.08
9 To see this note that if we extrapolated our results one would need to observe e65 = 54 years
for persons who enjoyed a monthly income of 28,000 Euro over a period of 30 years. Clearly, the
relationship has to level off at some point.
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years (HMD 2006) This is about 4 months higher than our estimates for the full
sample indicate. In terms of socio-economic status and mortality experience, most
of the persons not covered in our data should be roughly comparable to those in
that were excluded when we imposed the “HI25Y" restriction. Simplifying the
matter a bit, the main difference between them is that one group worked for a few
years in a job that covered them in the public pension system and then changed
to another one; the other group started in such another job already. Following
this argument we did expect a qualitatively similar rise in life expectancy if we
move from “All" to the full population as the one that we see when moving from
“HI25Y" to “All".
Finally, Figure 2.3 shows mortality rates for selected income groups under
the “HI25Y" restriction. They were calculated separately for each one-year age
band. The most salient feature of the graph is that their shape is very similar, they
seem to differ by little more than a parallel shift.10 Confidence bands for each
age are not shown in order to keep the graphs readable. Until age 74, all three
are statistically different from each other at the 95%-level. Mortality rates in the
highest income group are significantly lower than the other two even until age 88.
2.3.2 Mortality by EPpers and EPCP
The purpose of this section is to contrast the two different measures of lifetime
earnings for those persons where both are available. These are the cohorts born
1929 and later because most of them did not retire before 1992. Remaining life
expectancy is not a suitable summary statistic anymore because we do not have
any information on old-age mortality conditional on EPCP. As an alternative, we
chose the probability of reaching age 74 (this is the highest we can do) conditional
on reaching age 65 (P65{74}). Results are shown in Figure 2.4. The light bars
depict P65{74} conditional on EPpers, the dark ones show the corresponding values
based on EPCP.
Overall probabilities are identical at 76.4 percent because we use the same
sample in both cases. In the case of EPpers, we find very much the same pattern as
for life expectancy in the last section. There is a linear decline from the highest
income class to those persons with 35-39 EPpers which then levels out and rises
again at the very bottom. The dark bars look quite similar, but there are some
important differences. On the one hand, probabilities are slightly higher for all
groups with more than 35 EPCP. However, the decline does not level out at this
point but continues linearly to the very lowest group. Based on this measure, 65-
10 It is certainly much closer to a parallel shift in mortality than to a parallel shift in log mor-
tality (figures are available from the authors upon request), especially in the younger age groups
where the data is most reliable. The latter is the parametric assumption inherent in, for example,
proportional hazard models. We would like to thank one of our referees for pointing this out to us.
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Fig. 2.3: Mortality Rate by EPpers
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Note: Only the persons mandatorily enrolled in the public health insur-
ance scheme with at least 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods
are included in the analysis (selection HI25Y).
Fig. 2.4: Probability of Reaching Age 74 at Age 65 by EPpers
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95% confidence intervals.
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year-old individuals in the highest earnings class have a ninety percent probability
of reaching age 74. Less than two thirds in the bottom category survive to this age.
Our conclusions from this exercise are twofold. On the one hand, it does not
matter much whether one uses EPpers or EPCP if one is interested in the mortality
experience for individuals with at least 35 EPpers. Our summary statistics differ by
not much more than a constant that is mostly explained by the average differential
of 3 points between the two measures (see the first two rows of Table 2.3). On the
other hand, the choice of variable does matter in lower categories. By using EPCP
as a measure of lifetime earnings, we can reproduce the monotonic relationship to
mortality that is documented in international studies.
In the course of the analysis of this chapter we also checked whether dif-
ferences exist if we condition on actual contribution periods (CP) rather than
pension-relevant insurance periods (IPPR). One might have expected analogous
differences as in the case of the two earnings measures. However, none such dif-
ferences became apparent which is why we do not include a graph on that point.
2.3.3 Life Expectancy at Age 65 by EPpers and Place of Residence
In this section, we compare the mortality experience of people living in the former
socialist part of Germany with those living in western Germany. This is particu-
larly interesting to look at because of the very different biographies of people liv-
ing in either part.11 One could expect several things to happen in the eastern part.
There could be a long-run effect of the more equal distribution of socio-economic
status during the socialist era, resulting in smaller mortality differentials. The
opposite story might read that the sharp transformation in the early 1990s led to
higher inequality than in the West. Finally, one could imagine relatively quick
adaption to the new institutional arrangement, hence a picture that parallels that
in the West.
Naturally, the first thing to evaluate is e65 not stratified by income. We find
it to be 15.83 years in the West and 15.41 years in the East. The difference is
statistically significant at any common confidence level. This compares to full-
population estimates from official statistics of 16.19 years and 15.39 years, respec-
tively. In the West we have the effect described above: The 23% of the population
not included in our sample tend to have a lower mortality than the pensioners. On
the other hand, the 94% coverage in the East leads to almost identical estimates of
all-population mortality, so we are very confident to have a complete depiction of
the full population there. Our findings are consistent with the converging mortal-
ity experiences in the East and in the West that have been documented by several
11 In our interpretations of this section, we neglect migration between the two regions. People
in our sample were at least 53 years old at the time of reunification, so we do not expect any
substantial migration movements that would blur our results
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Fig. 2.5: Remaining Life Expectancy at Age 65 in years by Place of Residence and EPpers
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 overall
Earnings Points
Y e
a r
s
    West
    East
Note: Only the persons mandatorily insured in the public health insurance
scheme with at least 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods are
included in the analysis (selection HI25Y). The vertical bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
authors (cf. for example Nolte, Shkolnikov, and McKee (2000)).
Again, the main analysis concerns the comparison of life expectancy by in-
come group. As in the previous sections, we select upon mandatory enrollment in
the public mutual funds health care system and 25 years of coverage in the pension
system. The reason not to consider all-pensioner mortality here is that groups are
more comparable in the restricted sample. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, we ex-
pect much more heterogeneity in terms of earnings outside the system in the West
than in the East, particularly in the lowest categories. This is because in the former
GDR, virtually everybody was insured in the system. Hence we would obtain a
stronger bias within income classes if we did not impose the restrictions. The rea-
son is the larger heterogeneity with respect to socio-economic status in the West.
The restriction of the sample makes the analysis within categories more meaning-
ful, but a comparison of the unconditional life expectancies does not make much
sense. This becomes clear from the rightmost bars in Figure 2.5. While e65 does
not change for pensioners in the east of Germany, imposing the restriction leads
to a drop in remaining life expectancy to 15.14 years in the West. This reversal is
due to the fact that we excluded a large group of men with high socio-economic
status in the West and only few persons in the East.
Comparing the graphs for both regions in Figure 2.5, it becomes apparent that
no difference between them can be asserted for groups with more than 40 EPpers.
In all groups below that level, life expectancy in the West emerges larger than in
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Fig. 2.6: The distribution of EPpers by Place of Residence
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Note: Only the persons mandatorily insured in the public health insurance
scheme with at least 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods are
included in the analysis (selection HI25Y).
the East. Most notably, we find a close to strongly monotone relationship between
income and life expectancy in the East (the rise in the bottom group is not de-
tectable in a statistical sense for either region). In the lowest two groups in the
East, e65 is only around eleven years, eight years less than at the top of the dis-
tribution. We do not take this as evidence for more inequality in the East. It is
more likely that our selection procedure still does not enable us to pinpoint people
with low socio-economic status in the West, just as the analysis from Section 2.3.2
suggests. The higher life expectancy in the East for this particular selection arises
because the distribution of earnings points is shifted to the right as compared to
western Germany under the HI25Y selection, see Figure 2.6. In other words,
there are relatively more people in the higher income classes with a longer life
expectancy.
This analysis sheds a new light on previous findings from the epidemiolog-
ical literature. Several authors reported a larger predictive power of income for
health measures in the West than in the East (Mielck, Cavelaars, Helmert, Martin,
Winkelhake, and Kunst (2000), Nolte and McKee (2004)). Our results suggest
this to be a consequence of measurement error, unless the link between morbid-
ity and mortality works differently between both parts of Germany. The relevant
income concept as a marker for socio-economic status is a long-run measure, the
surveys employed in the cited studies contain a current income variable. Tran-
sitory fluctuations, for example due to high unemployment in the East, may well
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impact strongly upon the analysis. Here we conclude that inequalities with respect
to pension income have the same magnitude in the East as they do in the West.
A second thing to note is the striking similarity of the results in the income
classes from 40 EPpers on upwards. This is somewhat surprising given that bi-
ographies have been quite different. One part lived for forty years in a socialist
country with severely restricted civil rights, comparatively small wage differen-
tials, high job security, an economy with a large amount of goods rationing, etc.
People on the other side of the wall experienced much higher wage differentials,
somewhat lower job security, a market economy, and quite well protected civil
rights. Only from 1990 on – the cohorts in our analysis were already at least
53 years old – institutional arrangements started to converge, although large dif-
ferences remain, for example on labour markets. In the light of the observed
convergence in total mortality (Nolte, Shkolnikov, and McKee 2000), we note
that this convergence appears to be nearly perfect conditional on our measure of
socio-economic status. A natural interpretation of this would be an income effect:
Reunification brought about much higher real incomes for pensioners and twelve
years were enough to wipe out any lagged effects. Differences in total mortality
continue to exist only because of the composition effects – in the West there are
relatively more persons with a high socio-economic status. Note that it does not
follow from this that redistribution would lead to equal mortality experiences –
higher pension income in our case is also indicative of a higher ranking in the rel-
ative income distribution in the GDR/FRG. The parameters that give rise to this
ranking are very likely to be related to mortality, both directly and through inter-
action effects with income. Examples include education, intelligence, social skills
and networks, or genetics. However – if interpreted in this fashion – our results
suggest that redistribution would lead to a convergence in mortality experiences
among socio-economic groups, the extent of this remains unclear.
2.3.4 International Comparisons
In this section, we place our results in the context of the literature on differential
mortality. Closest in terms of regional proximity and research question is certainly
Reil-Held (2000). She uses survey panel data and finds a life expectancy (e37)
differential of 10 years between the top and the bottom quartile of the income
distribution, employing a somewhat broader household income variable that is
averaged across time. This is in the bivariate analysis that is comparable to our
approach. Confidence intervals are not reported due to small sample sizes. We
obtained her raw data and compared the estimates of e65. Her findings suggest
some 17.8 years for the top income quartile and 10.1 years for the bottom one.
The slightly lower value for the top quartile may be explained by the earlier time
period (she considered deaths in the 1984-1997 period). The much lower value for
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the bottom quartile is most likely due to our not very meaningful income data for
that population segment. Taken together, the numbers compare very well and our
claim to have identified a lower bound of 6 years on the life expectancy difference
from the bottom to the top is reinforced by her findings of a 7.7 year differential.
Expanding the region under consideration and the variables measuring socio-
economic status, the study by Huisman, Kunst, Andersen, Bopp, Borgan, Bor-
rell, Costa, Deboosere, Desplanques, Donkin, Gadeyne, Minder, Regidor, Spadea,
Valkonen, and Mackenbach (2004) serves well to place our results in a European
context. They analyse differential mortality by education and housing tenure and
find results that are quite similar to ours in qualitative terms. Throughout the
eleven countries included in their study, relative mortality risks declined in age,
but absolute mortality differences remained constant or increased until old age.
This is exactly what we find from Figure 2.3. It is impossible to compare numbers
because of the differences in covariates, furthermore the authors do not report life
expectancies. Doblhammer, Rau, and Kytir (2005) compare mortality by occu-
pational and educational group in Austria and also find large differences. Again,
they report relative mortality risks and quantities are not easily compared.
Further corroborative evidence for our findings comes from the US – Deaton
and Paxson (2004) report e25 to be about 10 years lower for members of families
with an annual income of less than $5,000 as compared to those earning more
than $50,000. Findings from Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) suggest that the gradi-
ent linking income and mortality is steepest at the bottom of the distribution. Since
there is no reason to expect this finding to reverse in Germany, this is supportive
of our view that we cannot identify people at the lower end of the distribution
very well and mortality conditional on correctly measured income would be much
higher. Finally, turning back to Europe, Attanasio and Emmerson (2003) show
that the position in the wealth ranking has a large impact on survival probabilities
in the UK. Palme and Sandgren (2004) are able to construct a measure of lifetime
income for a cohort born in 1928 in the city of Malmö, Sweden. They find this
variable to be only marginally significant in the case of prime-age mortality. How-
ever, their sample size is rather small and they conduct their analyses conditional
on parental income. Overall, we conclude that our findings for Germany fit in
very well with the existing literature on socio-economic status and mortality.
2.4 Conclusions
We found large differentials in remaining life expectancy at age 65 across classes
of lifetime earnings in Germany. In our case, lifetime earnings are directly tied
to pension income flows. Due to the nature of the data, we were only able to
put a lower bound of six years on the difference from the lowest to the highest
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income group. Over the parts of the income distribution that we measure well, life
expectancy rises linearly in earnings. Since we employed entirely nonparametric
methods, this is not an artefact of any assumed functional form. However, the
finding certainly does not extrapolate to the tails of the earnings distribution where
our observations lack precision.
Comparing the former GDR with the rest of Germany, we found virtually no
differences in life expectancy within income groups, except for the lowest groups.
However, the latter seems to be due to peculiarities of our data. Hence, any ag-
gregate difference in life expectancy is likely owed to composition effects. This
finding is quite remarkable because of the very different institutional design peo-
ple in either part were faced with during the prime ages of their working life.
Inequality in life expectancy appears to be equal in both parts.
What do we learn from these results? For one thing, there is a very sizeable
effect, even among the elderly, waiting to be explained. Which of the three chan-
nels mentioned in the introduction is responsible for how much of the differential?
Economic analyses suggest that in the socio-economic status to health causation,
income is not likely to play a large role (compare, for example, Adams, Hurd,
McFadden, Merrill, and Ribeiro (2003), Meer, Miller, and Rosen (2003), or Smith
(2004)). Another finding that deserves further illumination is the similarity of life
expectancy in the East and in the West conditional on lifetime earnings. Finally,
an interesting research question lies in the temporal changes of mortality. How
was the gain in life expectancy over the last ten years distributed over different
subgroups of the population? Did the poor or the rich gain more or was it evenly
distributed? Is this trend likely to continue? Answers to these questions have a
large impact on pension finance, the organisation of nursing home care, and many
other important policy questions.
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2.5 Tables
Tab. 2.1: Sample Size and Coverage of the General Population by Cohort
Birthyear West East
All HI 25y HI25y All HI 25y HI25y
before 1902 494 396 355 283 154 130 151 127
(64%) (51%) (46%) (37%) (96%) (81%) (94%) (79%)
1902 - 1906 7,425 6,649 5,691 5,202 2,307 2,115 2,267 2,082
(60%) (54%) (46%) (42%) (98%) (90%) (96%) (88%)
1907 - 1911 52,680 48,448 43,557 41,152 13,874 13,339 13,795 13,269
(61%) (56%) (50%) (48%) (95%) (91%) (94%) (91%)
1912 - 1916 152,514 135,688 126,505 116,739 35,139 34,281 34,987 34,158
(71%) (63%) (59%) (54%) (96%) (93%) (95%) (93%)
1917 - 1921 321,267 288,243 268,837 247,470 73,661 72,450 73,381 72,216
(76%) (68%) (64%) (59%) (92%) (90%) (92%) (90%)
1922 - 1926 629,208 579,373 532,667 498,207 141,318 139,044 140,761 138,571
(76%) (70%) (64%) (60%) (91%) (89%) (90%) (89%)
1927 - 1931 1,015,922 931,499 927,315 855,694 272,274 265,174 271,711 264,689
(79%) (72%) (72%) (66%) (93%) (91%) (93%) (91%)
1932 - 1936 1,301,622 1,155,290 1,273,053 1,140,150 393,716 372,431 393,438 372,273
(78%) (69%) (76%) (68%) (97%) (92%) (97%) (92%)
Total 3,481,132 3,145,586 3,177,980 2,904,897 932,443 898,964 930,491 897,385
(77%) (70%) (70%) (64%) (94%) (91%) (94%) (91%)
Note: Sample Size as number of pensioners, coverage of the general population in parentheses. “All" includes all pen-
sioners in the respective age range with more than 20 EPpers. “HI" restricts the sample to individuals who are furthermore
mandatorily insured within the public health insurance scheme. “25Y" considers only pensioners with more than 20 EPpers
and more than 25 years of pension-relevant insurance periods. “HI25Y" imposes both the “HI" and “25Y" restrictions.
Source: DRV (2005), HMD (2006), own calculations.
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Tab. 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for all Individuals
Variable West East
All HI 25y HI25y All HI 25y HI25y
EPpers 47.9 48.7 48.7 49.2 52.0 52.2 52.0 52.2
(12.8) (12.2) (12.4) (11.9) (10.6) (10.5) (10.6) (10.4)
IPPR 39.0 39.5 42.3 42.5 44.1 44.2 44.2 44.3
(11.4) (11.3) (4.4) (4.1) (2.7) (2.6) (2.0) (1.9)
HI=1 0.904 1.000 0.914 1.000 0.964 1.000 0.964 1.000
HI=2 0.092 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.034 0.000
HI=3 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
GERMAN 0.968 0.969 0.972 0.973 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
MIN PENS 0.043 0.041 0.046 0.045 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.015
DEAD 0.051 0.053 0.053 0.055 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051
Note: Mean of variables, standard errors in parentheses where appropriate. “HI=1,2,3:" Health in-
surance coverage by: mandatory public mutual funds, voluntary mutual funds or private insurance
company, insurance under foreign law. “GERMAN" shows the fraction of pensioners with Ger-
man citizenship, “MIN PENS" the fraction entitled for a scaling-up of EPCP due to low earnings
before 1992, and “DEAD" the fraction that died during 2002.
“All" includes all pensioners in the respective age range with more than 20 EPpers. “HI" restricts
the sample to individuals who are furthermore mandatorily insured within the public health insur-
ance scheme. “25Y" considers only pensioners with more than 20 EPpers and more than 25 years
of pension-relevant insurance periods. “HI25Y" imposes both the “HI" and “25Y" restrictions.
Source: DRV (2005), own calculations.
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Tab. 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Individuals born after 1928
Variable West East
All HI 25y HI25y All HI 25y HI25y
EPpers 47.6 48.3 48.1 48.6 50.9 51.1 50.9 51.1
(12.6) (11.9) (12.2) (11.7) (10.3) (10.1) (10.3) (10.1)
EPCP 44.9 45.6 45.6 46.0 47.4 47.4 47.4 47.5
(12.9) (12.3) (12.6) (12.1) (9.8) (9.6) (9.8) (9.6)
IPPR 41.0 41.4 42.4 42.6 44.0 44.1 44.1 44.1
(8.0) (7.8) (4.3) (4.0) (2.4) (2.2) (2.1) (2.0)
CP 37.8 38.3 38.4 38.7 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
(7.6) (7.2) (6.9) (6.8) (6.9) (6.8) (6.8) (6.8)
HI=1 0.896 1.000 0.903 1.000 0.953 1.000 0.954 1.000
HI=2 0.099 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.044 0.000
HI=3 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
GERMAN 0.956 0.957 0.962 0.963 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
MIN PENS 0.038 0.036 0.039 0.037 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.018
DEAD 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
Note: Mean of variables, standard errors in parentheses where appropriate. “HI=1,2,3:" Health in-
surance coverage by: mandatory public mutual funds, voluntary mutual funds or private insurance
company, insurance under foreign law. “GERMAN" shows the fraction of pensioners with Ger-
man citizenship, “MIN PENS" the fraction entitled for a scaling-up of EPCP due to low earnings
before 1992, and “DEAD" the fraction that died during 2002.
“All" includes all pensioners in the respective age range with more than 20 EPpers. “HI" restricts
the sample to individuals who are furthermore mandatorily insured within the public health insur-
ance scheme. “25Y" considers only pensioners with more than 20 EPpers and more than 25 years
of pension-relevant insurance periods. “HI25Y" imposes both the “HI" and “25Y" restrictions.
Source: DRV (2005), own calculations.
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3.1 Introduction
One of the most striking and frequently studied correlations observed in individ-
ual level data, is that between measures of income or socio-economic status and
measures of health. Data from all over the world, collected in many different
years, consistently show that those with greater levels of economic resources have
better health. Consequently, an extensive and continually evolving literature has
concerned itself with the precise nature of the relationship between income and
health and in particular the direction and magnitude of causal links between the
two.
Interpretations of the origin of the health-income gradient require researchers
to deal with a classic simultaneity issue. Three broad channels of causality can
be imagined. Epidemiologists stress the importance of causality from income to
health (Marmot 1999). Economists have often tried to quantify the reverse di-
rection going from poor health to impaired current and future earnings capacity
(Smith 2004). A third explanation is that there are one or more underlying fac-
tors determining both income and health. Among many potential candidates are
genetics, ability/intelligence and other background or early life factors such as
parental income (Case, Lubotsky, and Paxson (2002), Dehejia and Lleras Muney
(2004) or van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Portrait (2006)) or education (Lleras
Muney 2005).
In this paper, we focus on the effect of income shocks on health over the life-
cycle. First, we specify an individual dynamic model of both income and health
which allows us to decompose health and income shocks into transitory and per-
manent ones. We also allow for a non-linear relationship between income and
health at individual level. Second, we aggregate and estimate this model, using
synthetic cohorts followed for up to twenty-five years, which covers a substantial
part of the life-cycle. Third, we estimate the effect of permanent shocks to income
on a number of health outcomes including subjective and objective measures, as
well as health behaviour and mortality.
We use a synthetic cohort methodology for two reasons. First, by using it
we aggregate out individual level variation, allowing us to focus on exogenous
changes in income at the cohort level. In many countries, including the UK,
there have been important changes in the income structure over time (Buchin-
sky (1994) or Gosling, Machin, and Meghir (2000)). The causes appear to range
from changes in the return to education and experience due to skill-biased tech-
nology changes, declines in unionization and increased competition. Importantly,
however, these changes are not thought to be caused by changes in health and we
will use this as an exogeneity assumption to identify a causal effect of income
on health. In an individual level model it would be much harder to disentangle
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the effects in question. 1 In the spirit of robustness analysis we also investigate
briefly the results we would obtain under alternative identifying assumptions on
the strength of the effect of cohort health shocks on cohort incomes.
A second advantage of cohort data is that we can exploit a wealth of data with
detailed information on both income and many health outcomes because it allows
the combination of various datasets. This is particularly important in our analy-
sis because data on health and socio-economic variables typically have not been
recorded jointly. Longitudinal data sets have either good information on income
dynamics (e.g. the PSID in the US, or the BHPS in the UK) but no or very limited
information on health, or detailed health information but very limited information
on income or other socioeconomic variables. This has changed recently, but only
over the last decade, and mostly for data covering the elderly and near-elderly
population (e.g. the Health and Retirement Survey). Hence there are no long-T
panels currently available that facilitate the study of the joint dynamics of income
and health for the prime-aged population.
In our analysis we use techniques recently developed in the microeconometric
literature for modelling income processes and income uncertainty and apply them
to the question of identifying the effect of income shocks on subsequent health
outcomes. More precisely, we use the methods of Meghir and Pistaferri (2004),
who in turn build on the methods of Abowd and Card (1989), Gottschalk and
Moffitt (1994), Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini (2001), and Blundell, Pistaferri,
and Preston (2005) to identify the covariance of permanent income shocks with
changes in a series of health indicators. In this way we are able to extend the
Granger-causality type analysis, previously carried out for US individuals aged
over 70 (Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill, and Ribeiro 2003) and aged over 50
(Smith 2004), and apply it to a working age population in England. These previ-
ous studies found no effect of income shocks on subsequent health changes, once
one conditions on initial health and income. Differences in health care institu-
tions, between the UK and the US, and particularly the relative lack of private
provision in the UK, would hardly be expected to reverse such a result. The use
of a different age group, however, could lead to different findings than those of the
above studies, regardless of the country of study.
We show that different cohorts were affected by sizable permanent shocks to
income over that period, especially those with low education. We find, as in Ruhm
(2000), that these shocks have an impact on mortality. However, our results show
that these shocks are not transmitted to any of our other health measures, whether
we consider subjective ones (self-assessed health, longstanding illness) or objec-
1 Some attempts have been made using exogenous changes in income such as lottery gains
(Lindahl 2005), or “unexpected" inheritances (Meer, Miller, and Rosen 2003) as instruments al-
though these instruments apply only to subgroups of the population which may not necessarily be
representative.
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tive ones (high blood pressure, cardiovascular diseases, or respiratory diseases).
In contrast, we show that individuals change some of their behaviour such as total
expenditure as well as expenditures on tobacco and alcohol. Our interpretation
of these three findings is that risk behaviours do not seem to transmit directly
into mortality or morbidity for the prime-aged population. Procyclical mortality
is probably rather driven by work-related accidents and similar mechanisms, but
our results are not more than merely suggestive on this point.
Our analysis is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes our empirical strat-
egy by setting out the structural framework for the dynamics of income and health
processes, outlining our key identification assumptions and documenting our es-
timation methodology. Section 3.3 describes the various datasets that we draw
upon in order to carry out our analysis, and provides some simple summary statis-
tics. Section 3.4 presents our empirical results, first with reference to the effect of
income shocks on mortality and then with reference to a host of health indicators
and behaviour. The last part of that Section (3.4.6) contains a detailed compar-
ison of our approach to related ones found in the literature. Finally Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
In this section we describe our approach to modelling income and health as stochas-
tic processes that evolve over the life cycle. We then turn to our strategy to esti-
mate the relevant parameters. In either of the two areas, there exists substantial
previous work that we can build on. Starting with MaCurdy (1982), a large lit-
erature has emerged that models life-cycle income or earnings as stochastic pro-
cesses. In terms of methodology, Abowd and Card (1989) and especially Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004) are close to our approach. All these articles deal with in-
dividual panel data, applications to consumption with synthetic cohorts include
Blundell and Preston (1998) and Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini (2001).
Regarding the literature on the evolution of health, Smith (2004) gives an ex-
tensive overview of different specifications. Few authors have used pseudo panel
data in connection with health outcomes, a notable exception being a series of
papers by Deaton and Paxson (1998b, 2001, 2004). We provide a comparison of
our approach and results to theirs (and those of Ruhm (2000)) in Section 3.4.6.
We adopt the following notation throughout the analysis. ε and u denote transi-
tory shocks, ζ and v permanent shocks, xY income-related variables and xH health-
related variables. i/N denote an individual and the number of individuals respec-
tively, c/C are cohorts and the number of cohorts, t/T a time period (one year)
and the time dimension, a/A a particular age and the terminal age. L denotes the
lag-operator.
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3.2.1 Stochastic Process for Individual Income
We assume the following nonstationary process for the evolution of log household
income over the life-cycle:
Yit = Yi,t−1 + (1 − L)uYit + vYit(3.1)
The error terms are assumed to have the following structure:
uYit = ε
Y
ct + ξ1ε
H
ct + ε
Y
it + φ1ε
H
it(3.2)
vYit = ζ
Y
ct + ξ2ζ
H
ct + ζ
Y
it + φ2ζ
H
it(3.3)
We deliberately distinguish between cohort-wide shocks denoted by xYct and individual-
level shocks represented by xYit . Examples of the former include changes in the
returns to education, the latter may be promotions, bonuses or layoffs. Cohort and
individual health shocks are denoted by xHct and x
H
it respectively, with the impact
on income being determined by the coefficients ξ1, ξ2, φ1 and φ2. All our estima-
tion equations further include demographic terms which remain suppressed in this
section for ease of notation.
This set up is effectively a version of the stochastic process in Blundell and
Preston (1998) where individual health shocks are explicitly taken into account.
These authors also show how equation (3.1) can be derived from a decomposition
of income into a permanent and a transitory component. Essentially, permanent
shocks are represented by the ζ’s and transitory shocks are denoted by the ε’s. The
next section provides more discussion on the nature and role of these shocks.
In terms of generality, our specification fares well compared to the literature
on income and consumption. The only feature that we do not include is a moving
average component in the transitory errors as done in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)
or Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini (2001). Incorporating it would be straightfor-
ward, in particular it would not substantially alter any of our identification results
in Section 3.2.4. However, as indicated from our results in Section 3.4.1, our par-
simonious specification seems to be sufficient in order to capture the features of
the process at the cohort level for annual observations. With respect to the identi-
fication problem concerning cohort, age, and time effects, we assume the latter to
be zero although a time trend is captured by our empirical methodology. Results
reported in Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini (2001) show that shocks to cohort
income dominate any aggregate effects so that we do not view this assumption to
be problematic.
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3.2.2 Stochastic Process for Individual Health
For the purposes of this section, we treat health as a unidimensional stock variable.
To model its evolution over the life course, we use the process employed in Deaton
and Paxson (1998a) and augment it with an individual-specific age-trend mHia:
Hit = Hi,t−1 + mHia + (1 − L)uHit + vHit(3.4)
Again, we assume that the error terms can be broken down additively into several
components:
uHit = ε
H
it + ε
H
ct +
q∑
j=0
γ1 jε
Y
c,t− j +
q∑
j=0
ϑ1 jε
Y
i,t− j(3.5)
vHit = ζ
H
it + ζ
H
ct +
q+1∑
j=0
γ2 jζ
Y
c,t− j +
q+1∑
j=0
ϑ2 jζ
Y
i,t− j(3.6)
for some moving-average parameter q. The age trend mHia is included to capture
slow and steady biological processes such as cell-ageing or general wear and tear.
Examples of individual transitory health shocks εHit are broken bones or influenza,
which in most cases do not have important long-term effects. On the other hand
ζHit can be thought of as a permanent (incurable) shock like many cancers or AIDS.
Transitory cohort level shocks εHct could be highly infectious diseases whereas the
most important example for permanent innovations that affect entire cohorts ζHct
would be medical progress.
The income shocks described in the preceding section are allowed to have
a direct effect on health, but we impose the restriction that permanent shocks to
income influence health permanently and transitory shocks to income affect health
only in a transitory fashion. In this specification, transitory income shocks may
influence health in time periods t until t+q. Period-t permanent income shocks are
assumed to impact health not beyond period t + q + 1. In Section 3.4.3 we report
results for q = 0, 1, 2. Note that we impose the same restriction on the effects of
health on income while assuming that q = 0. 2
Note that we do not give (3.4) to (3.6) an interpretation that is structural in
the sense that all relevant decision parameters are incorporated in a model of
health production. We rather specify a model that is rich enough to incorporate the
most important conceivable causation channels and arrive at a causal interpreta-
tion through appropriate exclusion restrictions. This is different from the approach
taken in the consumption literature. For example, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
2 Note that we can allow for even more generality at the individual level. As long as it aggre-
gates out it doesn’t impact upon our analysis.
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(2005) derive a rather similar condition on the evolution of consumption from in-
tertemporal utility maximisation. A natural point of departure in our case would
have been a version of the classic model of health capital by Grossman (1972).
We do not employ such a model because research in epidemiology is richly sug-
gestive of mechanisms linking income changes to health outcomes over which
individuals have only limited control (for example through byproducts of physi-
ological stress markers). Put differently, we think that too little is known about
the causation channels running from income to health outcomes as to isolate and
parameterise the relevant ones a priori. As a consequence, we stick to the general
statistical modelling approach.
In our analysis we also focus on health behaviour. For these models we reinter-
pret Hit in equation (3.4) as a measure of expenditures or quantity of consumption
goods, such as fruits and vegetables, cigarettes and alcohol. In these cases, the
economic model of informed decision-making has received a widespread applica-
tion, as an example see the review of Chaloupka and Warner (2000) with respect
to smoking behaviour. Nevertheless we stick to our approach for coherency rea-
sons. The comments made in the last paragraph still apply: It is quite general and
we do not see any interesting causation channels that we miss. There is a qualifier
to this. It is well known that in our type of data it is not possible to control for
age, cohort, and time effects simultaneously. In our particular case, the exclusion
of time effects over and above a trend seems more justified in the case of health
outcomes than consumption goods. For example, a jump in the relative price of
cigarettes due to a tax increase may manifest itself as a shock that goes into the
same direction for all cohorts. The assumption of iid-shocks would be violated.
While we cannot make our inference strategy robust to this type of shocks, our
point estimates remain valid. Having said this, we note that relative prices of
cigarettes in the UK experienced a rather smooth upward trend over the period
under scrutiny (with the exception of two slight declines in the late seventies and
late eighties). All our estimates contain a full set of cohort dummies and a flexible
age trend which adequately capture such trends and since we are not interested
in interpreting either the age or cohort coefficients this seems sufficient for our
purposes.
3.2.3 Aggregation
We need some assumptions on the idiosyncratic shocks and the fixed effect before
we proceed to the cohort level. In particular we impose the restriction that their
mean depends on age only. This is equivalent to specifying an age-dependent
stochastic trend with zero mean of the errors. In addition to this, we assume all
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shocks to be independently and identically distributed. Accordingly, we have:
εYit ∼ iid
(
mY,Ta , σ
2
εY,i
)
ζYit ∼ iid
(
mY,Pa , σ
2
ζY,i
)
εYit ∼ iid
(
mH,Ta , σ
2
εH,i
)
ζHit ∼ iid
(
mH,Pa , σ
2
ζH,i
)
mHia ∼ iid
(
mH,FEa , σ
2
mH,i
)
where mT stands for constants associated with transitory shocks, mP for those
associated with permanent ones, and mH,FEa for the age trend of the individual-
level fixed effect. The i-superscripts on the variance terms indicate that they refer
to the respective individual-level parameters.
Aggregating (3.1) and (3.4) up for individuals within each cohort, c, leads to:
Yct = Yc,t−1 + (1 − L)(mY,Ta + φ1mH,Ta ) + mY,Pa + φ2mH,Pa(3.7)
+ζYct + ξ2ζ
H
ct + (1 − L)εYct + ξ1(1 − L)εHct + (1 − L)νYct
Hct = Hc,t−1 + mH,FEa + (1 − L)(mH,Ta + ϑ1mY,Ta ) + mH,Pa + ϑ2mY,Pa(3.8)
+
q+1∑
j=0
γ2 jζ
Y
c,t− j + ζ
H
ct +
q∑
j=0
γ1 j(1 − L)εYc,t− j + (1 − L)εHct + (1 − L)νHct
where νct represents cell variation as induced by summing up the stochastic terms.
It can also serve to incorporate classical measurement error (which was omitted
from equations (3.1) and (3.4) purely for ease of notation). Hence, both terms will
be iid with zero mean.
νYct ∼ iid
(
0, σ2
νY
)
νHct ∼ iid
(
0, σ2
νH
)
The transitory shocks to income and health at the cohort level may be correlated
across cohorts within periods. We only impose the standard assumption of no
correlation over time and an innocuous zero-mean condition.
εYct ∼
(
0, σ2
εY
)
εHct ∼
(
0, σ2
εH
)
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Turning to the permanent shocks, we assume them to be distributed according to:
ζYct ∼ iid
(
0, σ2
ζY
)
ζHct ∼ iid
(
0, σ2
ζH
)
where the zero mean assumption again is without loss of generality. Obviously
ζYct and ζ
H
ct need to be contemporaneously uncorrelated which does not seem to be
very restrictive with respect to health. Remember that the most important example
for cohort-level health shocks is probably medical progress which usually does not
affect all age groups in the same way. With respect to behaviour we refer to the
discussion in the concluding paragraph of the previous subsection.
In order to simplify (3.7) and (3.8), note that allm-terms including their coeffi-
cients are not separately identified. Thus they can be included in a single intercept
term that depends on age only:
mYa = (1 − L)(φ1mH,Ta + mY,Ta ) + φ2mH,Pa + mY,Pa
mHa = m
H,FE
a + (1 − L)( mH,Ta + ϑ1mY,Ta ) + mH,Pa + ϑ2mY,Pa
Hence we can rewrite (3.7) and (3.8) as:
Yct = Yc,t−1 + mYa(3.9)
+ζYct + ξ2ζ
H
ct + (1 − L)εYct + ξ1(1 − L)εHct + (1 − L)νYct
Hct = Hc,t−1 + mHa(3.10)
+
q+1∑
j=0
γ2 jζ
Y
c,t− j + ζ
H
ct +
q∑
j=0
γ1 j(1 − L)εYc,t− j + (1 − L)εHct + (1 − L)νHct
This is our basic system of equations which we use to identify permanent shocks to
income and to investigate the relation between them and various health variables.
3.2.4 Identification
Identification of the parameters in (3.9) and (3.10) closely traces the analysis in
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2005) once we
make the system triangular in terms of permanent shocks. To do this, our key
identifying assumption is that ξ2 = 0, i.e. that permanent cohort-level shocks to
health do not affect income (or are not present at all) and it merits some discussion
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here. 3
We first note that the model still allows for any type of health to income causal-
ity at the individual level. Here, both permanent and transitory shocks to health
may affect income in an arbitrary fashion. This covers most typically mentioned
channels ranging from work disability to transitorily impaired earnings capacities
such as broken bones. The aggregation to the cohort level, combined with the
time-series structure we impose, permits us to abstract from these issues. We also
allow for transitory health innovations at the cohort level to affect current income
which takes care of infectious diseases such as influenzas that might impact on
different age-education cohorts differentially.
With respect to permanent changes in cohort health, the most salient example
is medical progress that affects each cohort in a specific way. The introduction of
by-pass surgery could be seen as a permanent health shock for older cohorts. Our
identifying assumption claims that these changes are small enough as to not affect
the incomes of entire cohorts. Rather, permanent income fluctuations are driven
by the factors described above such as differential returns to education. This ex-
clusion restriction appears to be rather plausible to us, especially at younger ages.
Differences in early retirement seem to be more problematic in this respect. This
is the reason why we restrict ourselves to people until sixty years of age. We did
robustness checks with even younger cohorts only and results were not sensitive
to the cutoff age.
Having triangularised the system, we use very similar moment conditions as
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) to identify the permanent shocks. In contrast to them,
however, we do not consider bounding the transitory ones.4 We start by defining
gYct (g
H
ct) as the part in the growth rate of income (health) that is not explained by
age effects.
gYct = ζ
Y
ct + (1 − L)εYct + ξ1(1 − L)εHct + (1 − L)νYct
gHct =
q+1∑
j=0
γ2 jζ
Y
c,t− j + ζ
H
ct +
q∑
j=0
γ1 j(1 − L)εYc,t− j + (1 − L)εHct + (1 − L)νHct
Our identifying moment restrictions are based on the autocovariances and
3 Whilst we can’t identify ξ2 we can examine robustness to this assumption by considering the
estimates we would get with values other than zero. This is done briefly as a robustness check in
section 3.4.5
4 Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) find a MA(1)-process for the transitory shock to income which
gives them a system of three parameters (the variance of the transitory shock to income, the
MA(1)-parameter, and the variance of measurement error) in two equations based on the first and
second order autocovariances of income. With a MA(0)-process, the two variances are completely
confounded. In trying to exploit the cross-covariance restrictions (5 parameters in 3 equations for
the MA(0) case in the health process), we passed the limits of our synthetic cohort data.
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cross-covariances of these terms:
E
gYct
 1∑
j=−1
gYc,t+ j

 − E [gYct] E
 1∑
j=−1
gYc,t+ j
 = σ2ζY(3.11)
E
gHct
 q+1∑
j=−(q+1)
gHc,t+ j

 − E [gHct] E
 q+1∑
j=−(q+1)
gHc,t+ j
 =
 q+1∑
j=0
γ2 j

2
σ2
ζY
+ σ2
ζH
(3.12)
E
gHct
 1∑
j=−(q+1)
gYc,t+ j

 − E [gHct] E
 1∑
j=−(q+1)
gYc,t+ j
 = q+1∑
j=0
γ2 j σ
2
ζY
(3.13)
We note that the terms in the sum
∑q+1
j=0 γ2 j are not separately identified. Hence
we can say something about the aggregate impact over time of income shocks on
health, but we cannot break it down further by year. Treating this sum as one
parameter γ2, we have three parameters in three equations that can be estimated
via GMM.
3.2.5 Estimation
Our estimation strategy consists of three steps. We first sketch them very briefly
and then describe each one in more detail.
1. Regress the health and income variables on a suitable set of regressors cap-
turing cohort and age effects.
2. Use the first-differenced residuals to compute the terms inside the expecta-
tions of (3.11) to (3.13).
3. Calculate σ2
ζY
and
∑q+1
j=0 γ2 j for q = 0, 1, 2 via GMM, obtain confidence
intervals by bootstrapping.
With respect to the first stage regression, we choose a full set of cohort dum-
mies and a quadratic in age interacted with sex and education. Since our cohorts
will be based upon the latter two variables in addition to date-of-birth intervals
(see Section 3.3), this allows for very flexible profiles across the sex and education
groups as well as an additive effect for year of birth. The results were invariant to
higher order polynomials in age and the respective interaction terms. In particular,
this modelling strategy allows us to control for cohort specific effects determined
by macro-economic conditions at birth which may impact individuals as shown
by van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Portrait (2006) or Dehejia and Lleras Muney
(2004). They also capture the downward trends in overall mortality and morbidity
over time. We checked for robustness towards the additivity restriction on cohort
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effects by permitting the income and health profiles to be cohort-specific. Point
estimates did not change much but standard errors rose a lot as expected for an
overfitted model.
First-differencing the residuals from these regressions immediately gives us
the growth rates gYct and g
H
ct . In principle we could directly run a regression in first
differences. This is inhibited by the fact that our time series dimension is not long
enough to make the attenuation bias of OLS in this type of regressions negligible.
We then use GMM techniques to estimate the parameters of interest. All vari-
ance terms are allowed to vary across sex and education groups. After some exper-
imentation, we restrict the γ2-parameters to be the same. Due to the small-sample
bias that is often observed in optimal minimum distance estimation of covariance
structures, we use equally weighted minimum distance (Altonji and Segal 1996).
Since it is very hard to keep track of the pre-estimation error analytically, we
obtain confidence intervals by using the bootstrap (500 replications). As a conse-
quence of the nonstationarity of the model, we sample entire time series of each
cohort. Inference hence rests upon the cross-sectional dimension of the estimation
problem.
3.3 Data
In order to study the dynamic effects of income shocks on health, we construct
a synthetic cohort dataset, based on successive years of microdata from several
cross-sectional surveys. This type of data has proven to be very useful in the
consumption literature because it facilitates the use of large datasets in long time
series. While restricting the range of admissible models to additive ones, it per-
mits much more generality than aggregate data. Moreover the approach allows
the combination of various datasets. This is particularly important in our analy-
sis because data on health and socio-economic variables typically have not been
recorded jointly. This has changed over the last decade, but mostly for data cov-
ering the elderly and near-elderly population. Hence there are no panels currently
available that allow to study dynamics for the prime-aged population.
We use English data from three repeated cross-section surveys: The Family
Expenditure Survey (FES), the General Household Survey (GHS), and the Health
Survey for England (HSE). We will describe these datasets in turn after some
general remarks. All of them contain basic demographic information such as in-
dividual education level as measured by the age left full time education, marital
status, number of persons in the household, number of children and number of
children under five years of age in the household, and labour market status.
We construct cohorts based on 3-year date-of-birth intervals, sex, and whether
individuals attended school beyond the compulsory schooling age or not. We
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consider the working-age population of 30 to 60 years of age. The upper bound is
set because of cohort differences in early retirement. In our data, early retirement
(to the extent it is associated with a fall in income) would show up as a negative
income shock, but there may be an independent influence of retirement on health
that we cannot control for (see for example Snyder and Evans (2006)). We chose
the lower bound because we model household income and many people live with
their parents until their mid-twenties. One may well expect that risk sharing in
these households is not perfect and that there is a large deal of financial autonomy
between generations. If this is the case, then cohort differences in the changes of
household income at these ages would not necessarily reflect the type of income
shocks that we are interested in.
Table 3.1 lists the data availability by study and year and Table 3.2 provides
summary statistics of the cell sizes within each date-of-birth, education and gen-
der cohort in each of the surveys. As documented in Table 3.2, the cell sizes are
reasonably large and throughout the analysis we do not explicitly consider aggre-
gation error in calculating the standard errors. This is common practice in the
consumption literature (e.g. Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985)). The HSE dis-
plays very small sample sizes in its first two years of existence, as can be inferred
from the last two rows of Table 3.2. We check robustness to exclusion of these
two years in all specifications. All data are used on an annual basis from 1978
to 2003, although the HSE and some variables in the GHS do not cover the full
period. The rest of this section describes the relevant variables used from each of
the datasets in turn. The main variables are on household income and consump-
tion as well as individual-level risk behaviours and health outcomes. Descriptive
Statistics for all variables can be found in Table 3.3 which also indicates which
variables are used at an individual or at the household level.
In addition to the three repeated cross sections, we also use all-population
mortality from the Human Mortality Database (http://www.mortality.org) which
is available for the period 1978-1998. For this dataset, no covariates beyond sex
and age are available. Hence we cannot base cohorts on education groups when
it comes to mortality. The Longitudinal Study would have allowed for such strat-
ification, but its education measure is based on the highest degree obtained and
proved to be not comparable to the years of schooling measure.
3.3.1 The Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
The FES contains detailed information on household income and consumption.
Together with the Consumer Expenditure Survey in the US, it has emerged as
one of the workhorses in the consumption literature (see for example Blundell,
Pashardes, and Weber (1993)). Our data cover the period from 1978 to 2003
and our selected sample comprises 148,517 individuals. Unless indicated other-
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wise, we use expenditure and income in logarithms and weighted by the OECD-
equivalence scale
EQUIV = 1 + 0.6 · (#ADULTS − 1) + 0.4 · #CHILDREN.
We conduct sensitivity analyses with unequivalised values and demographic vari-
ables on the right-hand side, results were qualitatively similar and are not reported.
All variables are deflated with a general price index to obtain January 2000 prices.
The evolution of mean income and mean expenditure on non- and semi-durable
items is shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 for every other cohort.
The familiar hump-shape over the life-cycle becomes apparent for both vari-
ables and it seems to be more pronounced for expenditure as well as for the group
with low education. Values for men are slightly higher than those for women,
reflecting the higher income of male single households with respect to female sin-
gle ones. As expected, we find pronounced education differences. Compared to
these, cohort effects appear to be moderate with younger cohorts generating more
income and consumption than older ones. These effects seem to be stronger for
the higher educated, which is consistent with the findings of Gosling, Machin, and
Meghir (2000) for male wages. In addition to total expenditure, we also use food
expenditure in order to validate our methodology.
By virtue of the detailed consumption measures in the FES we are also able
to obtain expenditure on items related to risk behaviours. Specifically, we con-
sider expenditures on fruits and vegetables, alcohol, and cigarettes. While the first
two of these items suffer from the problem that expenditure changes might reflect
quantity or quality changes, this is less the case for cigarettes. Compared to other
products, the price differences among brands are very small at any given point in
time. By using a special price index for cigarettes and assuming between-product
price variation to be negligible, we are able to back out actual cigarette quantity.
3.3.2 The General Household Survey (GHS)
The GHS is a general purpose survey that has been conducted since 1971. Ques-
tions on health measures and risk behaviours have been included since 1978, our
data cover the period until 2003. It was not fielded in 1997 and 1999, we ex-
plain in Section 3.4.3 how we deal with these years. Please refer to Table 3.1 in
the Appendix for the availability of specific variables. We select the following
health variables: Self-reported health status on a three-dimensional scale (good-
fair-poor), whether respondents have a chronic disease, and whether they are lim-
ited in their activity by this disease. As an example, consider the proportion re-
porting good health that is shown in Figure 3.3. Consistent with many findings
from the literature (Case and Paxson 2005), women report worse health than men
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at younger ages. However, the decline is slower, leading to little if any gender
differences at age 60. Education effects seem to be even stronger. At age 30,
only small differences between education groups can be seen. Proportions remain
nearly constant for people in their thirties, the subsequent decline begins earlier
and is stronger for persons with low education. There are no apparent cohort
differences in either direction.
Furthermore, the GHS includes some self-reported data on risk behaviours.
We make use of questions on the quantity of cigarettes smoked and a six-category
question regarding the amount of alcohol consumed, running from zero consump-
tion to heavy drinking. With respect to the former, we use whether or not the
respondent is currently smoking and an unconditional cohort average of the num-
ber of cigarettes smoked per day. Regarding alcohol consumption, we simply
average the variable across cohort members.
3.3.3 The Health Survey for England (HSE)
Further health measures are available from the HSE, albeit only in a relatively
small number of years, namely from 1991 to 2003. What makes matters worse is
that cell sizes are very small in 1991 and 1992 which is made clear by the last two
rows in Table 3.2. Accordingly, we checked robustness to exclusion of these two
years in all specifications.
The HSE was set up to monitor population health in England and it includes a
physical examination by a nurse. However, each year a different subset of health
outcomes is emphasised (examples include cardiovascular disease and the health
of older people). Consequently, few variables are contained every year in the nurse
interview. In fact, the only one we are able to use is bloodpressure. We construct a
binary variable that is one if the measured bloodpressure is above 140/90 mmHg
(i.e. if the systolic pressure is above 140 or the diastolic pressure is above 90
or both) or if the respondent is currently taking bloodpressure medication. The
fraction of persons with such a condition is listed in Figure 3.4. The age gradi-
ent is very steep compared to other variables. There is a large gender effect with
women being much less likely to suffer from such a condition. There seems to
be a slight tendency for lower prevalence among the better educated. We also
use an indicator variable that takes the value one only if measured bloodpressure
is above 140/90 mmHg and doesn’t take account of medication. The two blood-
pressure variables treat medical progress in a different fashion. In the course of the
analysis, we term the two variables “Bloodpressure Condition" and “High Blood-
pressure", respectively. Going in the same direction, we also use a self-reported
measure of whether the respondent suffers from cardiovascular disease. A major
reason to put an emphasis on diseases of the cardiovascular system stems from
research in epidemiology which suggests causal mechanisms running from stress
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(that may be caused by sudden income drops) to cardiovascular markers which
operate rather quickly as compared to many other diseases such as cancer or liver
disease. See Brunner (1997) for a review and Steptoe, Willemsen, Owen, Flower,
and Mohamed-Ali (2001) for a specific experiment.
Besides bloodpressure, we obtain some self-reported measures from the HSE.
In particular, similar questions to those in the GHS are asked and we can use them
to complement the years 1997 and 1999 although there is an issue with respect
to comparability (see section 3.4.3). The longstanding illness question is further
broken down by type of disease, of which we use the prevalence of of respira-
tory diseases and the just-described measure of cardiovascular disease. Again,
epidemiological research suggests that smoking, a risk factor we consider below,
has more rapid effects on respiratory diseases than lung cancer, for example see
Peto, Darby, Deo, Silcocks, Whitley, and Doll (2000). The last health measure
we include in the analysis is the mean score on the 12-item General Health Ques-
tionnaire, a widespread instrument to measure mental health status. The questions
call for yes or no answers and the individual score is simply the number of affir-
mations. A higher score indicates poorer mental health.
The first thing to establish is that the ubiquitous health-SES gradient is indeed
present in our data. From 1997 on, the HSE contains an income measure that we
can use to estimate the conditional correlation at the micro level. Table 3.4 shows
the results of regressions of the various health variables on log household income
and a set of controls at the level of the individual. The general pattern that emerges
is that persons with higher income have better health, whatever the health measure
we consider, consistent with many findings from the literature.
3.4 Results
We present our results in four stages. First, we describe the income process and
the variance of permanent income shocks. We then show the effect on mortality,
health outcomes and risk behaviours. The concluding part of a section describes
the relation of our approach to other works in the literature.
3.4.1 The Variance of Income Shocks
Table 3.5 lists the autocovariances of the unexplained growth rate of income up to
order 5. Estimation is only based on equation (3.9) and moment condition (3.11).
All numbers in this table and Table 3.6 are multiplied by 1000 for easier read-
ing. An MA(0)-process implies that E[gYt g
Y
t−1] < 0 and that all autocovariances
of higher order are zero. The data seems to point to such a model as all covari-
ances two years apart or more are both small in magnitude and not significantly
3.4. Results 49
different from zero. The exception is for men as the covariance for higher order
lags rises somewhat again in absolute value. However, they are rather imprecisely
estimated. In any case, Table 3.5 suggests that our parsimonious model without a
moving average process for the transitory shock to income is sufficient to capture
its dynamics at the cohort level. This is consistent with the analyses of Banks,
Blundell, and Brugiavini (2001) on the same data, albeit over a slightly earlier
time period. They find that an MA(1)-process fits the quarterly income data from
the FES very well. Hence one would expect an MA(0)-process for the yearly data.
Table 3.6 presents the estimated variance of the permanent shock to income,
applying the methodology described above. All variances are significantly larger
than zero. The results correspond to annual shocks with a standard deviation
between 3 to 5% of income. The magnitude of the shocks is larger for individuals
with low education, although the difference is not statistically significant. Gender
differences in the point estimates are only visible for the highly educated with men
displaying a somewhat higher variance of income shocks. However, remember
that our measure is household income and differences are caused only by single
households which constitute around 25% of the total sample. To get a very rough
idea about the magnitude of these shocks, it is useful to compare them to the
findings reported in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). They estimate the variance of
permanent shocks to individual income in the US using the PSID. The magnitude
of the shocks we find is somewhere around 5% of their estimates. Obviously one
should not overstate cross-country comparisons, but this seems to be a reasonable
magnitude of cohort-wide income shocks as compared to individual ones. 5
3.4.2 Permanent Income Shocks and Mortality
Table 3.7 presents our estimates of γ2 (the effect of permanent income shocks) on
mortality outcomes in nine different specifications – allowing for three different
time lags for the income effects and three different age trend specifications. The
first thing to note is that a sufficiently flexible specification of the age trend is
extremely important when it comes to mortality: Moving from the quadratic to
the cubic specification all coefficients change their sign and confidence intervals
do not overlap. On the other hand, the cubic trend seems to be sufficiently general
as a comparison with the results on the quartic trend shows.
In general, we find that an increase in income leads to an increase in mortality.
When we allow no lagged effect of income, a one percent increase in income leads
to about 0.7 to 1 more deaths per 100,000 persons among the prime aged popula-
tion in any given year. By and large, we obtain similar results when we extend the
5 We also estimated the income process on different subset period and found no statistically
significant differences.
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lag with which income shocks can affect health although the null hypothesis of no
causation is just not rejected at the 95% confidence level (P-value 0.058).
3.4.3 Permanent Income Shocks and Health
Table 3.8 contains our basic results for the relation between permanent income
shocks and health outcomes.6 Except for mental health, all dependent variables
are measured prevalence rates in the population. These can be thought of as stem-
ming from a linear probability model with our unidimensional health stock on the
right hand side. Since we use household income in logarithms, the coefficients
measure absolute changes in prevalence rates with respect to percentage changes
in income. Taking the first entry of Table 3.8 as an example, a one percent shock
to permanent income would decrease the fraction of people reporting good health
by 0.065 percentage points. In other words a one standard deviation increase in
income would reduce the fraction of individuals reporting good health from about
60% to 59.7%. Moreover, the effect is not significantly different from zero. This
effect is obtained assuming that income has only an instantaneous effect on health.
When we additionally allow a one year delay, we still find an insignificant negative
effect on the probability of reporting good health. With a two year lag, the effect
of an increase in income becomes slightly beneficial to health, but with a small
magnitude: a one percent increase in income increases the probability of reporting
good health by 0.02 percentage points. This effect is not significant either.
We obtain a symmetric effect for the probability of reporting poor health. At
lags zero and one year, an increase in income increases the proportion of individ-
uals reporting poor health while after two years, the proportion is reduced. Once
again, all the effects are not significantly different from zero. Income does not
appear to affect other measures of health such as the proportion of individuals
with longstanding illness or limiting illness. If anything, a one percent increase in
income is associated to a 0.02 percentage point increase in these proportions.
Rows 5 to 7 in Table 3.8 present the effect on objective health outcomes re-
lating to cardiovascular health: The proportion of individuals with blood pressure
condition, with high blood pressure or with cardiovascular diseases.7 We do not
find any significant effects of income on these health outcomes either. This is im-
6 In Section 3.3 and Table 3.1 we noted that the GHS was not fielded in 1997 and 1999. The
HSE also contains a question on self-assessed health, but the answer is recorded on a five-point
scale (very good, good, fair, poor, very poor). We collapse the “good" and “poor" categories into
one each and use a dummy variable in the first estimation stage for these years. With respect to
the longstanding and limiting illness variables, we also use the values from the HSE and a dummy.
In all four cases, results were largely insensitive to using either the values from HSE for all years
beginning in 1993; or to cutting off the analysis in 1996.
7 One year each is missing for blood pressure and mental health (see Table 3.1), we interpolate
the adjacent values linearly for these years.
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portant as one may think that this set of diseases could be linked to changes in
socio-economic position due to stress, see the references listed in Section 3.3.3
among others. Neither can we reject the null hypothesis that income shocks have
no effect on respiratory diseases: All point estimates in row 8 of Table 3.8 are
negative but confidence intervals are too large to make statistically meaningful
statements.
Mental health is measured as the simple sum of the scores on the 12-item
general health questionnaire. A higher score indicates poorer mental health. We
find that a positive shock to permanent income leads to poorer mental health. The
confidence interval is rather large, but we can exclude the possibility of no effects
at the 5% level. Looking at more lags, the coefficient appears ill identified and we
cannot exclude the possibility that income has no effect on mental health.
Our strategy here has been to extract permanent shocks to income directly
from income data. The life-cycle model predicts consumption to react stronger
to permanent income innovations in income than to transitory ones. An alterna-
tive strategy to use as sensitivity analysis is to use data on expenditure to filter
out permanent shocks as described in Blundell and Preston (1998) and Blundell,
Pistaferri, and Preston (2005). We operationalise this idea by using total expen-
diture instead of income in the estimation procedure. The three moment condi-
tions (3.11) to (3.13) remain unchanged even though we do not need to take care
of transitory consumption movements if the life-cycle model is taken to be literal.
This is because the presence of measurement and aggregation error introduces a
transitory component in the consumption process anyhow. Results based on this
strategy are largely comparable to our estimates from the income process. In par-
ticular, none of the coefficients changed significantly in magnitude. 8
3.4.4 Permanent Income Shocks and Behaviour
We now turn to the effect of income on behaviour and particularly on Risk factors
for health. We first look at the effect of permanent shocks on total (non durable)
consumption. While total consumption is not thought to be directly linked to
health, it is a useful benchmark to compare to more health related consumption
decision.
The first row of Table 3.9 presents the elasticity of total expenditure with re-
spect to permanent income shocks. A one percent increase in income is asso-
ciated with a 0.4 to 0.6 percent increase in total expenditure, depending on the
order of the moving average. All effects are significantly different from zero.
Our estimates are in the same range as Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2005) on
8 The tables corresponding to Tables 3.8 and 3.9 calculated using this methodology are available
from the authors upon request.
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individual-level US data. In contrast with the findings in the previous section, per-
manent shocks lead to sizable changes in behaviour. We conclude that the income
data contains pertinent variation (as Table 3.6 indicated as well) and that the lack
of any significant effect of income on health is not due to lack in variation in the
explanatory variable. Therefore, these results establish the ability of our empirical
methodology to identify changes at the cohort level.
We now focus on a subset of total expenditure, the expenditure on food. A
one percent increase in income leads to a 0.20 to 0.25 percent increase in food
expenditure, although estimates are just shy of being significant. The elasticity
of food is about half of the elasticity of total expenditure, suggesting that house-
holds are able to smooth food consumption. The third row presents the effect of
permanent shocks to income on expenditure on fruits and vegetables. The effect
varies with the lag order for the income effect, with an elasticity between 0.45
and zero but we cannot exclude the possibility that income has no effect. More
importantly, point estimates have roughly the same magnitude as the ones on food
consumption and we can never tell them apart. Hence small income shocks do not
seem to cause individuals to switch to a healthier diet.
We now turn to risky behaviours such as smoking and alcohol consumption.
We find a significant impact of permanent income shocks on cigarettes smoked. 9
We get similar results when we use self-reported quantities instead of quanti-
ties inferred from expenditures. This is reassuring as these two measures come
from different data sets and reporting schemes. Overall, a one percent increase
in income increases the unconditional number of cigarettes smoked per day by
about 0.06 to 0.1. We also get significant results for the probability of being a
smoker, although the magnitude of the point estimates seems a bit large as to have
much confidence in this result.
Rows 7 and 8 of Table (3.9) present the results for alcohol consumption. Look-
ing at the self-reported quantity in row 7, we find a significant effect if looking at
contemporaneous effects only. Point estimates decrease in size and fail to be sig-
nificant for the more general models. Turning to the elasticity of alcohol expen-
diture, we find it to be around 0.5. As we consider a delayed response to income
shocks, the coefficients appear to be less stable with large standard errors.
To summarise, we find some evidence that permanent income shocks affect be-
haviour and particularly health behaviour. Broadly speaking, permanent increases
in income appear to lead to poorer health behaviour.
9 An exception is when we select a lag of one year which gives an instable parameter.
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3.4.5 Robustness of Results
The results presented above rely on the identification assumption that variations
in permanent income at cohort level are not caused by permanent shocks to cohort
health, i.e. ξ2 = 0. While we believe there is a plausible justification for this as-
sumption, we can explore the robustness of our results to this central assumption,
i.e. for values of ξ2 > 0.
In this case the effect of income shocks on health can be expressed as:
q+1∑
j=0
γ2 j =
E
[
gHct
(∑1
j=−(q+1) g
Y
c,t+ j
)]
− E
[
gHct
]
E
[∑1
j=−(q+1) g
Y
c,t+ j
]
− ξ2σ2ζH
E
[
gYct
(∑1
j=−1 gYc,t+ j
)]
− E [gYct] E [∑1j=−1 gYc,t+ j] − ξ22σ2ζH
Note that when ξ2 = 0, we get back to equation (3.13). The extent of the bias of
the effect of income on health depends both on the magnitude of the reverse effect
but also on the covariance between income, lagged income and health. The sign
of the bias is a priori ambiguous.
Table 3.10 displays the effect of income on health for ξ2 = 0 (baseline), for
ξ2 = 0.1 and for ξ2 = 1, which means that a 10 percentage point rise in the
proportion reporting good health would lead to an 1 (respectively 10) percent
increase in cohort income. The rest of the formula is calculated using moments
from the data and setting σ2
ζH
= 0.1 (estimated from the data). The baseline case
ξ2 = 0 simply reproduces the results from the first column of Table 3.8.
Our results are surprisingly robust to a relaxation of our main identifying as-
sumption. For ξ2 = 0.1, the coefficients are remarkably similar to the baseline es-
timates. For larger effects of cohort health on cohort income (ξ2 = 1), the change
in the coefficients are larger, especially for blood pressure conditions. However, if
anything estimates reinforce our previous results in the sense that, from the point
estimates at least, an increase in income appears to worsen health.
3.4.6 Relation to the Literature
We deem it important to compare our methodology and results to those previ-
ously found by authors who looked at mortality, health, and health behaviour with
some sort of aggregate data. In particular, we think of the work of Deaton and
Paxson (1998b, 2001, 2004), Ruhm (2000, 2003, 2005, 2006), and Ruhm and
Black (2002). The main differences relate to the question of how the relationship
between income (or macroeconomic conditions) and health is restricted by the
various modelling approaches. Common to all studies is that causality running
from health (behaviours) to income is not modelled. It is useful to reformulate our
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model of how health evolves over the life cycle (3.10) as:
Hct = Hc,0 +
t∑
s=0
(
mHs−c + γ2ζ
Y
c,s + ζ
H
c,s
)
+ γ1(εYc,t − εYc,0) + εHc,t − εHc,0(3.14)
We suppress all lagged effects of the income shock on health and moving average
parameters in the transitory terms as well as the measurement error terms for ease
of notation. The formulation of the age trend makes use of the fact that a = t − c.
This shows that current health is a function of some initial condition, the difference
between the current and initial transitory effects, and the accumulation of the age
trend, income and health shocks. From this equation (and the equivalent one
on the income process) we move on to identify the parameters of interest from
deviations in the cohort growth rates of income and health from their projections.
Deaton and Paxson construct datasets similar to ours for the United States (and
also England and Wales in the 2004 paper). Their basic model 10 looks as follows
in our notation:
Hct = ma + β1t + β2Yct + β3 · Xct + uct
where Xct represents a vector of covariates. Hct is operationalised by using the
log odds of mortality. Identification is then based on cohort differences in income
and mortality conditional upon a nonparametric age profile, the linear time trend,
and the other covariates. This strategy does not allow for cohort fixed effects that
are correlated with the residuals. A cause for this could be long-term effects of
macroeconomic conditions at birth on mortality (van den Berg, Lindeboom, and
Portrait 2006). More general than such a fixed effect is the question of whether or
not mortality may experience persistent shocks. If this is the case, then
E[uc,t+s|Ic,t] , 0, some s > 0
where Ic,t represents the information available in period t. The relevance of this
problem depends on the persistence of the process. In our nonstationary formula-
tion it holds for all s > 0 and is potentially serious. If shocks exhibit only limited
persistence, it is probably not too important in practice.
In order to compare the two approaches on our data, we ran a mortality regres-
sion based on the following model:
Hct = ma + βc + β2Yct + β3 · Xct + uct(3.15)
where βc represents the coefficient on a cohort dummy, the age trend is interacted
with gender and allowed to be quadratic (cubic, quartic), Xct contains the educa-
10 The authors also investigate a direct effect of income inequality on mortality. We do not
consider the part of their analysis that focusses on this issue here.
3.4. Results 55
tion measure. Yct is again specified as log equivalised household income. Overall,
results for β2 go into the same direction as the ones for γ2, but there are important
differences. If the age trend is specified to be quadratic, results show a signifi-
cantly negative correlation of income and health. However, this again seems to
be an artefact of specifying the age trend in a too restrictive fashion. Turning to
higher order polynomials, we get point estimates of βˆ2 = 0.1 which is about a
tenth of the magnitude observed for the coefficient on the permanent shock. It is
never significant. This is consistent with the results reported in Deaton and Pax-
son (2004) for a specification that is just slightly different. It is difficult to pin
down the exact reason for this discrepancy. Either it could be the importance of
the focus on permanent shocks and the filtering out of transitory movements and
measurement error; or else the coefficients based on (3.15) are biased due to rea-
sons laid out in the preceding paragraph. In any case, we conclude that the more
involved strategy employed here is not a futile complication of matters.
Another strand of the literature has investigated the impact of macroeconomic
fluctuations on aggregate mortality (Ruhm 2000), on mortality from heart disease
(Ruhm 2006), on various health measures (Ruhm 2003), on drinking behaviour
(Ruhm and Black 2002) and on several other risk behaviours and markers of un-
healthy behaviour(Ruhm 2005). The identification strategy in this work has been
based on deviations in state unemployment rates from the (US) national average,
controlling for a time trend and population (in case of the mortality studies) or
individual (health and health behaviour studies) characteristics. This research has
shown that for the population above 20 years of age, most of these variables move
in accordance with employment rates. The interpretation was that unhealthy be-
haviour is one of the factors underlying the procyclical variation in mortality rates.
While these results are broadly consistent with our findings in this paper, we
want to highlight some important differences. The results in the mortality studies
(Ruhm 2000, 2006), have been based on aggregate data. It is well known that this
type of data does not permit models that are nonlinear in the variables. While
this is probably not an issue if employment rates are the dependent variable, it
does pose a problem if the interest is in the effect of income. The function link-
ing income and health is typically thought to be concave. In our particular case,
it turned out to be very important indeed to specify household income in loga-
rithms as opposed to levels and we can aggregate such variables exactly from the
underlying microdata. Another point concerns the use of log mortality as the out-
come of interest which underlies most specifications in the two just-cited papers.
While this may be important to capture the aggregate relationship well, it inhibits
the interpretation of the results at the individual level. Finally, macroeconomic
conditions may affect cohorts in a very different way. For example, unfavourable
conditions at the beginning of the working life may impact negatively upon all
future labour market outcomes (Raaum and Røed 2006), thereby constituting a
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permanent shock; whereas they may affect older cohorts’ incomes only transito-
rily.
The only contrasting results and interpretations are found with respect to health
outcomes as contained in Ruhm (2003). The basic identification strategy is the
same as the one for the mortality studies, but individual-level data from repeated
cross sections is used. Unfortunately, no results are reported for the overall prime-
aged population which renders specific comparisons difficult. In the cases where
analysis is restricted to a similar age range as the one considered here the sam-
ple is also restricted to the working population introducing a problem of sample
selection. Furthermore, it is not quite clear what kind of effect is picked up by
state-level unemployment rates if the sample is restricted to employed persons.
Finally, the data analysis is cross-sectional in the sense that no individual-level
fixed effects are controlled for. This relates immediately to the sample selection
issue. Results based on these data in the US show a procyclical variation of health.
We cannot detect such an effect. On the other hand, we are rather confident
that we would be able to pin it down if it were there. Our conclusion is that there
may not be much instantaneous causation running from risk behaviours to health
outcomes and on to mortality. Maybe one would expect the most direct effects
with respect to smoking. However, if we look at respiratory diseases (which are
expected to react much quicker than cancers), if anything, we find a countervailing
effect. In our view, procyclical mortality is more likely to be driven by work-
related accidents than by health and health behaviours. Given the indirect nature
of this evidence, more research is needed to disentangle the precise causation
channels.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate the effect of permanent shocks to income on health
and health behaviour. We use a long time series of cohort data from multiple
surveys which covers the life-cycle and report detailed information on income and
health (both subjective and objective measures) as well as health behaviour. We
exploit the fact that at the cohort level, over the eighties and nineties, there have
been sizable changes in income mainly related to changes in the macro-economic
environment (skill biased technological change, changes in the return to education
and experience, increased competition). Our identification scheme relies on the
fact that these changes are not due to changes in cohort health. While we allow
for reverse causation at the individual level, as well as a rich stochastic structure,
we aggregate it out at cohort level to focus only on the effect of these observed
income shocks on cohort health.
As in Ruhm (2000), we find some evidence that income and mortality are
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related, although in our case we decompose income and filter out the transitory
component. While we find some evidence that permanent income shocks lead to
poorer health behaviour, we find no evidence that it affects directly any of our
health measures. Despite sizable shocks to income at cohort level during our
period of analysis, which can be empirically linked to changes in consumption
expenditures, we fail to find any changes in (cohort) health, even if we allow
those shocks to affect health with a lag. Moreover, the point estimates often hint
that an increase in income leads to poorer health, except for blood pressure. This
is in contrast with micro, cross-sectional evidence, where higher income is related
to better health. Taken literally, our results suggest that this observed “gradient"
does not stem from income innovations of the magnitude we observe at the cohort
level.
Reconciliation of this lack of evidence for time series causation with the strong
correlations observed in many studies, even those which control for many possible
covariates, is not really necessary given the often limited extent to which the lat-
ter studies can isolate exogenous changes in income or economic resources. The
results of Lindahl (2005) and Meer, Miller, and Rosen (2003), using lottery gains
and unanticipated bequests respectively to exploit exogenous changes in incomes
at the individual level, warrant more of a comparison. One obvious although
rather uninteresting point is that different relationships may of course be obtained
in different institutional settings, or for different subgroups of the population. An
alternative factor may be that the relationship of health to income shocks could be
non-linear or even discontinuous, with the effect that large changes in resources,
of the nature used in these two studies, yield more substantial (and more identifi-
able) health effects than the smaller changes in cohort averages that we use here,
perhaps through channels such as changes in neighbourhoods and peer groups or
major changes in housing or lifestyle more generally. Finally we cannot rule out
effects of income shocks that take longer to feed through into health outcomes
than we have allowed for in the time-series processes estimated here (up to three
years). Nevertheless, from a policy perspective our results seem particularly rele-
vant, suggesting that the kind of changes to incomes that might be expected from
redistribution towards particular age-education cohorts of working age adults are
unlikely to lead to improvements in health at least in the short to medium run.
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3.6 Tables
Tab. 3.1: Data Availability by Year
Dataset 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
FES
GHS
GHS: Illness
GHS: Risk Behaviours
HSE
HSE: Bloodpressure
HSE: GHQ 12
HMD: Mortality
full data available limited amount of observations
Year
Tab. 3.2: Cell sizes after aggregation
First Total Number
Dataset Mean Median Percentile Minimum of Individuals
FES 137.3 134.5 65 55 148,517
GHS 257.3 221 84 58 277,084
HSE 149.6 140.5 25 18 80,541
HSE, 1993+ 164.0 152 62 51 76,943
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Tab. 3.3: Descriptive Statistics Averaged Across Cohorts
Men Low Education High Education
Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60 Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60
Education (FES) *) 0.555 0.489 0.476 0.589 0.445 0.511 0.524 0.411
Education (GHS) *) 0.507 0.469 0.478 0.563 0.493 0.531 0.522 0.437
Education (HSE) *) 0.521 0.440 0.430 0.538 0.479 0.560 0.570 0.462
Log Income (HH) 5.008 5.040 5.166 5.045 5.355 5.347 5.490 5.374
Log Total Expend. (HH) 4.612 4.672 4.789 4.625 4.833 4.894 5.023 4.980
Log Food Expend. (HH) 3.001 3.116 3.186 3.231 3.047 3.188 3.260 3.309
Log FruitVeg Expend. (HH) 0.741 0.904 1.031 1.085 1.088 1.175 1.357 1.382
Cigarettes (FES, HH) 2.167 2.113 2.286 2.323 2.042 1.954 1.956 2.134
Log Alcohol Expend. (HH) 1.808 1.742 2.076 1.847 1.964 1.788 2.001 1.928
Good Health 0.715 0.669 0.600 0.456 0.796 0.770 0.722 0.630
Poor Health 0.047 0.080 0.141 0.213 0.031 0.045 0.090 0.122
Longstanding Illness 0.265 0.303 0.369 0.547 0.253 0.246 0.327 0.508
Limiting Illness 0.110 0.162 0.230 0.385 0.104 0.115 0.174 0.278
Smoking Y/N 0.452 0.437 0.400 0.377 0.315 0.283 0.294 0.235
Cigarettes (GHS) 8.233 8.766 8.054 6.268 4.821 4.380 5.539 3.958
Alcohol Quantity 3.399 3.346 3.259 3.068 3.408 3.331 3.308 3.149
Bloodpressure Condition 0.243 0.278 0.488 0.654 0.243 0.220 0.423 0.624
High Bloodpressure 0.250 0.247 0.436 0.574 0.244 0.217 0.381 0.557
Cardiovascular Condition 0.017 0.041 0.100 0.218 0.007 0.037 0.080 0.176
Respiratory Condition 0.075 0.060 0.056 0.091 0.069 0.077 0.059 0.043
Mental Cond. (GHQ 12) 1.271 1.284 1.285 1.358 1.551 1.373 1.190 0.959
Mortality Rate / 1000 persons 0.908 1.802 5.180 15.736
(both education groups)
Women Low Education High Education
Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60 Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60
Education (FES) *) 0.513 0.471 0.491 0.542 0.487 0.529 0.509 0.458
Education (GHS) *) 0.532 0.456 0.534 0.591 0.468 0.544 0.466 0.409
Education (HSE) *) 0.493 0.436 0.479 0.510 0.507 0.564 0.521 0.490
Log Income (HH) 4.836 5.050 5.160 4.902 5.272 5.343 5.498 5.272
Log Total Expend. (HH) 4.495 4.682 4.788 4.543 4.786 4.912 5.038 4.903
Log Food Expend. (HH) 3.011 3.130 3.248 3.224 3.091 3.227 3.274 3.332
Log FruitVeg Expend. (HH) 0.767 0.907 1.139 1.084 1.105 1.236 1.351 1.422
Cigarettes (FES, HH) 2.134 2.143 2.270 2.271 1.937 1.864 2.029 2.187
Log Alcohol Expend. (HH) 1.521 1.739 1.963 1.671 1.697 1.692 1.993 1.714
Good Health 0.613 0.583 0.498 0.436 0.683 0.705 0.666 0.569
Poor Health 0.093 0.135 0.173 0.184 0.071 0.074 0.095 0.133
Longstanding Illness 0.280 0.314 0.408 0.545 0.242 0.260 0.321 0.510
Limiting Illness 0.124 0.190 0.250 0.341 0.098 0.124 0.175 0.308
Smoking Y/N 0.460 0.443 0.409 0.376 0.253 0.247 0.231 0.242
Cigarettes (GHS) 7.294 7.321 6.526 5.087 3.089 3.194 3.039 3.226
Alcohol Quantity 2.725 2.834 2.644 2.422 2.919 2.906 2.922 2.709
Bloodpressure Condition 0.085 0.131 0.354 0.646 0.064 0.123 0.337 0.548
High Bloodpressure 0.077 0.105 0.294 0.547 0.062 0.108 0.306 0.449
Cardiovascular Condition 0.030 0.046 0.073 0.208 0.012 0.033 0.088 0.183
Respiratory Condition 0.101 0.073 0.101 0.094 0.084 0.061 0.084 0.100
Mental Cond. (GHQ 12) 1.832 1.600 1.812 1.856 1.768 1.578 1.622 1.336
Mortality Rate / 1000 persons 0.475 1.189 3.305 8.865
(both education groups)
Note: *) Data from 1991-2000 only to ensure comparability across datasets. All other numbers are based on total number
of observations for each variable, see Table 3.1. HH: Variable measured at the Household Level, equivalised by OECD
scale.
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Tab. 3.4: Regressions Showing the Correlations Between Health and Income.
Dependent Variable Coef. Std. Err. N
Self-Reported Good Health 0.415** 0.010 36,641
Self-Reported Poor Health -0.491** 0.014 36,641
Longstanding Illness -0.213** 0.009 36,639
Limiting Illness -0.332** 0.009 36,639
Bloodpressure Condition -0.067** 0.012 23,871
High Bloodpressure -0.053** 0.011 27,567
Cardiovascular Condition -0.130** 0.013 36,639
Respiratory Condition -0.092** 0.012 36,639
Mental Condition (GHQ 12) -0.535** 0.018 35,313
Note: Coefficients of simple probit regressions of health outcomes on
household income in logarithms (Mental Condition: OLS). All spec-
ifications further include year dummies as well as sex and a two-
dimensional education measure, both interacted with a quadratic age
trend. ** significant at the 5% level.
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Tab. 3.5: The Autocovariances of the Unexplained Growth of Income
Order Low Education High Education NT
Men Women Men Women
0 6.50** 7.25** 5.91** 6.12** 944
(5.18 , 8.04) (6.08 , 8.48) (4.67 , 7.03) (5.37 , 6.68)
1 -2.38** -2.70** -2.22** -2.54** 888
(-3.18 , -1.70) (-3.60 , -1.82) (-2.95 , -1.50) (-3.36 , -1.83)
2 -0.41 0.07 -0.27 0.57 832
(-2.13 , 1.02) (-1.32 , 1.22) (-1.16 , 0.80) (-0.42 , 1.67)
3 -0.19 -0.07 0.93 -0.22 776
(-0.92 , 0.49) (-0.98 , 0.89) (-0.15 , 1.86) (-1.39 , 0.72)
4 0.89 -0.12 -1.30** -0.22 720
(-0.26 , 2.28) (-1.22 , 0.93) (-2.19 , -0.30) (-1.32 , 0.94)
5 -1.00** -0.12 0.80 0.07 664
(-1.75 , -0.20) (-1.42 , 1.00) (-0.49 , 1.90) (-1.06 , 1.16)
Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in parentheses, ** significant at the
5% level. All values scaled up by 1000.
Tab. 3.6: The Variance of the Permanent Shock to Income
Time Low Education High Education NT
Period Men Women Men Women
1978 − 2003 2.257** 2.027** 1.675** 0.872 832
(0.60 , 4.09) (0.43 , 3.72) (0.75 , 2.57) (-0.32 , 1.84)
Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in parentheses, ** significant at the
5% level. All values scaled up by 1000.
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Tab. 3.7: The Effect of Permanent Income Shocks on Mortality.
Variable Age Trend Moving Average Parameter (q) NT
0 1 2 q = 0/1/2
Mortality Quadratic -0.786** -1.108** -1.013** 320 / 272 / 224
(-2.118 , -0.076) (-3.202 , -0.136) (-2.204 , -0.091)
Mortality Cubic 0.721** 0.729 0.527 320 / 272 / 224
(0.329 , 1.617) (-0.063 , 3.629) (-0.090 , 1.561)
Mortality Quartic 1.000** 1.151 0.650 320 / 272 / 224
(0.469 , 1.953) (-0.082 , 6.448) (-0.231 , 2.276)
Note: Mortality refers to number of deaths per 1000 persons with respect to a 1% change in household income. Boot-
strapped 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
Tab. 3.8: The Effect of Permanent Income Shocks on Health Outcomes
Variable Time Moving Average Parameter (q) NT
Period 0 1 2 q = 0/1/2
Good Health 1978-2003 -0.0647 -0.1683 0.0235 832 / 720 / 608
(-0.2189 , 0.1111) (-0.5471 , 0.1532) (-0.2835 , 0.3372)
Poor Health 1978-2003 0.1074 0.1012 -0.0781 832 / 720 / 608
(-0.0165 , 0.2564) (-0.0684 , 0.3454) (-0.3070 , 0.2196)
Longstanding 1979-2003 0.0228 0.0595 0.0592 832 / 720 / 608
Illness (-0.1252 , 0.2361) (-0.2589 , 0.2888) (-0.2525 , 0.3728)
Limiting 1979-2003 0.0264 0.0750 -0.0999 800 / 688 / 576
Illness (-0.1083 , 0.1739) (-0.2272 , 0.2959) (-0.3416 , 0.1470)
Bloodpressure 1991-2003 -0.1342 0.4226 0.1660 352 / 272 / 192
Condition (-0.9238 , 0.2461) (-0.3116 , 1.4468) (-0.3655 , 0.8034)
High 1991-2003 -0.2106 0.4100 0.0361 352 / 272 / 192
Bloodpressure (-1.0594 , 0.4111) (-0.1700 , 1.2800) (-0.4885 , 0.7392)
Cardiovascular 1991-2003 0.0006 -0.1112 0.1978 352 / 272 / 192
Condition (-0.1917 , 0.3149) (-0.3034 , 0.1809) (-0.1156 , 0.8175)
Respiratory 1991-2003 -0.2440 -0.1751 -0.2114 352 / 272 / 192
Condition (-0.6579 , 0.0592) (-0.5663 , 0.2026) (-0.5878 , 0.0541)
Mental 1991-2003 0.037** 0.2244 0.0081 352 / 272 / 192
Health (0.0056 , 0.6592) (-0.0052 , 0.8781) (-0.0290 , 0.7814)
Note: Except for mental health, all values denote changes in percentage points of prevalence rates with respect to a
1% shock to permanent income. Mental health: change in average score on the GHQ12 with respect to a 1% shock to
permanent income. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in parentheses, ** significant at the 5% level.
3.6. Tables 63
Tab. 3.9: The Effect of Permanent Income Shocks on Behaviour
Variable Time Moving Average Parameter (q) NT
Period 0 1 2 q = 0/1/2
Total 1978-2003 0.4365** 0.4524** 0.6491** 832 / 720 / 608
Expenditure (0.2289 , 0.6381) (0.1547 , 0.7756) (0.1230 , 1.0909)
Food 1978-2003 0.2135 0.2494 0.2435 832 / 720 / 608
Expenditure (-0.0158 , 0.4572) (-0.0308 , 0.6378) (-0.1693 , 0.6902)
Fruits and Veg. 1978-2003 0.2604 0.4596 -0.0085 832 / 720 / 608
Expenditure (-0.0590 , 0.8441) (-0.0612 , 1.2263) (-0.9402 , 1.0431)
Fraction 1978-2003 0.0656 0.3673** 0.3778** 832 / 720 / 608
of Smokers (-0.1485 , 0.3393) (0.0521 , 0.7280) (0.0132 , 0.9539)
Cigarettes via 1978-2003 0.0824** 0.0966** 0.1025** 832 / 720 / 608
Self-Rep. Qty. (0.0475 , 0.9420) (0.0589 , 0.2549) (0.0534 , 0.3999)
Cigarettes via 1978-2003 0.0631** 0.4539 0.0592** 832 / 720 / 608
Expenditure (0.0354 , 0.1846) (-0.0183 , 0.9135) (0.0355 , 0.5185)
Alcohol 1978-2003 0.0059** 0.0044 0.0041 832 / 720 / 608
Self-Rep. Qty. (0.0024 , 0.0125) (-0.0058 , 0.0374) (-0.0078 , 0.2533)
Alcohol 1978-2003 0.5325 0.4306 -0.0502 832 / 720 / 608
Expenditure (-0.3041 , 1.5006) (-1.0875 , 34.1617) (-2.0854 , 36.3326)
Note: Expenditure (Total, Food, Fruit and Vegetables, and Alcohol): Coefficients shown are elasticities. Smoking Fraction:
Change in percentage points of prevalence rate with respect to a 1% shock to permanent income. Cigarette variables:
Change in daily number of cigarettes smoked (unconditional) with respect to a 1% shock to permanent income. Alcohol
Self-Reported Quantity: Change in average reported value with respect to a 1% shock to permanent income. Bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals in parentheses, ** significant at the 5% level.
Tab. 3.10: Robustness of Results.
Variable ξ2 = 0 ξ2 = 0.1 ξ2 = 1
Good Health -0.0647 -0.0717 -0.1487
Poor Health 0.1074 0.1144 0.1918
Longstanding Illness 0.0228 0.0297 0.0963
Limiting Illness 0.0264 0.0335 0.1191
Bloodpressure Condition -0.1342 -0.1269 -0.0217
High Bloodpressure -0.2106 -0.2033 -0.0967
Cardiovascular Condition 0.0006 0.0075 0.0716
Respiratory Condition -0.244 -0.2372 -0.1781
Mental Health 0.037 0.0454 0.2727
Note: The calculations are described in detail in Section 3.4.5. For the
health variables defined in negative terms, the sign of ξ2 is reversed.
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3.7 Figures
Fig. 3.1: OECD-equivalised Household Income in Logarithms by Cohort
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Source: FES 1978-2003, own calculations. Only every other cohort is shown for legibility reasons.
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Fig. 3.2: OECD-equivalised Total Household Expenditure in Logarithms by Cohort
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Source: FES 1978-2003, own calculations. Only every other cohort is shown for legibility reasons.
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Fig. 3.3: Fraction Reporting Good Health by Cohort
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
Fr
ac
tio
n 
R
ep
or
tin
g 
G
oo
d 
He
al
th
 (G
HS
)
30 40 50 60
Age
1927
1933
1939
1945
1951
1957
1963
Male Low Education
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
Fr
ac
tio
n 
R
ep
or
tin
g 
G
oo
d 
He
al
th
 (G
HS
)
30 40 50 60
Age
1927
1933
1939
1945
1951
1957
1963
Male High Education
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
Fr
ac
tio
n 
R
ep
or
tin
g 
G
oo
d 
He
al
th
 (G
HS
)
30 40 50 60
Age
1927
1933
1939
1945
1951
1957
1963
Female Low Education
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
Fr
ac
tio
n 
R
ep
or
tin
g 
G
oo
d 
He
al
th
 (G
HS
)
30 40 50 60
Age
1927
1933
1939
1945
1951
1957
1963
Female Low Education
Source: GHS 1978-2003, own calculations. Years 1997 and 1999 are interpolated linearly. Only
every other cohort is shown for legibility reasons.
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Fig. 3.4: Fraction with Bloodpressure Condition by Cohort
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4.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a boost in the literature on the generalisability of find-
ings from laboratory experiments. See Harrison and List (2004) for an extensive
discussion. A concern that has been recurring with a particularly high frequency
is the one of subject pool bias. Extrapolation exercises are not inevitably valid
and convenience samples of students do not necessarily constitute the population
of interest. In some cases they may be — for example, testing predictions from
industrial organisation with MBA students seems more sensible than also having
assembly line workers in the laboratory — in many others they are not. The latter
is for example typically the case when it comes to the elicitation of preference pa-
rameters, see for example Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002). There are several
ways of recruiting samples with more demographic variation. One rather labori-
ous possibility is to take the laboratory from the university to the population of
interest; for one of many examples taking this approach see Harrison, List, and
Towe (2007). Sample sizes usually do not exceed those typically encountered in
the laboratory, which may pose a problem in accounting for demographic hetero-
geneity. Another road along the same lines that has become available recently is
to integrate experiments into existing traditional socio-economic household sur-
veys (see Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2003) and, for
an application in our context, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wag-
ner (2005)). Major advantages of this approach are that careful sampling frames
are employed and that a large amount of background information on the sub-
jects comes as a free lunch. Until now, capacity constraints in the survey instru-
ments and the relatively high costs of personal interviews have hindered a more
widespread use of this method. The two cited studies were able to use moderately-
sized subsamples from the much larger German Socio-Economic Panel (N=429
and N=450, respectively). Finally, experimenters used convenience samples of
Internet respondents recruited using newspaper advertising. See Lucking-Reiley
(1999) and Güth, Schmidt, and Sutter (2006) for specific examples. While these
approaches facilitate recruiting very large numbers of participants, there is essen-
tially no control over the recruitment process in most cases. Selection issues may
arise due to the necessity of having access to the Internet and reading a particular
newspaper.
In this paper, we study a relatively standard risk preference elicitation experi-
ment that combines the advantages of the latter two approaches. Our basic sample
consists of 1,928 participants of a household survey conducted over the Internet,
the CentERpanel, based on a stratified random sample of the Dutch population.
Households without access to the Internet are provided access by giving them a
set-top box for their TV (and a TV if necessary). For related papers using the
same source of data see Donkers, Melenberg, and van Soest (2001) who analyse
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risk preferences using hypothetical questions, and Bellemare and Kröger (2007)
who used this panel to conduct the trust game with real payoffs. In order to assess
the importance of subject pool bias, we compare the results to those of parallel
laboratory experiments. However, replacing the laboratory by the Internet also
changes the environment, unlike the case of comparisons based on a “mobile lab-
oratory" approach (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 2005). Potential dif-
ferences due to demographic variation hence are confounded with environment or
implementation mode effects. We address this issue from two angles. First, we in-
troduce a treatment in the laboratory that replicates the Internet setting as closely
as possible. In particular, no experimenter is present while subjects complete the
experiment and there is no restriction to wait for the last person to finish before
leaving the room. Second, our Internet sample is sufficiently large to restrict at-
tention to a subsample that roughly resembles the student population in terms of
age and education. If environmental factors play a role, they should become ev-
ident when comparing results from this subsample to results for the laboratory
experiment.
Even in experiments designed for a broad subject pool, another selection bias
may still arise from nonparticipation or incomplete participation in the experi-
ment. This issue has not received much attention until recently, a notable excep-
tion being Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2005). The main reason for this is that
usually there is little control over the recruitment process. Experimenters typically
collect some demographic information about participating subjects but the corre-
sponding values of nonparticipants are unobserved. We have a lot of information
on certain types of nonparticipants which allows us to address the selection issue
in some detail.
Our results can be summarised as follows. We cannot detect any differences
arising from the environmental treatment for the young and educated. When mov-
ing to the general population, the most dramatic difference is a drastic rise in the
number of violations of the most basic economic principles, namely choosing
dominated options and non-monotonic behaviour. Risk aversion also turns out to
be higher in the overall population. Finally, we detect differential participation
in the experiment and some influence on inconsistent behaviour — participants
typically have observed characteristics that make them less prone to making mis-
takes. Risk preferences do not seem to be seriously affected by participation bias.
We also find evidence of self-selection based on interest and expertise in financial
matters, which calls for some caution in the interpretation of the results.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the design of the
experiments in the laboratory and on the Internet. Section 4.3 discusses partici-
pation and compares the composition of the Internet and the laboratory samples.
Section 4.4 analyses the differences between the choices respondents have made
in the two experiments, looking at errors and inconsistencies as well as implied
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preferences. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data and Experimental Setup
This section lays the foundations for the following chapters in providing a detailed
description of our experimental design and subject pools. The next subsection il-
lustrates the basic set-up of the experiment. Starting out from a well-established
methodology for preference elicitation, the multiple price list format (MPL), we
adapt it in two ways. First, we try to make it cognitively less demanding by includ-
ing pie-chart representations of the probabilities in addition to the number repre-
sentations. Second, the experiment is designed to elicit two preference parameters
besides risk aversion, namely loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and
uncertainty resolution preferences (Kreps and Porteus 1978). After describing the
core section of the experiment, which remains constant across implementations
in the laboratory and over the Internet, we point out the differences. Specifically,
we highlight our design features for disentangling subject pool effects and im-
plementation method effects. The most important of these is the introduction of
two environmental treatments in the laboratory. One replicates traditional experi-
ments, the second mimics the Internet setting as much as possible. We term them
“Lab-Lab" and “Lab-Internet" to avoid confusion with the CentERpanel experi-
ment (for which we use the term “Internet experiment" synonymously). The full
experimental instructions, samples of choice problems, help screens, final ques-
tions, and the debriefing part are available upon request from the authors.
4.2.1 The Multiple Price List Format
The experiments were conducted using an adapted version of the multiple price
list format pioneered in economics by Binswanger (1980) and recently employed
in the context of risk preferences by Holt and Laury (2002). A general and exten-
sive description can be found in Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2006).
Here we stick to a brief depiction and highlight our modifications. In principle the
MPL works as follows: Each subject is presented a list of four lotteries with iden-
tical payoffs but varying probabilities such as the one presented in Figure 4.1.1
In each of the four cases, the participant can choose between Option ‘A’ and Op-
tion ‘B’. The table is designed such that the expected value of lottery ‘A’ starts
out higher but moves up slower than the corresponding figure of lottery ‘B’. A
participant with monotone preferences switches at some point from one to the
other.
1 We use four choices per screen to avoid the need for scrolling and to make it not too over-
whelming for the respondents.
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Fig. 4.1: Screenshot of Lottery 5, First Screen
Progress:  70% Instructions Help
Please, make a choice between A and B for each of the decision problems below.
  
Option A 
-outcome IMMEDIATELY revealed
Option B 
-outcome revealed in THREE 
MONTHS
Choice
A B
€ 21 with probability 25%
€ 18 with probability 75%
€ 54 with probability 25%
€ -9 with probability 75%
€ 21 with probability 50%
€ 18 with probability 50%
€ 54 with probability 50%
€ -9 with probability 50%
€ 21 with probability 75%
€ 18 with probability 25%
€ 54 with probability 75%
€ -9 with probability 25%
€ 21 with probability
100%
€ 18 with probability 0%
€ 54 with probability
100%
€ -9 with probability 0%
   
 Continue
Subjects who are consistent in the sense that they do not switch back and forth
between ‘A’ and ‘B’ and choose the higher certain payoff in the fourth question
are routed to a second screen containing lotteries with the same payoffs, but a
finer probability grid. This consists of 10%-steps located roughly between their
highest choice of ‘A’ and their lowest choice of ‘B’. This is essentially a slightly
modified version of the iterative multiple price list (iMPL) format described in
Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2006). In contrast to earlier studies using
the MPL format we chose to supplement the verbal descriptions of the decision
tasks with pie-charts describing the probabilities of the outcomes. Subjects faced
seven such tasks. We believe that this design is easy to grasp and capable of
generating relatively precise estimates in combination with the iterative procedure.
In order to identify loss aversion, some of the riskier lotteries involved nega-
tive outcomes, see Table 4.1 for the characteristics of each of the lotteries. Note
that payments from the safer option ‘A’ were strictly positive in all cases. All
payments were made three months after the experiment, which allowed us to vary
the timing uncertainty resolution keeping the payment date constant. To intro-
duce variation in the timing of uncertainty resolution we indicated on each screen
whether the outcome of the lottery is revealed immediately or in three months
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Tab. 4.1: Payoffs from the Seven Lotteries
Uncertainty Payoff Payoff Uncertainty Payoff Payoff
Sheet resolution Low, A High, A resolution Low, B High, B
1 early 27 33 early 0 69
2 early 39 48 early 9 87
3 early 12 15 early -15 48
4 early 33 36 late 6 69
5 early 18 21 late -9 54
6 early 24 27 early -3 60
7 late 15 18 late -12 51
Note: These values were shown in the high incentive and hypothetical treatments. For the low
incentive treatment they were divided by three. Order 0 consisted of the sequence of screens
{2, 7, 3, 6, 1, 4, 5} and order 1 of the sequence {1, 4, 5, 2, 6, 3, 7}.
time. If uncertainty was resolved late, the indication was highlighted by red let-
ters, see again Figure 4.1 for an illustration. Pretests showed that it was important
to make it very clear in the instructions that all payments would take place in three
months time. Otherwise some subjects might have been confused with respect to
the timing of the payment and would have confounded time preference and uncer-
tainty resolution preferences. Consequently, we devoted the second page of the
instructions entirely to the payment procedure.
To ensure incentive compatibility one row was selected at random and the sub-
jects were paid according to the outcome of that lottery. In order to avoid negative
payoffs the highest possible loss was chosen not to exceed the fixed participation
fee. Respondents faced seven two-stage multiple price lists aimed at capturing
the three preference parameters. Everybody who answered all first-screen ques-
tions in a consistent fashion hence faced 56 decision problems with seven different
payoff configurations.
4.2.2 The CentERpanel Experiment
The subjects in the Internet experiment are respondents in the CentERpanel, aged
16 and older. Recruitment of subjects and administration of the CentERpanel
is carried out by CentERdata, a survey research institute affiliated with Tilburg
University. The panel contains approximately 2,000 households that are represen-
tative of the Dutch population in terms of observable characteristics. The surveys
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and experiments conducted on the CentERpanel are carried out using an Internet-
based telepanel. To avoid selection bias, households without Internet access are
provided with a set-top box for their TV. Almost every week, the panel members
fill in a questionnaire on the Internet from their home.2 Panel members are re-
imbursed for their costs of participation (fees of dial-up Internet connections etc.)
on a regular basis. Our payments were included in one of these transactions three
months after our experiment.
A major advantage of this setup is that we have access to a sample that is
representative of the population. Moreover we have access to a large amount
of background information on demographics and work; housing and mortgages;
health and income; assets and liabilities. The latter are measured in a particularly
detailed way, distinguishing over 20 different asset components and eight different
forms of liabilities. We conducted the experiments in November and December
of 2005.
We included a non-participation option on the welcome screen after a brief in-
troduction to the experiment. For the two treatments with real incentives, subjects
were told the amount of the participation fee and that they had the chance to win
substantially more or lose (part of) this money again. It was made clear that no
payment would be made upon non-participation. In the hypothetical treatment,
subjects were told that the questionnaire consisted of choices under uncertainty
in a hypothetical setting. They then had to tick one of two buttons, indicating
whether they wanted to participate or not. See Figure 4.2 for the complete intro-
ductory screen of all treatments. In total, 2,299 persons logged into the system.
Slightly less than thirteen percent opted for non-participation on the first screen,
leaving us with 2,008 persons who took part in the experiment. Another eighty
subjects dropped out before completing the questionnaire. Our resulting sample
consists of 1928 subjects who made 98,108 choices among risky prospects. After
going through two pages of online instructions these subjects faced the seven two-
stage multiple price lists. The instructions and specially designed help screens
could be accessed throughout the experiment. These were included to improve
comparability with the laboratory experiments, compensating for the absence of
an experimenter.
We employed a 3x2 treatment design with respect to payoffs and orderings of
the screens. The three payoff treatments consisted of hypothetical and real lot-
teries with the amounts shown in Table 4.1 and another one with real payoffs,
but amounts divided by three. We refer to these as hypothetical, high and low
incentive treatments. All subjects in the high and low incentive groups received
an upfront payment of 15 and 5 Euro, respectively. No payment at all was made
in the hypothetical group. We introduced two randomly determined orderings of
2 For more information about the CentERpanel see http://www.uvt.nl/centerdata/.
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Fig. 4.2: Translations of the Welcome Screens in the CentERpanel Experiment
Hypothetical Treatment
Welcome to this economic experiment carried out by re-
searchers of Tilburg University. The experiment is about
making choices under uncertainty. Please read the instruc-
tions carefully in order to understand how the experiment
works.
If you have questions after the beginning of the experi-
ment, you can return to the instructions by clicking on a
link at the top of the screen. If you have questions on the
specific screen, you can click on ‘Help’ at the top right
corner of the screen.
The questions are not designed to test you. Answers are
therefore not correct or incorrect; please give the answers
that reflect your own preferences.
This questionnaire is about making choices between sev-
eral situations in which you can (hypothetically) gain or
lose money. Your revenue depends on the choices you
make and on chance. What matters is what you would
do in hypothetical situations, in reality, there is noth-
ing at stake for you. If you nevertheless do not want to
participate out of principle, you can indicate this below. In
that case you will not continue with the questionnaire.
O Yes, I proceed with the questionnaire
O No, I do not want to complete this questionnaire
High (Low) Incentive Treatment
Welcome to this economic experiment carried out by re-
searchers of Tilburg University. The experiment is about
making choices under uncertainty. Please read the instruc-
tions carefully in order to understand how the experiment
works.
If you have questions after the beginning of the experi-
ment, you can return to the instructions by clicking on a
link at the top of the screen. If you have questions on the
specific screen, you can click on ‘Help’ at the top right
corner of the screen.
You will receive 15 (5) Euros for participating. Then you
can, depending on the choices you make and on chance,
earn more or lose part of the 15 (5) Euros. If completing
the total experiment, you receive the reward for participat-
ing, possibly increased by your gain (or reduced by your
loss) in one of the choices you have made. Whether the
latter occurs and which choice then determines your pay-
off, will be determined by chance. Your total reward will
be added to your CentERpoints.
The questions are not designed to test you. Answers are
therefore not correct or incorrect; please give the answers
that reflect your own preferences. Assume in each choice
problem that this choice determines your actual payoff.
This questionnaire is about making choices, and your pay-
off depends on your choices and on chance. If you do not
want to participate out of principle, you can indicate this
below. In that case you will not continue with the ques-
tionnaire.
O Yes, I proceed with the questionnaire
O No, I do not want to complete this questionnaire
screens. Order 0 consisted of the sequence {2, 7, 3, 6, 1, 4, 5}, order 1 of the or-
dering {1, 4, 5, 2, 6, 3, 7}. In the incentives treatments, only one in ten respondents
actually got paid for one of the lotteries, everybody received the participation fee
(and respondents were informed about this also).
4.2.3 The Laboratory Experiment
In order to compare the answers in our Internet survey to those in the environment
of a controlled laboratory experiment traditionally used in the large majority of
economic experiments, we performed the same experiment in the economics lab-
oratory at Tilburg University. In total, 203 students participated in the experiment
(8 sessions in September 2005 and 8 sessions in May 2006). To enable compar-
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isons between behaviour in the laboratory and on the Internet, the six treatments
described above were carried out in the laboratory as well. Since the purpose was
to distinguish effects due to different subject pools from potential effects due to
moving from the controlled laboratory setting to the Internet, we also replicated
this latter change in environment in the lab. This was done by performing the
laboratory experiments using two different environmental structures.
The first environment treatment, labelled the “Lab-Lab” treatment was de-
signed to replicate the traditional setup used in laboratory experiments. In par-
ticular, an experimenter was present in the room to help the subjects and answer
questions. The link to the instructions and help screens was deleted from the
screens; otherwise, the screens were similar to the one shown in Figure 4.1. Par-
ticipants also had to wait for everyone else in the session to finish before leaving.
The second environmental treatment, the “Lab-Internet" treatment, differed in that
the experimenter was not present in the laboratory while participants went through
the experiment. When the subjects arrived in the laboratory an experimenter an-
nounced the following before leaving the room: “1. Please do not talk to the other
participants. 2. If you have any questions, please consult the online help screens
and instructions. 3. If you encounter a computer break down, please contact me
outside the room. 4. Make sure you complete the whole questionnaire before
leaving - otherwise your answers won’t get registered and you won’t receive any
payments. 5. When you have finished and have completed the whole experiment,
you may leave.” The main differences compared to the “Lab-Lab” treatment were
hence that there was no experimenter in the room, the availability of help screens,
and the possibility to leave upon completing the experiment without having to wait
for everyone else. Subjects in the laboratory experiments faced the same incen-
tives treatments as CentERpanel respondents, but in the hypothetical treatment,
in contrast to Internet participants, lab participants received a participation fee of
5 Euro. This was necessary for recruitment. The payment procedure for the in-
centives treatments was as in the CentERpanel experiment: The participation fee
was transferred to participants’ bank accounts three months after the experiments,
one in ten subjects received in addition the (possibly negative) payment from one
of the lotteries he had played.
4.3 Selection Effects in the CentERpanel Experiment
A major advantage of conducting the experiment via an existing survey is that
we know many characteristics of the persons eligible for participation, regardless
of whether they actually take part in the experiment or not. This allows us to
monitor the recruitment process much better than usual. In particular, we can
relate the participation decision on the first screen (see Section 4.2.2) to observed
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variables. Put differently, in order to get reliable population-wide estimates, it is
not enough to sample from a representative sub-population unless nonresponse is
perfectly random. Since people self-select into the experiment it is unlikely that
this condition holds.
The fact that selection effects may be important for the outcome of interest
in our setting has been demonstrated recently by Harrison, Lau, and Rutström
(2005). The advantage of our setup compared to theirs is that we have much more
information about non-participants. There is a qualifier to this, however. One
could think of the sampling process for our experiment on the CentERpanel in
four stages. First, Dutch households are contacted at random and choose to par-
ticipate in the CentERpanel or not. Second, a random subsample of CentERpanel
participants is asked to take part in our experiment. Third, after getting to know the
nature of the experiment, some of these people choose to not take part in it. Fourth,
some of the participants drop out or click through the screens extremely rapidly.
The analysis in section 4.3.1 is concerned with step three whereas section 4.3.2
takes a closer look at step four. There is a rich set of background variables avail-
able for these two analyses. For step one, CentERdata provides standard survey
weights based upon a much larger Dutch household survey drawn by Statistics
Netherlands, and the analysis in section 4.4 additionally takes these weights into
account. The construction of the final weights which account for all four steps
is described in section 4.3.3. Note that the selection at step two of the selection
process is completely random by design and does not induce any selection effects.
Steps three and four are especially interesting for experimental economics be-
cause they replicate the recruitment process for laboratory experiments to some
extent. Usually, some information is conveyed on payoffs and the type of exper-
iments before subjects come to the lab. This is exactly what happens on the first
screen of our experiment. We would argue that step four is a type of selection that
is mixed up with step three in a laboratory setting. Fixed costs of going to the
laboratory are higher than those of logging into the experiment on the Internet —
subjects can be expected to have contemplated the costs and benefits of participat-
ing beforehand. This is not necessarily the case for an Internet setting, where the
experiment is “just two mouse clicks away". The cost-benefit analysis may well
be postponed to take place during the experiment. Indeed, people leaving the lab-
oratory prematurely is virtually not an issue in experimental economics, whereas
four percent of subjects do not finish our CentERpanel experiment. Another mate-
rialisation of this story is that some people may speed through the experiment, not
caring much (or at all) about instructions or the like. Taking the shortest duration
observed in the laboratory as a lower bound, some seven percent of respondents
fall into this category. We now investigate in more detail whether steps three and
four bear any relation to observed characteristics of participants.
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4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Participation
Table 4.2 lists some descriptive statistics for the participants in the CentERpanel
and laboratory experiments and for those who opted for non-participation in the
former. The first thing to note is that there is indeed a broad variation over all
characteristics in the first two columns. This is all the more true, albeit not sur-
prising, if compared to the last column. In terms of age category and educational
qualification, the laboratory population represents only five percent of that in the
first two columns. The variables listed in Table 4.2 can be broadly classified into
6 groups: Incentive treatment; education; sex and age; employment status and
residential area; financial literacy and experience; income and wealth. Some of
the questions, particularly those on assets and financial literacy and experience,
are drawn from the DNB household survey (DHS), a survey focusing on financial
issues held among CentERpanel respondents once a year.
Comparing the first two columns, the results suggest some possible paths for
selection effects: Less qualified persons, women, the elderly, subjects without an
occupation and those with high incomes and less asset holdings seem more prone
to decline participation. However, these descriptives may be blurred by correlation
amongst the variables, calling for a more formal analysis. This is less of a concern
for the incentive treatments since we know they have been randomised over the
population. Results are striking with non-participation rates being much higher for
the hypothetical treatment. This is indicative of a path through which monetary
incentives may matter which has not been studied directly so far (cf. Beattie and
Loomes (1997) or Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)), namely through differential
participation in the experiment. Since the type of earnings is often announced in
the recruitment process (“Earn 10 Euros in one hour", “Make up to 23 Euros in
45 minutes", etc.), different subject pools may be attracted.
We carry out a simple exercise to test for selection effects by regressing the
participation decision on observed characteristics in a probit model. Results are
presented in Table 4.3. The first column contains the most basic specification with
the incentive treatments, education, gender, age, occupational status, and residen-
tial area as covariates. In the subsequent columns, the number of observations
is somewhat lower since we have to draw upon questionnaires of the DHS that
not everybody answered. Specification (2) adds the financial variables: whether
the respondent manages the households finances, whether the employer offers a
save-as-you-earn deduction arrangement3, whether the respondent holds such a
3 This is an employer provided savings plan that is heavily subsidized by the state through tax
deductions. See Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2006). Up to some maximum, contributions
are tax deductible and withdrawals after four years or later are not taxed, making net returns much
higher than on any other safe asset for most tax payers. While it is not hard to sign up for these
plans and while the employer does most of the paperwork, the default is not to participate, which
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Tab. 4.2: Selected Characteristics of Participants
Variable Participants, Non-Participants, Participants,
CentERpanel CentERpanel Laboratory
Hypothetical Treatment 31.6 50.2 36.5
Low Incentive Treatment 36.7 23.0 27.0
High Incentive Treatment 31.7 26.8 36.5
Primary/Lower Sec. 31.0 44.1 0.0
Higher Secondary Education 14.0 13.1 0.0
Intermediate Vocational Training 19.6 16.9 0.0
Higher Vocational Training 24.0 20.0 0.0
University Degree 11.4 5.9 100.0
Female 46.5 53.6 45.5
Age 16-34 26.5 14.1 100.0
Age 35-44 19.0 13.4 0.0
Age 45-54 21.7 21.9 0.0
Age 55-64 18.2 17.0 0.0
Age 65+ 15.7 32.7 0.0
Employed, Freelancer, or Self-Employed 55.8 35.7
Unemployed, Looking for Job 2.5 2.8
Other Occupation, Student, Pensioner, Housework 41.7 61.5
Lives in Urban Area 60.0 62.5
HH Financial Administrator 63.8 56.0
Employer offers Savings Plan 43.1 25.5
Holds Employer-Sponsored Sav. Plan 35.4 16.5
Has Savings Account, Deposit Book, etc. 87.0 85.2
Holds Funds, Stocks, Options, etc. 30.6 24.7
Difficult to Manage on Budget 56.0 51.9
HH Income <14k Euro 10.0 11.0
HH Income 14k-22k Euro 24.2 24.1
HH Income 22k-40k Euro 48.8 51.2
HH Income >40k Euro 17.0 13.8
Mean Log Total Asset Holdings excl. Accom. 7.37 2.77
Maximum Number of Observations 2,008 291 178
Note: Except for the last two rows, numbers indicate column percentages. The next to the last row indi-
cates mean log assets and the last row shows the number of observations, not taking into account any item
non-response on some of the previous variables. “Difficult to Manage on Budget" refers to answering “very
hard", “hard", or “neither hard nor easy" to the question “How well can you manage on the total income of
your household?", the remaining options are “easy" and “very easy". Some households did not complete the
questionnaires of the DHS from which some of the variables are drawn. Hence the number of observations is
lower for some of the variables in question.
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plan, whether the household’s financial portfolio includes savings accounts and
the like, and whether it includes mutual funds, stocks, etc.. Specifications (3)
to (5) add in turn some measures of income and wealth: First, a subjective income
variable; second, household income in four categories; and third, the logarithm of
total asset holdings.
Results are very consistent across specifications. They indicate that persons in
the top two education categories are indeed significantly more likely to participate
in the experiment. The gender effect also confirms what the bivariate correlations
suggested with women being more likely not to take part. Age effects start to mat-
ter at age 45, where participation rates are smaller than for younger persons. They
are more pronounced for higher age categories, point estimates rise monotonously.
Those beyond 65 years of age are significantly less likely to start the experiment
than all other age groups. Point estimates for working (as opposed to not partic-
ipating in the labour market) are negative, but small and generally insignificant.
The point estimates indicate that the unemployed are more likely to participate
in the experiment, but the difference with persons outside the labour force is in-
significant. Residents in an urban area have somewhat lower participation rates.4
With respect to the incentive treatment, the results in Table 4.2 are confirmed.
Being assigned to an incentive treatment significantly increases the propensity to
participate in the experiment. Surprisingly, the point estimate is higher for the low
incentive treatment. However, the difference to the high incentive treatment is just
significant at the 5%-level in the first specification (χ2 = 4.96) and insignificant in
all remaining estimations. We conclude that incentives do seem to increase overall
subject turnout. Their size does not seem to have an impact, though.
Adding the financial variables mainly serves the purpose to control for individ-
uals’ preferences and their financial knowledge. Being the financial administrator
of the household for example may reflect a preference for spending one’s time
with risky choice problems (the opposite line of argumentation is probably more
intuitive: not being the financial administrator of the household is on average in-
dicative of a general dislike to deal with such questions). It significantly increases
the propensity to participate. Whether the employer offers a savings plan is just a
control variable that is necessary in order to not confound the effects of holding
such a plan with one’s employment status (note that the latter is only imperfectly
controlled for by the direct measures). The variable of interest, taking part in a
save-as-you-earn savings arrangement, emerges highly significant and negative.
We view this as supporting the interpretation of the financial variables as to reflect
a certain preference to contemplate financial questions. This is strengthened by
may explain why employees with little financial knowledge or interest often do not sign up, cf.,
e.g., the work of Madrian and Shea (2001) on non-take up of 401(k) plans.
4 We also tested for interaction effects but did not find any of them to be important.
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Tab. 4.3: Nonparticipation in the CentERpanel Experiment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low Incentive Treatment -.475∗∗∗ -.502∗∗∗ -.541∗∗∗ -.505∗∗∗ -.501∗∗∗
(.079) (.090) (.097) (.090) (.090)
High Incentive Treatment -.289∗∗∗ -.426∗∗∗ -.419∗∗∗ -.428∗∗∗ -.425∗∗∗
(.078) (.094) (.100) (.094) (.094)
Higher Secondary Education -.187∗ -.184 -.173 -.184 -.187
(.104) (.122) (.129) (.123) (.122)
Intermediate Vocational Training -.129 -.147 -.118 -.151 -.149
(.096) (.113) (.119) (.113) (.113)
Higher Vocational Training -.202∗∗ -.179∗ -.197∗ -.185∗ -.181∗
(.090) (.105) (.115) (.108) (.105)
University Degree -.247∗∗ -.285∗ -.258 -.283∗ -.289∗
(.121) (.149) (.159) (.153) (.149)
Female .187∗∗∗ .151∗ .176∗∗ .157∗∗ .151∗
(.067) (.079) (.084) (.079) (.079)
Age 35-44 .107 .149 .177 .145 .148
(.107) (.134) (.148) (.134) (.134)
Age 45-54 .152 .236∗ .264∗ .237∗ .233∗
(.101) (.124) (.136) (.125) (.124)
Age 55-64 .179∗ .353∗∗∗ .423∗∗∗ .347∗∗∗ .346∗∗∗
(.107) (.127) (.139) (.128) (.127)
Age 65+ .553∗∗∗ .691∗∗∗ .705∗∗∗ .683∗∗∗ .679∗∗∗
(.112) (.136) (.148) (.137) (.138)
Employed, Freelancer, or Self-Employed -.157∗ -.024 -.045 -.032 -.023
(.085) (.106) (.114) (.107) (.106)
Unemployed, Looking for Job .226 .287 .301 .298 .289
(.196) (.227) (.244) (.228) (.227)
Lives in Urban Area .106 .151∗ .208∗∗ .150∗ .151∗
(.067) (.080) (.086) (.080) (.080)
HH Financial Administrator -.147∗ -.187∗∗ -.137∗ -.146∗
(.081) (.087) (.083) (.081)
Employer offers Savings Plan .165 .128 .160 .160
(.141) (.157) (.142) (.142)
Holds Employer-Sponsored Sav. Plan -.482∗∗∗ -.447∗∗∗ -.479∗∗∗ -.477∗∗∗
(.150) (.167) (.151) (.151)
Has Savings Account, Deposit Book, etc. .033 -.012 .023 -.005
(.114) (.122) (.114) (.138)
Holds Funds, Stocks, Options, etc. -.153∗ -.242∗∗ -.156∗ -.161∗
(.087) (.096) (.087) (.088)
Difficult to Manage on Budget -.059
(.087)
HH Income 14k-22k Euro .094
(.146)
HH Income 22k-40k Euro .123
(.140)
HH Income >40k Euro .072
(.168)
Log Total Asset Holdings excl. Accom. .008
(.017)
Constant -.922∗∗∗ -.923∗∗∗ -.900∗∗∗ -1.007∗∗∗ -.945∗∗∗
(.119) (.177) (.207) (.207) (.183)
No. of Observations 2296 1802 1626 1802 1802
Note: Coefficients and standard errors of simple probit regressions on opting for nonparticipation on the first screen of the
CentERpanel experiment. Left-out categories of relevant variables are hypothetical treatment; primary and lower secondary
education; ages 18-34; other type of occupation; and household income less than 14,000 Euro. “Difficult to Manage on
Budget" refers to answering “very hard", “hard", or “neither hard nor easy" to the question “How well can you manage on the
total income of your household?", the remaining options are “easy" and “very easy". All other variables are self-explanatory.
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level.
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the other two portfolio variables. On the one hand, having an ordinary savings
account does not seem to have any predictive power for taking part in the experi-
ment. Saving accounts are a class of products that virtually everybody knows from
childhood. They have a very simple structure and do not require much expertise
or effort. On the other hand, the ownership of mutual funds, stocks, and the like
is significantly associated with higher participation rates. These are much more
sophisticated products and investing in them requires more financial knowledge.
The point made here is similar to the finding of Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber
(2006) that many subjects are willing to pay a positive price in order to avoid be-
ing the proposer in a dictator game. In the context of risky choice experiments,
subjects who dislike such situations just do not participate.
Finally, turning to specifications (3) to (5), it becomes evident that none of the
income and wealth variables are associated with participation. Point estimates are
generally small and insignificant, and a joint test confirms this.
4.3.2 Perseverance
As discussed above, Internet experiments may suffer from an additional selection
issue that is not a concern with laboratory experiments – either through dropping
out of the experiment before completion or through very rapid completion of the
tasks without giving them serious thought. Considering the latter as a form of
nonparticipation is motivated by the fact that there is a lower bound on the time
needed to digest the instructions and give nonrandom answers to all the questions.
It is certainly higher than the 1:43 minutes which is the minimum amount of time
that one subject in the Internet experiment needed in order to click through the
screens. After doing some robustness checks, we settled for the minimum duration
observed in the laboratory as a cut-off point (5:20 minutes).
We attributed this fourth step in the full selection process to drastically lower
fixed costs of taking part in our Internet experiment and argued that most subjects
who exhibit either behaviour would not enter a laboratory in the first place. Hence
selection problems are similar. There is at least one alternative interpretation,
namely interaction with the experimenter and typical rules in the laboratory. The
most salient mechanism of how this may matter is the possibility to ask questions.
If a subject does not understand (part of) a task, he may opt for randomly ticking
options or drop out entirely. Another reason is that in typical laboratory experi-
ments everybody is expected to stay until the last subject has finished. Hence there
is no point in rapid completion - people might just as well spend the time which
they have to stay in the laboratory anyway on the experiment. We do not think
that this explanation is very likely however, because we largely control for these
effects via the “Lab-Lab" and “Lab-Internet" treatments of the laboratory experi-
ments (see section 4.2.3). The minimum amount of time spent on the laboratory
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experiments is actually found in the “Lab-Lab" treatment, the smallest value in
the “Lab-Internet" treatment is about 80 seconds longer. Overall, dispersion is
much higher in the traditional Lab-lab treatment (standard deviation 4.71 vs. 3.92
in the “Lab-Internet" treatment), and the left hand tail of the distribution in the
“Lab-lab" treatment has more mass than in the “Lab-Internet" treatment. Hence
we definitely cannot find more mass in the left tail of the “Lab-Internet" treat-
ment durations, which is what one would expect from the second explanation of
the selection mechanism. Of course the comparison between these two treatment
only applies to the young and highly educated lab population, and not necessarily
to other population groups. Especially not understanding the tasks is a concern
that we cannot fully discard. This may indeed introduce an additional problem of
selection bias in Internet experiments as compared to those in the laboratory.
We investigate the two selection mechanisms from step four (not completing
or completing n less than 5:20 minutes) of the process described in the introduc-
tion to this chapter by estimating a multinomial logit model. The dependent vari-
able classifies participating subjects (N= 2, 008) into three categories. The first
category is made up of 138 persons who took less than five minutes and twenty
seconds to complete the entire experiment. Eighty subjects dropped out entirely
after starting with the experiment and enter group two. The remaining category,
our final sample used in the remainder of the paper, consists of 1,789 subjects
and constitutes the baseline category of the regression. Results are presented in
Table 4.4. The construction of the estimates is similar to the one in Table 4.3.
We first present an estimation that maximises the number of observations. Coef-
ficients are listed in column (1) for those who fall under the duration cut-off and
in column (2) for those who drop out. We then sacrifice a sixth of our sample
for a richer set of covariates. Coefficients are listed in columns (3) and (4) which
correspond to columns (1) and (2), respectively.
The only case where an incentive treatment seems to matter is that for high
incentives the probability of rapid completion decreases. The other estimates all
point in the same direction or are very close to zero. However, standard errors
are too large for inference. Columns (1) and (3) indicate that subjects with more
education were less likely to rapidly click through the experimental screens. Our
interpretation of this is related to the difficulty of the experiment: One reaction
of subjects who do not understand the task may be to finish it as fast as possible,
while not foregoing the chance to win some money in case of the real incentive
treatments. Direct tests for the latter could be based on interaction effects of ed-
ucation and incentive treatment. They did not produce any significant results, but
sample sizes relevant for such questions are very small despite the rather large
pool of participants. Evidence with respect to dropping out is mixed. Results
generally point in the same direction as for rapid completion, yet only one point
estimate barely reaches significance.
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Tab. 4.4: Abortion and Abbreviation of the CentERpanel Experiment
Specification / Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Incentive Treatment -.212 -.261 -.283 -.403
(.211) (.288) (.235) (.338)
High Incentive Treatment -.519∗∗ .026 -.467∗ -.205
(.235) (.279) (.260) (.337)
Higher Secondary Education -.070 -.110 -.204 -.830
(.263) (.376) (.296) (.515)
Intermediate Vocational Training -.181 -.164 -.151 -.513
(.245) (.355) (.275) (.426)
Higher Vocational Training -1.003∗∗∗ -.243 -1.075∗∗∗ -.709∗
(.300) (.341) (.347) (.419)
University Degree -1.259∗∗∗ .280 -1.247∗∗ -.175
(.457) (.361) (.517) (.453)
Female .316∗ .233 .435∗∗ -.143
(.191) (.239) (.212) (.291)
Age 35-44 -.533∗∗ -.289 -.575∗∗ -.500
(.232) (.335) (.275) (.424)
Age 45-54 -1.127∗∗∗ -1.010∗∗ -1.094∗∗∗ -1.311∗∗∗
(.260) (.397) (.293) (.492)
Age 55-64 -1.861∗∗∗ -.566 -1.840∗∗∗ -.731∗
(.369) (.379) (.398) (.440)
Age 65+ -2.817∗∗∗ .027 -2.625∗∗∗ -.263
(.609) (.383) (.617) (.477)
Employed, Freelancer, or Self-Employed -.073 -.054 -.147 .028
(.214) (.313) (.239) (.380)
Unemployed, Looking for Job -.577 .966∗ -.290 1.176∗
(.751) (.540) (.766) (.623)
Lives in Urban Area -.231 .215 -.216 .244
(.186) (.247) (.207) (.296)
HH Financial Administrator -.763∗∗∗ .112
(.222) (.312)
Has Savings Account, Deposit Book, etc. .352 .208
(.341) (.447)
Holds Funds, Stocks, Options, etc. .014 .224
(.238) (.312)
HH Income 14k-22k Euro .274 -.505
(.449) (.503)
HH Income 22k-40k Euro .457 -.221
(.432) (.462)
HH Income >40k Euro .840∗ -.194
(.482) (.569)
Constant -1.211∗∗∗ -2.920∗∗∗ -1.611∗∗∗ -2.499∗∗∗
(.281) (.423) (.573) (.728)
No. of Observations 2006 2006 1689 1689
Note: Coefficients and standard errors of multinomial logit regression. Columns indicate categories of the
dependent variable by regression type. The reference category are those who completed the experiment in
more than 5:20 minutes. Columns (1) and (3) contain coefficients for completing the experiment in less
than 5:20 minutes; columns (2) and (4) those for dropping out before completing the experiment. Left-out
categories of relevant variables are hypothetical treatment; primary and lower secondary education; ages
18-34; other type of occupation; and household income less than 14,000 Euro. “Difficult to Manage on
Budget" refers to answering “very hard", “hard", or “neither hard nor easy" to the question “How well can
you manage on the total income of your household?", the remaining options are “easy" and “very easy".
All other variables are self-explanatory. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level.
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Women not only have a smaller propensity to participate than men, they also
have a higher propensity to quickly go through the experiments. They do not seem
to be more likely to drop out, though. Older participants are more likely to make
it into our final sample. This is mainly due to the fact that people are less likely to
complete the experiment rapidly. Part of this result is surely due to lower computer
skills among the elderly, however effects are already visible for ages around forty.
They then exhibit a monotonic increase. Drop-outs are least prevalent for people
in their late forties and early fifties. The unemployed exhibit the highest quitting
rates relative to groups with a different occupational status. Coefficients are only
borderline significant, though.
The preference argument with respect to the financial variables goes through
again, albeit not over such a broad range of variables as for the participation de-
cision. In particular, ownership of mutual funds and of an employer-sponsored
savings plan (not shown for brevity reasons) does not help to predict either out-
come. On the other hand, being the financial administrator of the household is
associated with a lower propensity to rapidly go through the tasks, reinforcing
our argument from the above discussion. Finally, being in the top income class
is related to a higher probability of speeding through the questionnaire, proba-
bly reflecting a larger opportunity cost of time. Given the low significance, this
interpretation should not be overly stressed, though.
4.3.3 Overall Selection and Construction of Sampling Weights
Breaking up the selection process in different components and subcomponents is
important for a better understanding of the mechanisms, but what matters for the
outcome of interest are overall effects. For example, while results on incentive
effects point in the same direction in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, this is not the case for
age effects. To look at this issue, we constructed a binary variable that included
our final sample in one category and all nonparticipants, drop-outs, and rapid
finishers in the other. As in section 4.3.1, we then ran simple probit regressions
of participation on both the parsimonious set of covariates and richer ones. For
reasons of brevity, we stick to a verbal description of the effects since they are not
surprising. Tables are available from the authors upon request.
The payment of incentives leads to much higher participation rates overall.
The marginal effect for either incentive treatment is a little above twelve percent
(with the baseline participation rate for the hypothetical treatment and all dum-
mies in the rich specification set to zero being at 80%). Being in the top two edu-
cation classes is significantly associated with selection into the experiment while
females are much less likely to enter our final sample. The financial variables
are still indicative of a higher participation probability, especially being the finan-
cial administrator and taking part in a save-as-you-earn arrangement. Ownership
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of mutual funds is not quite significant in overall participation. Being in the top
income decile is borderline significant for a lower propensity to take part in the
experiment. In the case of the age variables, there are some important neutralisa-
tion effects. Recall that age was associated with a higher propensity to start the
experiment, but also with higher rates of speeding and dropping out. The consol-
idated values show an important increase in participation rates for ages 45 to 64
in the parsimonious specification, higher perseverance rates dominate here. Both
effects just cancel for the elderly and also for the other groups when we move to
the richer specification.
For testing whether selection effects matter for the analysis in the next section,
we invoke the assumption that observations are conditionally missing at random
(CMAR; see, e.g., Little and Rubin (2002)). That is, we assume that the nonre-
sponse decision is random after controlling for factors observable to us. We then
can construct weights from the probit model estimated here by taking the inverse
of the predicted probability of being in the final sample. These weights do not
capture the whole selection process yet, since they only correct for steps three and
four. As detailed above, CentERdata provides weights similar to ours that control
for the rest. By combining the two sets of weights we can account for the full pro-
cess. More specifically, the CentERdata weights are multiplied with the predicted
inverse probability of participation and then normalised through dividing by the
population average of this product. Due to sample size considerations we opt for
the parsimonious specification in the probit regression. We then can proceed to
test whether results from the weighted sample are the same as those from the raw
data.
A final note at this point concerns how our approach to the selection issue
compares to the selection model pioneered by Heckman (1979) and less paramet-
ric versions of that model. This is the solution that comes immediately to mind
upon the cue “selection problem", due to its widespread use and generality. In
particular, Heckman’s model allows for a selection mechanism based on unob-
servable characteristics while the CMAR assumption does not. The reason for not
employing it here is that the model relies on the existence of valid instruments,
one or more variables that affect the selection decision while having no impact
upon the outcome of interest. The above-sketched results on the financial vari-
ables can be seen as indirect evidence for selection based on preferences towards
dealing with risky choice situations, but such preferences may also be correlated
with risk preferences and (or) error frequencies, and are therefore unlikely to serve
as valid instruments. We cannot think of any valid instruments and certainly do
not see any in our set of background variables (which is much broader than what is
mentioned and relevant in this paper), since participation and risk preferences and
error frequencies are too closely interwoven. Therefore we stick to concentrating
on the effects of selection on observables.
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4.4 Errors and Preferences
This section compares behaviour between the laboratory and the Internet treat-
ments in order to assess the importance of subject pool composition and the In-
ternet interface. We also consider whether the selection process discussed in the
previous section has an effect on the aggregated measures of behaviour.
4.4.1 Errors and Inconsistencies in the Lab vs. the CentERpanel
As a starting point for a further analysis of behaviour we analyse to what extent
the subjects’ choices were consistent with the standard assumption of monotonic
preferences. In our design, there are three patterns of choices that we consider as
inconsistent. First, choosing option ‘B’ when there is a zero probability for the
high outcome to occur or choosing ‘A’ when there is a 100 percent probability for
the high outcome to occur, clearly violates dominance. A second type of inconsis-
tency emerges when subjects switch back and forth on the same screen. Finally, a
third category of violations consists of inconsistent choices between screens with
the same payoffs. Recall that we use an iterative version of the MPL, where after
choosing among four options on a first screen, subjects are transferred to a sec-
ond screen with the same payoffs but with a finer partition of probabilities. There
were some overlaps of probabilities between screens enabling subjects to make a
choice on the second screen that is inconsistent with the choice made on the first
screen. In Table 4.5, the averages of dominance or monotonicity violations are
presented by treatment and choice task. Note also that only one violation per sub-
ject is counted for each of the screens, limiting the maximum amount of mistakes
to seven.
The striking fact revealed by Table 4.5 is that the numbers of violations are
much higher in the Internet experiment than in the laboratory experiment. The per-
centage of inconsistent answers varies between 9% and 23% in the lab, whereas it
ranges between 31% and 39% among the Internet participants. Clearly, answers
made by the laboratory subjects were more consistent which is confirmed using
the Mann-Whitney (MW) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) nonparametric tests on
the number of inconsistencies per subject aggregating over all screens. Irrespec-
tive of whether we look at each type of violation separately or whether we aggre-
gate over all types of violations we can reject the null hypothesis that observations
are drawn from the same sample using both tests (two-sided p-values<0.01).
One of the possible sources behind this difference between the laboratory and
the Internet is the different environment under which these experiments were con-
ducted. The presence of an experimenter in the laboratory experiments is for
example one factor that might have an impact upon answers. To assess this is-
sue we investigate the percentage of violations in the “Lab-Lab" treatment with
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the “Lab-Internet" treatment. Contrary to this hypothesis, the figures in Table 4.5
indicate that violations are slightly more common in the “Lab-Lab" than the “Lab-
Internet" treatment. These differences are, however, not significant if judged by
the MW and KS tests (p-values>0.1). The higher frequency of violations ob-
served in the Internet treatment is thus most likely not driven by the presence of
an experimenter or the ability to leave immediately after finishing the experiment.
Following these results, the natural explanation behind the disparity between
the results from the laboratory and the Internet experiment lies in the different
characteristics of the subject pools. A way to investigate this is to compare choices
of the laboratory sample with a subsample of the Internet sample that share some
important characteristics of the laboratory sample. On these grounds, we formed a
subsample labelled “Uni", consisting of all respondents between 18 and 34 years
of age with a university education. When restricting attention to this subsample,
behaviour of the Internet participants resembles that of the student sample. The
fraction of violations among the “Uni" subsample ranges between 0.15 and 0.22,
which is covered by the 0.09 to 0.23 range observed among the laboratory sub-
jects. Overall violations in the “Lab-Lab" treatment and from the “Uni" subsample
are almost exactly the same. All these differences are also insignificant using the
KS and MW tests. The higher frequency of errors in the Internet treatment seems
hence to be driven by the characteristics of the different subject pools. Different
implementation forms do not seem to play a role, at least not for the young and
educated.
A related issue is whether subjects in the two experiments commit the same
type of errors. Investigating the relative frequency of the three different types of
violations described above, it turns out that this in is not the case. In both the lab-
oratory and the Internet treatments 17.9% of the violations were due to switching
back and forth within screens. In the laboratory 72.5 % of the violations were due
to nonmonotonicities between screens with a corresponding figure of 43.6 % in
the Internet. Finally, dominance violations made up 9.6% of the violations in the
lab, but 38.4% in the Internet treatment. Nonmonotonicities between screens is,
hence, the prevailing source of errors in the laboratory sample, whereas violation
of dominance plays a much more pronounced role in the Internet treatment. Along
these lines, looking at the average number of inconsistencies per type we detect
a higher number of violations within screens in the Internet treatment. Still, the
main factor behind the difference is found in the number of violations of domi-
nance. The pattern found in the laboratory replicates results reported by Loomes,
Moffatt, and Sugden (2002) on a different risky choice design, namely very few
dominance violations and rather frequent inconsistencies when faced with iden-
tical decision problems twice. For the general population, this changes dramati-
cally.
Another important question is whether providing monetary incentives makes
94 Chapter 4. Experimental Elicitation of Preferences
Tab. 4.5: Average Number of Answers that Violate Monotonicity or Dominance
Sample All Sheets Sheet 1 Sheet 2 Sheet 3 Sheet 4 Sheet 5 Sheet 6 Sheet 7 N
Laboratory
All 1.21 0.17 0.20 0.09 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.22 178
Lab-Lab 1.29 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.27 90
Lab-Internet 1.14 0.16 0.20 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.20 0.17 88
Order 0 1.28 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.29 0.13 0.18 0.30 87
Order 1 1.15 0.19 0.22 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.14 91
Incentive 0 1.32 0.17 0.20 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.20 0.22 65
Incentive 1 1.23 0.19 0.21 0.06 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.21 48
Incentive 3 1.09 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.20 0.11 0.14 0.23 65
CentERpanel
All 2.43 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.35 1789
Uni 1.28 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.19 96
Order 0 2.54 0.28 0.35 0.32 0.44 0.39 0.31 0.45 913
Order 1 2.32 0.41 0.38 0.30 0.33 0.28 0.37 0.24 876
Incentive 0 2.49 0.36 0.38 0.29 0.43 0.34 0.35 0.33 555
Incentive 1 2.41 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.32 0.34 0.35 660
Incentive 3 2.40 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.36 574
CentERpanel - Weighted
Incentive 0 2.59 0.38 0.40 0.30 0.44 0.36 0.36 0.35 555
Incentive 1 2.70 0.38 0.42 0.35 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.39 659
Incentive 3 2.50 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.33 0.38 573
Note: A choice pattern is classified as violating monotonicity or dominance if a subject switched back and forth between
options ‘A’ and ‘B’ or if he chose option ‘A’ for the sure high outcome. No more than one violation is counted for each of
the seven decision tasks.
subjects take more care in answering the questions and make fewer errors. Gener-
ally, this is not the case, as can be seen by comparing the percentage of violations
across the different incentives treatments in Table 4.5. Also comparing the differ-
ences between screens across questions, we cannot report significant differences
using both tests. Finally, we note that the ordering of screens does seem to have
an impact on the number of violations. Averaging over all sheets, we can detect
a marginally lower error rate for order treatment 1 in the CentERpanel, but not in
the laboratory. On the other hand, differences of several individual screens show
up as significant. We do not find any clear pattern in terms of learning, fatigue,
or screen sequencing, however. Hence there seems to be another direction of
how framing effects may matter besides inducing different levels of risk aversion
(Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 2006)— different probabilities to exhibit
inconsistent behaviour.
To assess implications of the selection process sketched in section 4.3.3 on the
observed distribution of preferences, the characteristics of the non-respondents
have to be taken into account. Using the weights described in section 4.3.3, we
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conclude from the figures in Table 4.5 that not correcting for selection would lead
to a slight underestimation of the number of violations. T-tests reveal a strongly
significant effect overall (two-sided p-value=0.0008). Breaking this down individ-
ually by incentive treatment, we find that it is mostly driven by the low incentives
group. These results go in the direction that one would expect from the the find-
ings reported in section 4.3.3 for the education variables, since one would expect
better educated people to make fewer errors. For the other variables, we did not
have clear priors.
4.4.2 Preferences in the Lab vs. the CentERpanel
To obtain a crude measure of preferences we consider at which probability of the
high outcome subjects switched from (the safe) option A to (the risky) option B.
However, as highlighted in the previous section, a considerable amount of partic-
ipants made inconsistent choices, either by switching back and forth on the same
screen, or by choosing a dominated option. This implies that not all subjects have
a unique switch point, and we need to define what we label a lowest switch point
and a highest switch point. The lowest possible switch point is defined by the
probability corresponding to the highest ‘A’ choice that still is lower than the min-
imum ‘B’ choice. We define the highest switch point as the minimum probability
observed for option ‘B’ which is still higher than the maximum probability where
option ‘A’ was chosen. If only choice ‘A’ (‘B’) was observed, both switch points
were set to one (zero). To get a single measure we also calculated the mean of
these two switch points for each individual.
Table 4.6 displays the average switch points by sample and treatment. A
higher number indicates that subjects, on average, switched at a higher proba-
bility for the high outcome to occur, thus indicating a more risk averse behaviour.
Note, that except for the rows labelled “Incentive 1", subjects in the low incentive
treatment were excluded since they faced a different payoff scale which renders
comparisons of switch points misleading if pooled with other subjects. A second
note of caution concerns the treatment of errors which cannot be entirely separated
from preferences. On the one hand, monotonicity violations lead to a large dif-
ference between the lowest and the highest switch point. We cannot judge which
is the right one in this interval. Hence, comparing two mean switch points may
lead to false conclusions if the intervals they are based on have different lengths.5
5 A numerical example might help to make the point clearer. Assume that person 1 exhibited
consistent behaviour with a low switch point of 0.6 and the high value at 0.7. She is compared with
a second person who chose a pattern ‘ABAB’ on the first screen, leading to a low switch point of
0.25 and a high switch point of 1. A ranking in terms of preferences based on mean switch points
would be seriously misleading since the interval revealed by person 1 is completed covered by the
second persons possible set of switch points.
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For a valid ranking of preferences both sets of lowest and highest switch points
must rank in the same way. On the other hand, this ranking may be affected by
dominance violations where both switch points are the same. We checked that all
results reported in this section also go through if switch points are set to missing
in these cases. Having said this, we often stick to comparisons of mean switch
points for expositional reasons since the above-mentioned effects did not have
much empirical relevance.
Comparing the answers between the laboratory and the Internet (first rows in
the respective sections of Table 4.6), it is evident that there are some noteworthy
differences in the observed behaviour. The average switch points in the Internet
experiment are visibly higher than the corresponding figures for the laboratory
experiments. Moreover, the difference between the two samples is found across
all sheets. Consequently, the degree of risk aversion appears to be lower among the
students in the laboratory than among the participants of the Internet experiment.
Using the MW and KS we find that the difference between the laboratory and
Internet samples is highly significant irrespective of which average switch point
we use. That is, no matter whether we look at the lowest or highest switch point
and whether we compare averages across all questions or look at each question
separately, there is a significant difference between the choices made by the two
samples.
To disentangle the different explanations for these observed differences, we
proceed as in section 4.4.1 by comparing the average switch points in the “Lab-
Lab" treatment and the“Lab-Internet" treatment. The mean switch points are
slightly higher in the “Lab-Lab" treatment suggesting that the observed differ-
ence between the laboratory and the Internet samples is most probable not due
to characteristics of the laboratory setting since we would then expect the differ-
ence to be in the other direction. There is, however no clear systematic difference
between the two treatments considering each screen separately. Comparing the
treatments using the MW and KS tests reveals that we are not able to soundly
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the samples for any
of the measures.
Just as in the case of inconsistencies, behaviour of the Internet participants gets
close to the student sample when restricting attention to the “Uni" subsample. The
mean switch point of 65.1 aggregating over all screens of the “Uni" sample pre-
sented in Table 4.6 is closer to the laboratory mean of 61.5. When looking at the
separate price lists the averages are comparable in most cases. Using the MW and
KS tests on individual mean switch points the differences are insignificant except
for sheets 3 and 5. Controlling for subject group differences hence eliminates most
of the differences between the samples. The disparity found between both errors
and preferences in the Internet sample and the laboratory experiments thus seems
to be driven by the fact that behaviour of the homogenous student differs from the
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Tab. 4.6: Mean, lowest, and highest average switch points by subsample and treatment
Sample All Sheets Sheet 1 Sheet 2 Sheet 3 Sheet 4 Sheet 5 Sheet 6 Sheet 7
Laboratory
All 61.5 63.0 57.8 63.5 53.9 67.7 63.3 61.8
55.7 67.4 57.2 68.8 51.8 63.7 58.5 68.5 47.3 60.5 62.6 72.7 57.5 69.0 54.8 68.8
Lab-Lab 60.3 60.4 58.8 61.1 51.7 66.5 63.0 60.6
54.4 66.2 54.2 66.5 53.3 64.3 55.9 66.3 44.4 59.0 61.8 71.3 57.7 68.2 53.5 67.7
Lab-Internet 63.1 66.1 56.5 66.3 56.5 69.0 63.6 63.2
57.2 68.9 60.7 71.5 50.1 63.0 61.5 71.1 50.8 62.3 63.6 74.5 57.3 70.0 56.4 70.1
Order 0 59.7 68.2 55.5 64.3 52.9 63.4 57.3 56.0
54.0 65.4 63.1 73.4 50.6 60.5 59.4 69.1 46.4 59.5 58.4 68.4 51.7 62.9 48.0 64.0
Order 1 63.4 57.8 59.9 62.7 54.8 71.8 69.1 67.3
57.3 69.4 51.4 64.3 53.0 66.8 57.6 67.9 48.1 61.5 66.7 77.0 63.1 75.0 61.3 73.4
Incentive 0 61.3 63.8 57.7 63.7 50.3 67.8 62.7 62.8
55.4 67.2 58.1 69.6 51.7 63.6 58.9 68.5 43.6 57.1 62.8 72.8 56.7 68.8 55.7 69.9
Incentive 1 58.2 58.6 51.3 61.6 54.8 64.2 59.4 57.4
52.1 64.3 53.2 64.1 44.5 58.0 56.4 66.9 48.9 60.7 57.5 70.8 53.9 65.0 50.5 64.4
Incentive 3 61.8 62.1 57.9 63.3 57.4 67.5 63.8 60.7
55.9 67.7 56.2 67.9 52.0 63.8 58.0 68.5 50.9 63.9 62.3 72.6 58.3 69.3 53.8 67.6
CentERpanel
All 70.4 70.8 64.8 75.5 62.2 78.2 71.1 69.9
63.7 77.0 63.9 77.7 57.8 71.8 69.9 81.1 54.7 69.8 72.3 84.0 65.1 77.1 62.3 77.5
Uni 65.1 65.9 59.0 71.7 55.9 73.7 65.6 64.1
59.1 71.1 60.5 71.4 53.4 64.5 66.0 77.3 49.7 62.1 67.1 80.3 59.5 71.8 57.4 70.7
Order 0 68.7 76.7 63.1 76.6 61.9 76.1 64.3 62.5
62.2 75.3 71.7 81.6 56.7 69.5 71.4 81.9 54.8 69.1 69.9 82.2 58.2 70.5 53.0 72.0
Order 1 72.1 64.3 66.7 74.3 62.5 80.5 78.5 78.0
65.3 78.9 55.3 73.3 59.0 74.4 68.3 80.3 54.5 70.5 75.0 86.0 72.6 84.4 72.4 83.5
Incentive 0 70.6 71.7 64.0 76.2 62.0 78.8 71.7 70.0
64.0 77.2 64.7 78.7 57.2 70.8 70.7 81.7 54.6 69.5 72.9 84.6 65.8 77.5 62.4 77.6
Incentive 1 68.0 68.8 63.3 71.0 62.1 73.6 69.6 67.7
61.2 74.8 61.5 76.1 55.6 71.0 65.0 77.1 55.0 69.1 67.4 79.9 63.5 75.6 60.4 74.9
Incentive 3 70.1 69.9 65.6 74.9 62.4 77.6 70.5 69.8
63.4 76.8 63.1 76.7 58.4 72.8 69.2 80.5 54.7 70.1 71.7 83.5 64.3 76.8 62.2 77.4
CentERpanel - Weighted
Incentive 0 71.3 72.5 64.5 76.7 63.1 79.5 72.6 70.0
64.5 78.1 65.2 79.8 57.8 71.2 70.9 82.5 55.5 70.6 73.3 85.7 66.6 78.7 62.1 77.9
Incentive 1 69.2 69.9 64.5 72.5 63.2 74.6 70.6 68.8
62.2 76.2 62.8 77.0 56.7 72.4 66.3 78.8 55.9 70.6 68.1 81.1 64.2 76.9 61.2 76.4
Incentive 3 71.6 71.6 67.4 76.1 63.8 78.8 72.6 71.1
64.8 78.4 64.7 78.5 60.0 74.8 70.4 81.7 55.5 72.0 73.0 84.6 66.5 78.7 63.4 78.8
Note: Bold figures indicate the mean of the lowest and the highest average switch point, which are listed below it. The lowest
switch point is defined as the maximum probability where option ‘A’ was chosen that is lower than the minimum observed
probability of option B. Accordingly, the highest switch point is defined as the minimum probability observed for option B
which is higher than the maximum probability where option A was chosen. If only choice ‘A’ (‘B’) was observed, both switch
points were set to one (zero). Only subjects with duration longer than 5:20 minutes are included. Except for the lines labelled
“Incentive 1", individuals from the incentive 1 treatment are dropped for comparability reasons. Group “Uni" refers to the
subsample of the CentERpanel sample between 18 and 34 years of age who hold a university degree or are in the process of
obtaining it. Sample sizes are the same as those indicated in Table 4.5.
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behaviour of the general population.
Turning to the issue of incentives, the choices in the hypothetical treatment
and high incentive treatments, summarised in Table 4.6, are strikingly similar. For
all questions, in both the Internet and laboratory experiments, the average switch
points are quite similar. Providing monetary incentives does not seem to affect
the behaviour in any systematic way. This is confirmed when running the MW
and KS tests on average switch points. As in Holt and Laury (2002), the tripling
of incentives (and risk for that matter, loosely speaking) does not increase switch
points as strong as typical preference functionals would predict. Finally, we note
a similar finding on order effects as in the case of monotonicity and dominance
violations. There are differences, but we cannot relate them to any of the expla-
nations typically brought forward. In a structural model of choice behaviour, they
will have to be controlled for by statistical methods.
The comparisons above highlight the impact of demographic characteristics
of the subject pool on the distribution of elicited preferences. To obtain estimates
valid for the general population, it is hence important to take into account the
fact — discussed earlier — that participation is voluntarily and that selection into
the experiment is not a random process. The summary statistics for the weighted
sample are given in Table 4.6. There seems to be a slight underestimation of the
mean switch points when using the unweighted sample. Using t-tests we can,
however, not reject that the mean switch points for the weighted and un-weighted
sample are equal irrespective of which measure we use. Although the participation
decision is correlated with demographics, selection based on observables does not
fundamentally alter the results on this crude measure of risk preferences.
4.5 Conclusions
We have presented evidence on different aspects of the representativeness of pref-
erence elicitation experiments. First, we looked at selection effects that may arise
from voluntary participation. We concluded that selection based on observable
characteristics does matter for violations of monotonicity and dominance, but
seems to be a minor issue for risk preferences. We also found evidence that par-
ticipation is related to variables that proxy financial knowledge and expertise, that
probably are also associated with preferences to deal with risky choice problems.
This suggests that nonparticipation may also be related to unobservable respon-
dent characteristics, and we cannot exclude the possibility that such unobservable
characteristics are also associated with risk preferences. We think it is difficult to
find valid instruments for a sample selection model that would control for such
selection effects. As a consequence, some caution must be taken in interpreting
the results from experiments with voluntary participation in terms of represen-
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tativeness. Second, we tried to disentangle environmental effects (laboratory vs.
Internet) from traditional subject pool bias. On the one hand, we showed that
the implementation mode does not matter for either errors or preference estimates
among the young and educated. On the other hand, we found dramatic differ-
ences in the number of dominance and monotonicity violations when moving to a
sample drawn from the general population. Subjects in the latter also exhibited a
higher degree of risk aversion.
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5.1 Introduction
Characterising decision behaviour under risk and uncertainty is one of the most
prevalent themes in economics. Its pervasiveness is driven by the forward-looking
nature of economic decisions and the observation that the convenient assump-
tion of risk neutrality often provides a poor description of actual behaviour. Un-
der nearly all circumstances, the use of observational data for investigating risky
choice behaviour is only feasible under auxiliary identifying assumptions such as
rational expectations or complete markets. As such restrictions often seem diffi-
cult to justify, empirical studies have been largely confined to laboratory settings.
This allows the researcher to isolate the decision problem of interest. It has the
drawback that interest usually lies in economically “large” quantities, while the
standard practice in experimental economics with real monetary incentives is to
keep the stakes quite small. Despite the negative extrapolation results of Rabin
(2000), there certainly is a lot left to learn about regularities in human decision
behaviour from such studies.
The early wave of experiments following Allais’ (1953) seminal study was
mainly devoted to documenting violations of the von Neumann-Morgenstern ax-
ioms. These findings spurred the development of numerous new models of choice
under uncertainty capable of accounting for some of the empirical departures from
expected utility. Machina (1987) and Starmer (2000) survey many of these devel-
opments. Following them, a second wave of experiments have put effort into
distinguishing between different models, Camerer (1989) is an early example.
Quite recently the literature has witnessed a shift from testing theories toward
estimating preference parameters. Holt and Laury (2002) investigate the relation
between risk aversion and incentive effects using the same experimental design
that we will employ in this study (multiple price lists). They report that subjects
exhibit more risk aversion as measured by the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative
risk aversion when payoffs are scaled up and actually paid in cash. Even when
faced with very low incentives, most subjects are risk averse.
The multiple price list methodology was taken to the field by Harrison, Lau,
and Rutström (2007), who estimated risk attitudes on a representative sample of
the Danish population. They report that the average Dane is risk averse, but that
the degree of relative risk aversion is nearly constant on the range of payoffs they
consider. Risk attitudes are found to vary significantly with demographic variables
such as age and education. Other studies have also emphasised the importance of
taking heterogeneity into account and are too numerous to review completely here.
As an example, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005) find
that risk attitudes are related to background variables such as age and sex. They
reach this finding by exploiting answers to a hypothetical general risk question
which they compare to a risky choice experiment for a subsample of respon-
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dents. Females and older people are less tolerant towards risk. In a sample of
Chilean high school students, Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2006) demonstrate
that small-stakes risk aversion is less common among those with higher standard-
ised scores on tests that measure cognitive ability.
As noted before, recent decades have witnessed a boost in extensions to the
classical expected utility model. One of the most influential of them has been
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Arguably its most prominent
characteristic is loss aversion and it has become a widely established finding that
– on average – agents are more sensitive to losses than to gains. Until very re-
cently, studies of loss aversion focused on these mean parameters as opposed to
estimating degrees of heterogeneity, no matter whether it relates to observables
or is of idiosyncratic nature. Harrison and Rutström (2006) include negative out-
comes (relative to an initial endowment) in their design. They estimate a mixture
model allowing for for agents to behave along the lines of either prospect theory
or expected utility theory. They find evidence that the probability of behaving
according to either one is related to background characteristics of the subjects.
Johnson, Gächter, and Herrmann (2006) explore loss aversion on the individual
level using both a telephone mediated market situation as well as choices between
gambles. They find loss aversion to vary with demographic variables. It appears to
be lower for younger and more educated individuals and stronger for individuals
with high levels of incomes and wealth.
A second significant extension to the canonical model consisted of accom-
modating preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution (Kreps and
Porteus 1978). Experimental studies involving this model are relatively scarce.
Chew and Ho (1994) investigate such preferences using hypothetical scenarios
concerning disclosure of exam results and tax refunds (liabilities). Their findings
suggest that preferences towards the resolution of uncertainty depend on the pos-
sible outcomes of the situation at hand. On the one hand, subjects generally prefer
early resolution if losses are possible (anxiety). On the other hand, if the outcome
space features only gains, subjects tend to prefer delaying the uncertainty resolu-
tion (hope). However, the latter is only the case for disclosure of exam results and
not in the tax refund case (where most subjects prefer early resolution). More-
over, they find preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution and risk
aversion to be uncorrelated. Ahlbrecht and Weber (1996) conduct a study involv-
ing hypothetical gambles and scenario-style questions. Among other things, they
report that people are not indifferent towards the timing of uncertainty resolution
and that most subjects prefer early resolution.
In this paper, we try to bring these lines of the literature together. We take a
classical expected utility of income model to the data and extend it to allow for
loss aversion and preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution. An
experiment is conducted on the CentERpanel, a representative sample of Dutch
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households. The survey is administered via the Internet. In addition to the large
sample size, we also obtain a lot of background information already available from
previous interviews of the CentERpanel participants. The large sample size com-
bined with the nature of our decision task allow us to specify a rich econometric
model. In principle, we can estimate the joint distributions of the three individual-
level parameters conditional on a rich set of demographic characteristics. Due to
numerical issues, the current version of the paper uses a somewhat less general
model than the one we ultimately want to aim for.
Our results can be summarised as follows. As the previous literature, we find
strong effects of risk aversion and loss aversion in homogeneous specifications of
the model. Augmenting it by the uncertainty resolution parameter produces mixed
results. However, we can say with some confidence that a negative prospect in the
outcome set significantly reduces the attractiveness of late uncertainty resolution,
something that is well in line with earlier psychological findings. As one would
expect, we find heterogeneity in risk aversion to be very important. Interestingly,
only a very small part of the overall between-subject variation is explained by
the most important demographic variables. Among these, age is associated with
higher risk aversion. Men show less risk-averse behaviour than women. Finally,
education and higher household income levels are linked with lower risk aversion
levels. Since our experimental setting involves many choice tasks for each sub-
ject, we can relate the propensity to commit errors (as defined relative to individual
preference functionals) to demographic characteristics. The first thing to note is
that overall error rates are much higher than in laboratory settings with student
populations. This appears to be an effect of demographics rather than implemen-
tation mode. We find a higher rate to go hand in hand with age, especially for
the oldest subjects. Errors are less frequent among the well educated and mem-
bers of high-income households. Regarding the magnitude of inconsistencies, we
find that in the group where errors are less frequent, the predicted rate for errors
that cost the utility equivalent of 30 Euros is 5 %. Among the most error-prone
subjects, predicted rates are twice as high.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present a parsi-
monious specification of the utility functions that form the basis of our analysis.
Section 5.3.2 provides a brief introduction to our experimental design and high-
lights some features of the data that deserve special attention in the econometric
implementation. We explain our empirical strategy in Section 5.4 before turning
to the results in 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes.
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5.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we lay out the utility specifications that form the basis of our econo-
metric analysis. As mentioned in the introduction, we start with a simple expected
utility of income specification and then augment it by a loss aversion parameter,
as in prospect theory. In Section 5.2.2, we introduce a temporal component to
the model, which then has two periods. While all payments are made in the sec-
ond period, uncertainty may be resolved either in the first or the second period.
We implement a parsimonious version of the Kreps and Porteus (1978) model in
order to allow for preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution. All
this is done for a deterministic specification of the utility function; we move to a
stochastic world when we describe our econometric model in Section 5.4.
5.2.1 A Simple Model of Choice Under Risk
In modelling individual decisions, we start from a standard Expected Utility for-
mulation and gradually build it up to encompass the core features of our study
(loss aversion and timing of uncertainty resolution). The basis of our framework
is an exponential utility function:
u(z, γ) = −1
γ
e−γz(5.1)
where z ∈ R denotes lottery outcomes and γ ∈ R is the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion. The outcomes in our experiment are framed as losses and gains relative
to an initial endowment. In order to allow agents to process losses differentially
from gains we augment the formulation in (5.1) with a loss aversion parameter λ.
The utility function thus becomes:
u(z, γ, λ) =
 −
1
γ
e−γz for z ≥ 0
λ−1
γ
− λ
γ
e−γz for z < 0
(5.2)
With λ > 1, the utility function is steeper for losses than for gains, reflecting the
original prospect theory observation (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) that agents
are more sensitive to losses than to gains. Many experimental as well as ob-
servational studies have confirmed that this is an important aspect in modelling
behaviour under risk (see Starmer (2000) and Camerer (2000) for reviews).
However well established, the precise definition of the notion of loss aversion
is not uncontroversial. In this paper, we adopt the definition of Köbberling and
Wakker (2005). They define loss aversion as the ratio of the left and the right
derivatives of the utility function at zero. The authors also derive implications for
108 Chapter 5. Risk Preferences in the Small for a Large Population
parametric families of utility functions and demonstrate that some severe prob-
lems are associated with the commonly used power utility formulation. Our spec-
ification (5.2) ensures that regardless of the risk attitude parameters, λ can always
be interpreted as the loss aversion parameter in their sense. This is one reason for
using exponential utility. Another one is that exponential utility is also convenient
when extending the model to include preferences over uncertainty resolution (see
below).
Our experimental setup does not contain enough variation on the negative do-
main to enable separate estimates of risk aversion parameters on the negative and
positive domains. In (5.2) we have therefore assumed that the risk aversion pa-
rameter is constant along the real line. This stands in contrast to the standard
prospect-theory specification, where agents are assumed to be risk averse on the
positive domain and risk seeking when it comes to negative gambles. The motiva-
tion behind our choice of restriction is twofold. First, adopting the same parameter
for the whole real line is conservative with respect to the estimation of λ because
risk aversion on the negative domain implies ceteris paribus lower values of λ. Put
differently, our estimates of the loss aversion parameter represent a lower bound
compared to a formulation where agents switch to risk-seeking on the negative
domain. Second, the observation of risk-seeking on the negative domain has been
made predominantly on the basis of purely negative gambles (cf. Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) or Starmer (2000)). Contrary to this, our setup involves gam-
bles with mixed outcomes, and it is always possible to choose a less risky lottery
with weakly positive outcomes only. The use of mixed gambles is motivated by
the fact that most real economic decision problems involve some possibility of a
loss and some possibility of a gain. However, in the light of recent findings by
Baltussen, Post, and van Vliet (2006) it seems questionable if the early findings
of risk seeking on the negative domain extend to the case of mixed gambles.1
5.2.2 Preferences towards the Resolution of Uncertainty
The timing of uncertainty resolution is a key characteristic of many real-world
decision problems, ranging from insurance decision to investment choices. Indi-
viduals may have different attitudes towards living with uncertainty and investi-
gating the nature of such preferences hence seems highly motivated. Apart from
the planning advantage that early resolution brings, several authors have recently
1 Recognising the widespread use of the prospect theory specification, we also estimate a model
with γ− = −γ+. That is, we also estimate a model where we restrict the absolute value of the
parameter to be same on both the positive and negative domain but the signs to be different. See for
example Tversky and Kahneman (1992) who use a similar specification in a power utility function.
Note that this formulation requires some rescaling of (5.2) in order to keep u(·) continuous, which
is most easily achieved by fixing it at the origin.
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highlighted the importance of anticipatory feeling such as hope and anxiety (c.f.
(Wu 1999) and (Caplin and Leahy 2001)). In order to model preferences towards
the resolution of uncertainty, we adopt the general model of Kreps and Porteus
(1978). See also the work by Epstein and Zin (1989). In correspondence with
our experimental setup we consider a two-period setting, where all decisions are
made in the first period and all payments are carried out in the second period. The
outcome of a gamble is either revealed directly after the choices have been made
in period one (early resolution) or at the time of the payments in period two (late
resolution).
Assume that agents first calculate period two utility for all outcomes based on
a function v(·). Thereafter, they use a continuous and strictly increasing weighting
function, h(·), to calculate their first period utility, with period two utility as its ar-
gument. The period one utility of a degenerate lottery that gives a certain outcome
in period two is then simply given by h(v(z, ·)). The evaluation of nondegenerate
lotteries hinges on the timing of uncertainty resolution. Depending on the latter,
the expectations operator is applied either to the weighted or unweighted period
two utility. Formally, let V denote the period one utility function for gambles, pi
where the outcomes are paid out in period two. The first period utility evaluation
of pi is then given by:
V(pi) =
 E[h(v(z, ·))] for early resolutionh(E[v(z, ·)]) for late resolution(5.3)
Note that the expectations operator is always applied to the quantity that is
known at the end of period one. If uncertainty resolves early, the decision-maker
may apply the weighting function to the utility of the specific outcomes of pi. If
the outcome of pi remains uncertain until the second period, he can only calculate
the moments of v(z, ·) in period one and applies the weighting function to its ex-
pected value. Kreps and Porteus (1978) show that h is convex (concave, linear)
if and only if the decision maker prefers early to late resolution (late to early, ex-
hibits indifference). We choose the following parsimonious implementation for
the weighting function:
h(v(z, ·)) = −S (−S v(z, ·))ρ−S(5.4)
with ρ ∈ R+ and S denoting the following sign operator:
S =
 1 for γ ≥ 0−1 for γ < 0.(5.5)
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For ρ > 1, h(·) is convex and early resolution is preferred to late resolution. Indif-
ference is obtained for ρ = 1, and late resolution is preferred for ρ < 1. We model
the second period utility function as a slightly modified version of equation (5.2):
v(z, γ, λ, ρ) =
 −
1
γ
e−γρ
S z for z ≥ 0
λ−1
γ
− λ
γ
e−γρ
S z for z < 0
(5.6)
Formulation (5.4) in combination with (5.6) allows individuals to be either
risk averse or risk seeking. The inclusion of ρS in the exponent serves to retain the
interpretation of γ as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for early resolving
lotteries on the positive domain — for such lotteries V(pi) collapses to E[u(pi)]
from equation (5.2). This makes clear why the distinction between risk aversion
and uncertainty resolution preferences is identified. Unfortunately, there is no
such result for gambles with negative outcomes because of the additive term λ−1
γ
in (5.6) that is needed to keep v(z, ·) continuous in the presence of loss aversion.
In the model consisting of (5.3), (5.4), and (5.6), the effect introduced by this term
is negligible for the parameter values of γ, λ, and ρ that we estimate.2
5.3 Data and Experimental Setup
In this section we are concerned with a brief description of our data and the exper-
imental design, focussing on the issues that are most relevant for the econometric
analysis. A detailed description of both the experimental setup and the data that
we use is provided elsewhere (von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengström 2007).
We implement our experiment on the CentERpanel, a Dutch household survey
that is administered via the Internet. In order to avoid selection problems due to
lack of Internet access, respondents without a computer are equipped with a set-
top box for their television set. The panel consists of roughly 2,000 households
who are representative of the Dutch population in terms of observable character-
istics. Hence there is rich variation in and background information on important
demographic and socio-economic characteristics that we describe in detail in the
above-cited paper. Our experiment was administered to some 2,299 individuals
in November and December of 2005. Respondents are reimbursed regularly for
their expenses connected with Internet use and we could use the existing system
for reimbursement to make payments to the subjects who participated in the ex-
periment.
2 This is not true anymore if we assumed agents to have prospect theory type preferences with
switching risk attitudes between the positive and negative domains. Hence we do not estimate
such a specification.
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Tab. 5.1: Payoffs from the Seven Lotteries
Uncertainty Payoff Payoff Uncertainty Payoff Payoff
Sheet resolution Low, A High, A resolution Low, B High, B
1 early 27 33 early 0 69
2 early 39 48 early 9 87
3 early 12 15 early -15 48
4 early 33 36 late 6 69
5 early 18 21 late -9 54
6 early 24 27 early -3 60
7 late 15 18 late -12 51
Note: These values were shown in the high incentive and hypothetical treatments. For the
low incentive treatment they were divided by 3. Order 0 consisted of the sequence of screens
{2, 7, 3, 6, 1, 4, 5} and order 1 of the sequence {1, 4, 5, 2, 6, 3, 7}.
5.3.1 Experimental Design
In order to integrate all features of decisions under risk that are necessary for es-
timating the parameters of the utility function, we opted for an adapted version
of the multiple price list format (see Binswanger (1980) for its introduction to
economics, Holt and Laury (2002) and Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2007) for
recent applications and Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2006) for a de-
tailed description). Very briefly, multiple price lists work as follows. Each subject
is presented a list of four pairs of lotteries. We call these pairs option ‘A’ and
option ‘B’, where the latter is always the riskier alternative. Subjects may opt
for either option in each of the four choice tasks. The payoffs of both options do
not change, but the probabilities for the respective high payoff vary from 25 %
to 100 % as one moves down the screen. The table is designed such that the
expected value of option ‘A’ starts out higher but moves up slower than the cor-
responding figure of option ‘B’. In total, we confronted subjects with seven such
screens which are listed in Table 5.1.
If participants behave according to any utility theory that we are aware of, they
should switch at some point from option ‘A’ to option ‘B’ (or choose option ‘B’ on
the whole screen). If such consistent behaviour is observed, the subject is routed
to a screen containing lotteries with the same payoffs, but a finer probability grid.
Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2006) recommend using this method and
call it “iterated multiple price list”. The grid now consists of steps of 10 percentage
points located roughly between the subject’s highest choice of ‘A’ and his lowest
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choice of ‘B’. Given this design, we obtain an unbalanced panel of between 28
and 56 binary choices for each respondent.
We tried to limit the cognitive effort by including pie-chart representations of
the probabilities and by using multiple price lists with only four items instead
of the standard ten. We tested the instructions thoroughly. Unlike in typical ex-
perimental settings, there was no experimenter to answer questions. In order to
compensate for this, subjects had access to the instructions and specially designed
help screens throughout.
We implemented six treatments in a 3 × 2 design along the incentives and
order dimensions. Two treatments involved real incentives. We call the first one
the high incentive treatment with payoffs as in Table 5.1. For the other group with
real incentives, payoffs were divided by three. We term this the low incentive
treatment. After the experiment, one of the 28-56 choices was selected at random
and the lottery was played out for one in ten participants. The remaining incentive
treatment was entirely hypothetical. Values shown on the screens were identical
to those in the high incentive group. We randomly determined the two orderings
of the screens that are listed in the legend of Table 5.1.
Since our theoretical model involves a loss aversion term, we incorporated
gambles with negative outcomes on some of the screens. There are two things to
note in this respect. First, we wanted to avoid negative overall payoffs and paid
everybody in the real incentive treatments a participation fee that was equal to the
maximum loss which could be incurred subsequently.3 The potential drawback
of this approach is an asymmetry of findings with respect to the loss aversion
parameter: If we did not find it to be important, this could be because people
decide on the basis of final earnings from the entire experiment. Anticipating the
results from Section 5.5, this does not seem to be an issue. Second, the less risky
option ‘A’ always contained only weakly positive outcomes, so that subjects were
able to avoid losses altogether. Hence they were faced with mixed gambles which
raises some comparability issues with respect to the earlier experimental literature
on prospect theory. As noted above in Section 5.2.1, this had been predominantly
concerned with gambles having purely negative outcomes in hypothetical settings.
Finally, all payoffs were made three months after the experiment. Hence we
were able to reproduce the two-period setting of Section 5.2.2 by setting the timing
of uncertainty resolution to either directly after the experiment; or just before
the payment was actually made. We took special care in order to make clear to
subjects that this concerned only the timing of uncertainty resolution and not the
timing of payment.
3 Note that everybody in the real incentive treatments received this participation fee, not only
the ones that were actually chosen for playing out the lotteries later on. The upfront payment was
only mentioned in the introductory screen, but not thereafter.
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5.3.2 Descriptive Evidence
At this point, we want to highlight some of the features that our experimental data
exhibits, thereby setting the scene for the structural analysis in the remainder of the
paper. From the 2,299 persons who logged into the system, in this paper we make
use of data from 1,789 subjects who completed the entire questionnaire within a
reasonable time.4 In total, we observe 98,108 binary decisions. We merely sketch
the most important points that are relevant for the subsequent analysis. See von
Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengström (2007) for a more detailed analysis.
We first turn to the issue of errors. At this point, there are two types of be-
haviour that we classify as being inconsistent with utility theories: Switching back
and forth between options ‘A’ and ‘B’ within one of the seven screens; and choos-
ing a dominated option, i.e. option ‘A’ if the probability for the high payoff is one,
or option ‘B’ if the probability for the low payoff is one. We term these errors
monotonicity and dominance violations, respectively.
We find non-monotonic behaviour in some 21 % of the seven screens, domi-
nance violations can be detected in 15% of these. Note that both categories are not
mutually exclusive, but overlap is not all too important. While the first number
is broadly consistent with earlier evidence on behaviour of students in repeated
choice tasks (see Loomes (2005) and the references cited therein), the number of
dominance violations is much higher than what is ordinarily observed in labora-
tory experiments. In order to investigate whether this is to be attributed to poor
experimental design on our behalf or rather to the richer demographic variation of
the CentERpanel respondents we restrict attention to a subgroup of the latter who
are comparable to typical experimental subjects. In particular, we select 96 indi-
viduals who study at a university or hold a degree and are less than 35 years old.
The results are encouraging – dominance violations drop by two thirds and are
now in the range of what is typically observed in the laboratory. We conclude that
it is yet more important to model the stochastic component of utility if one deals
with a representative population. While this is certainly not all too surprising, it is
important to keep in mind when interpreting the results in Section 5.5.
As a very crude way of comparing decision behaviour across the different
characteristics of the lotteries we consider the mean switch points on each screen.
The mean switch point is calculated as the mean of the lowest and the highest
observed switch point. The lowest switch point is defined as the maximum prob-
ability where option ‘A’ was chosen that is lower than the minimum observed
probability of option ‘B’. Accordingly, the highest switch point is defined as the
4 Some respondents chose not to participate after the introductory screen which contained an
explicit non-participation option, others dropped out along the way. Finally, we excluded those
who went through the whole experiment in less than 5:20 minutes. See von Gaudecker, van Soest,
and Wengström (2007) for more details and an investigation of selection issues.
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minimum probability observed for option B which is higher than the maximum
probability where option A was chosen. If only choice ‘A’ (‘B’) was observed,
both switch points were set to one (zero). Note that the two may differ quite
strongly because of nonmonotonicities.
First note that in order to not confound risk preferences that vary across differ-
ent ranges of payoffs (Holt and Laury 2002) with the other preference parameters,
we restricted attention to a relatively narrow scale of payoffs. Very loosely speak-
ing, if utility was based on traditional risk attitude alone, we would expect broadly
similar behaviour across screens. This is certainly not the case. In terms of mean
switch points, the screens rank as follows from the highest to the lowest fraction
of risk-averse choices: 5, 3, 6, 1, 7, 2, 4.
With respect to loss aversion, in general we observe a higher fraction of risk-
averse choices on the screens with include options with the possibility of negative
payouts (screens 5, 3, 6, 7) than on the others. The picture is less clear-cut with
respect to preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution – we find the
two lotteries where only option ‘B’ resolves late (screens 5 and 4) at opposite ends
of the spectrum and the one where all lotteries resolve late in the middle (screen
7). A very tentative interpretation of this may be that there exist interactions be-
tween the possibility of a negative payoff and uncertainty resolution preferences
– if outcomes are weakly positive, subjects may be indifferent or even prefer late
resolution. On the other hand, if there is the possibility of bad news, they may
want to hear it now. Such behaviour could be rationalised, for example, by some
of the arguments in Caplin and Leahy (2001) that are based on earlier evidence
collected by psychologists (Cook and Barnes (1964), Loewenstein (1987)). Incen-
tive effects do not seem to be very important for mean switch points. In particular,
they are slightly lower for the low incentive treatment than for the high incentive
and hypothetical treatments. This mimics findings by Holt and Laury (2002), who
find that switch points become higher as stakes are increased by scalar multipli-
cation. Finally, we do observe order effects with order 1 generating more risk
averse choices than order 0. However, we cannot relate their pattern to any of the
explanations typically brought forward, so we will treat them as a fixed effect in
the parameter estimates.
5.4 Econometric Specification
We estimate structural econometric models by maximum likelihood methods. In
principle, the model is sufficiently general to allow for individual heterogeneity in
preference and error parameters that may vary with observed characteristics of the
individual. As we shall see shortly, estimation of even much less general versions
is a formidable task and we are not yet able to estimate the most general model.
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First define a binary variable Yi j which is one if individual i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}
chooses option B in decision task j ∈ {1, . . . , Ji} and zero otherwise. Note that
the number of decision tasks varies with the individual because of the routing.
Subjects answered those screens with finer probability grids only upon making a
monotone and non-dominated set of choices in the first round. Now define the
utility difference in any decision task as:
∆CEi j = CE(piBi j, γi, λi, ρi) − CE(piAi j, γi, λi, ρi),
where CE(piki j, ·), k = A, B is the period one certainty equivalent of lottery piki j
given the utility function in (5.3) in combination with (5.4) and (5.6). For the
inversion of v(·) and h(·) that lead to it, please refer to the Appendix. One reason
for choosing to model decisions in terms of certainty equivalents differences over
using utility differences directly is to bound the maximum difference between
options B and A. Over all our seven screens it has a minimum of −30 and a
maximum of 39 for all individuals, regardless of the utility function parameters.
Using utility differences directly would lead to very large differences between
these values which would depend on the scaling of the utility function.
In moving to a stochastic specification of utility, we follow the approach taken
in Hey and Orme (1994) and model the individual’s choice as:
Yi j = I
{
∆CEi j + τi εi j > 0
}
,(5.7)
where I{·} denotes an indicator function. Throughout the analysis, we assume
εi j to follow a standard logistic distribution. In contrast to most binary choice
models, the scale of ∆CE does has a meaningful interpretation in monetary terms
here. Hence the parameter τi ∈ R+ governs the probability for individuals to
make errors relative to their utility function parameters that decrease in ∆CE (Hey
and Orme 1994). These are often termed Fechner errors and we include them in
all the models that we estimate. Defining them in relation to certainty equivalents
gives them an intuitive interpretation in terms of the monetary costs of errors upon
which we will comment below. Subjects may differ in their probability to commit
Fechner errors, but we do not allow the error distribution to vary over decision
tasks within subjects. For extensive discussions of various error specifications,
please refer to Ballinger andWilcox (1997), Loomes, Moffatt, and Sugden (2002),
Loomes (2005), or Hey (2005).
We can now write the likelihood contribution of choice j by individual i as:
li j = Λ
(
(2Yi j − 1) 1
τi
∆CEi j
)
,(5.8)
where Λ(·) stands for the cumulative standard logistic distribution. A random
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coefficients model is our choice to specify a distribution of preference and error
parameters that may vary with observed characteristics. Define
ηi = X
η
i jβ
η + ξ
η
i
for Ji xKη regressor matrices Xη and η = γ, λ, ρ, τ. For ease of notation, collect
the latent terms in ξi = (ξ
γ
i , ξ
λ
i , ξ
ρ
i , ξ
τ
i )
′ and define M = dim(ξi). We assume these
errors to be jointly normal with mean zero (which is without loss of generality
since Xηi j includes a constant for all η) and variance-covariance matrix Σ
′Σ, where
Σ denotes an upper triangular matrix of Cholesky-factors. Defining ξ∗ = (Σ′)−1ξ
we can express the individual likelihood contributions as:
li =
∫
RM
 Ji∏
j=1
li j(·, ξ∗)
 φ(ξ∗)dξ∗(5.9)
where φ(·) denotes the standard normal probability density function. Once this
quantity is computed, its logarithm can be summed over all individuals which is
then maximised by standard methods.
The integral in equation (5.9) does not have an analytical solution and has to
be approximated numerically. This is a serious challenge for numerical techniques
because it is characterised by very sharp peaks and long tails with zero conditional
probability over most of the support where the population density φ(ξ∗) takes on
substantial positive values. One reason for this lies in the long panel dimension
which varies between 28 and 56. Relative to typical binary choice models that
contain a linear index as the argument of the function mapping the latent variables
to the unit interval, it is strongly exacerbated by the highly nonlinear nature of
∆(CEi j)/τi.
For this type of problem, global approximation techniques are almost certain
to provide approximations and indeed this proved to be the case in our particular
application. Heuristically, very few points will lie in the region with positive val-
ues for the integral. Such issues frequently occur in Bayesian Statistics and two
types of closely related methods have been discussed. Simulation of li is viable by
means of importance sampling Geweke (1989). The method can be sketched as
follows. Instead of sampling directly from the population distribution, the mode
µi of the integrand in (5.9) is calculated in a first step. The importance sampling
density is then constructed starting from a multivariate normal density with mean
µi and its variance determined by the negative inverse Hessian of the integrand at
µi. Iteratively, this approximation is adapted (if warranted) in each direction along
every axis of the multivariate normal by means of multivariate normals with ad-
justed variance parameters or student-t distributions with appropriate degrees of
freedom to mimic the tail behaviour of the integrand (so-called split-t transforma-
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tions). Integration is then performed by simulation methods over the importance
sampling density.
Closely related to importance sampling is subregion-adaptive integration with
deterministic techniques (Genz and Kass 1997). It also performs integration over
the importance sampling density, but instead of simulation method it uses quadra-
ture techniques in the last step. The approach has proven to be more powerful for
the moderate dimensionality of our problem (Genz and Kass 1997). It is imple-
mented as a Fortran routine in the BAYESPACK software Genz and Kass (1998).
There is one important caveat for our application. Being developed for Bayesian
analyses, the numerical computation of derivatives is not an issue. Essentially,
the approximation needs to be extremely precise as to not confound changes in
li that are due to changes in the importance sampling density with those that are
due to the actual perturbation of the parameters.5 The solution to this is to use
the same evaluation points for calculating the gradient that are used to calculate
the original function value, see Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles (2005) for
a discussion of this issue. Modification of the BAYESPACK software for this
purpose emerged as a very complex task that we did not yet fully solve. Hence
we only report results for the heterogeneous model based on (5.1) where the inte-
gration achieves sufficient precision. Later versions of the paper will incorporate
higher-dimensional heterogeneity.
Finally, note that the split-t transformations account for asymmetries in the
tails of the integrand. These proved to be very important for some individuals in
our case. For example, if subjects exhibited risk aversion on some screens and
risk lovingness on others, this would result in bimodal integrands in (5.9). It is the
reason why the routines described by Liu and Pierce (1994), Hartzel, Agresti, and
Caffo (2001), and Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles (2005) which are based
on symmetric normal approximations of the importance sampling density were
unreliable in our application.
5.5 Results
This section is devoted to the presentation of the results, alluding to earlier find-
ings from the literature that we reviewed briefly in the Introduction. As noted
before, we are limited with respect to the dimensionality of heterogeneity that we
can accommodate by the currently employed integration techniques. We begin
with the discussion of a model that does not incorporate any heterogeneity. On
the other hand, this allows us to consider the richest model specification from
Section 5.2.2.
5 This very same problem arises in an importance sampling context.
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5.5.1 Evidence from a Model not Allowing for Individual Heterogeneity
The first column of Table 5.2 contains estimates from (5.9) with Σ = 0 based
on the simple utility specification (5.1). The first four rows show that agents are
clearly risk averse. Order effects are statistically significant, but small in magni-
tude. As in Holt and Laury (2002), we find strong differences of the risk aver-
sion estimates if we vary the dimension of the payoffs. Interpreting the between-
subject finding as a within-subject one, this is evidence for decreasing absolute
risk aversion. Interestingly, it does not seem to matter whether we provide real
incentives or not.6
Turning to the following two columns that additionally augment the model by
a loss aversion parameter, we find clear evidence for subjects being more sensitive
to losses than to gains. Baseline estimates for λ in the low incentive treatment and
order 0 are significantly larger than one and effects are even stronger in the other
treatments. In particular, loss aversion appears to become more pronounced as
stakes are increased. It is larger for in the group with hypothetical payoffs than in
the one with tripled incentives. This is likely to be an effect of the participation fee
which only the subjects in the real incentive treatments received – and some sub-
jects may base their behaviour on the net payoffs from the experiment while others
do not, see Harrison and Rutström (2006) for evidence on this point. Risk aversion
estimates drop by roughly ten percent as compared to the estimates with λ = 1.
This is a reflection of the typical finding that some part of ordinarily measured
risk aversion is better attributed to loss aversion. Comparing the estimates based
on utility function (5.2) with those from the classical prospect theory specification
(γ− = −γ+), the only differences we find are with respect to the loss aversion pa-
rameters. As an inevitable result of the functional form restrictions, they increase
in magnitude as one moves to switching risk preferences. Since the models are not
nested, it is difficult to discriminate between them. Far from being a valid test, the
lower log likelihood for our preferred specification may be interpreted as evidence
in its favour. A final note concerns the magnitude of the estimated loss aversion
parameter which is considerably larger (for many subjects) than most previous
estimates in the literature and varies quite strongly across treatments. A similar
finding emerges in Harrison and Rutström (2006). This may suggest a peculiarity
of multiple price list designs that deserves further investigation.
The last three columns contain estimates of the full model in (5.3) and (5.6).
In the first of these, λ is restricted to one. Comparing the risk aversion estimates
with those from column one does not reveal any differences between them. The
estimates of the uncertainty resolution preference parameter are mixed. On the
one hand, incentives do not seem to have an effect. On the other hand, subjects
6 Remember that the representation of payoffs is identical in the hypothetical and the high
incentive treatments.
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Tab. 5.2: Results of Simple Logit Models Without Heterogeneity
Parameter Exp U Exp U Prospect K-P K-P K-P
Loss Av Theory Exp U Loss Av Loss Av
γbaseline 0.1131∗∗ 0.0996∗∗ 0.0973∗∗ 0.1118∗∗ 0.1001∗∗ 0.1031∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015)
γorder1 0.0104∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.006∗∗ −0.005∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
γhypothetical −0.068∗∗ −0.063∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.063∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
γhigh_incent −0.069∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.062∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
λbaseline 1.1847∗∗ 1.9045∗∗ 1.3803∗∗ 1.2818∗∗
(0.0517) (0.0718) (0.0706) (0.0766)
λorder1 1.9213∗∗ 2.4942∗∗ 1.4066∗∗ 1.1099∗∗
(0.0750) (0.0917) (0.0943) (0.0952)
λhypothetical 1.2102∗∗ 1.5081∗∗ 1.0745∗∗ 0.9069∗∗
(0.0956) (0.1167) (0.1099) (0.1064)
λhigh_incent 0.5406∗∗ 0.9635∗∗ 0.5258∗∗ 0.5115∗∗
(0.0714) (0.1010) (0.0931) (0.0995)
ρbaseline 0.8865∗∗ 0.8266∗∗ 0.6884∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0366) (0.0361)
ρorder1 0.5653∗∗ 0.3876∗∗ 0.3604∗∗
(0.0310) (0.0389) (0.0344)
ρhypothetical 0.0595 −0.022 0.0014
(0.0370) (0.0412) (0.0342)
ρhigh_incent 0.0305 −0.006 −0.010
(0.0372) (0.0408) (0.0349)
ρneg_outcome 0.2016∗∗
(0.0320)
τbaseline 5.2828∗∗ 5.3208∗∗ 5.3199∗∗ 5.2729∗∗ 5.3418∗∗ 5.3312∗∗
(0.0333) (0.0347) (0.0346) (0.0331) (0.0349) (0.0356)
τorder1 −0.443∗∗ −0.458∗∗ −0.531∗∗ −0.491∗∗ −0.525∗∗ −0.553∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0337) (0.0336) (0.0341) (0.0341)
τhypothetical 11.480∗∗ 11.537∗∗ 11.415∗∗ 11.411∗∗ 11.490∗∗ 11.418∗∗
(0.1155) (0.1125) (0.1112) (0.1140) (0.1129) (0.1126)
τhigh_incent 11.625∗∗ 11.614∗∗ 11.624∗∗ 11.568∗∗ 11.613∗∗ 11.616∗∗
(0.1077) (0.1076) (0.1073) (0.1066) (0.1074) (0.1083)
Number of Individuals 1,789 1,789 1,789 1,789 1,789 1,789
Log Likelihood -50483.2 -49806.2 -49811.0 -50262.3 -49767.4 -49750.0
Note: “Exp U” refers to a specification of ∆CE based on (5.1), “Exp U, Loss Av” takes (5.2)
as its basis. “Prospect Theory” is similar but risk preferences switch between the positive and
negative domains. Finally, “K-P, Exp U” uses (5.3) and (5.6) to calculate ∆CE while restricting
λ to one. In the “K-P, Loss Av” specification, this last restriction is dropped. Coefficients shown
are baseline estimates and deviations from these.
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in order treatment 0 exhibit preferences for late resolution of uncertainty while
we estimate h(·) to be concave in the other group. The general picture does not
change much when λ is estimated along with the other parameters. In the last col-
umn we test the idea from Section 5.3.2, namely differential uncertainty resolution
preferences depending on whether negative prospects are involved in the gamble.
This is implemented by including a dummy for a negative prospect in option ‘B’
among the determinants of ρ. Subjects in group two are now estimated to be in-
different between early and late resolution for positive prospects only. If there is
a negative outcome involved, the attractiveness of late resolution is significantly
reduced. However, the reduction is not sufficiently large as to make subjects in
order group 0 prefer early resolution over it. Hence we do not reach a definite
conclusion in this respect.
Finally, note that the error estimates do not change much across the six specifi-
cations. Their magnitude can be assessed by noting that the probability for choos-
ing the option that is contrary to what is implied by ∆CE is given by 1−Λ(∆CE/τ).
For example, the probability to choose a dominated option with a 30-Euros differ-
ence between the two payouts is roughly 14.5 % for subjects in the high incentive
or hypothetical order 0 treatment. However, we are very reluctant to call the esti-
mates for τ error estimates in the homogeneous setting because anybody choosing
according to preferences that are different from mean preferences would be con-
tributing to them.
5.5.2 Evidence from a Model of Risk Aversion with Individual Heterogeneity
One big advantage of our data structure is that we have sufficiently rich back-
ground information combined with a large sample size as to estimate conditional
distributions of preference parameters in the population. For instance, it is very
interesting to which extent preference heterogeneity can be attributed to observ-
able characteristics and to which extent it remains idiosyncratic. In the future,
we will also be able to comment on the joint distribution of the preference and
error parameters, but this is not possible at present due to the difficulties with the
integration procedures explained above. All results reported in this section and in
Table 5.3 are based on the utility specification (5.1) only.
From a comparison of the first columns in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 we note that point
estimates for γ do not change substantively when moving from the homogenous
to the heterogenous specification. Heterogeneity emerges as very important with
the standard deviation of the risk aversion coefficient being almost as large as
the coefficient itself in the low incentive treatment. This means for instance that
for the low incentive treatment, 50 % of the respondents have a risk aversion
coefficient in the range of [0.047, 0.169]. As another example, 11.7 % of the
sample would be expected to show risk-loving behaviour. Trivially, there is a
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significant drop in the error estimates that reduces the probability to choose the
dominated option to 6.6 % (see column 4 in Table 5.3). Put differently, there is
a 6.6 percent chance that somebody in the high incentive - order 0 treatment will
commit an error that may cost him the utility equivalent of 30 Euros. This number
increases to 30 % for a utility equivalent of 10 Euros.
We now turn to the influence of demographic variables in columns two and
three of Table 5.3. The two specifications are governed by the availability of
covariates – we do not have all the information on all households.7 In general, co-
efficients do not change much between the two specifications and we will describe
both columns together, highlighting only differences.
As in large parts of the previous literature, we find women to be significantly
more risk averse than men (Croson and Gneezy (2004) provide an overview).
Note that this finding is not undisputed and may be most salient in abstract choice
tasks, see Schubert, Brown, Gysler, and Brachinger (1999) for a critical view.
Risk aversion is monotonically increasing in age, although the difference is only
significant from age 55 on (ages 18-34 are the left-out category). The more ed-
ucated exhibit significantly less risk aversion (left-out category is primary/lower
secondary education). The effect is insignificant only for people with intermediate
secondary education. The income effect goes in the expected direction with per-
sons from higher income households displaying significantly lower risk aversion.
Once income is controlled for, the age effects become slightly more pronounced
which may be expected from the generally positive correlation between the two
variables. Finally, being the financial manager of the household does not appear
to have a significant influence on risk-taking behaviour.
Interestingly there is no substantial drop in the estimated dispersion of the
risk aversion coefficient despite the large number of significant influences on risk
aversion (the point estimate drops by only 2 %, but the change is not significant).
Hence almost all of the observed variation in risk averse behaviour appears to
be attributable to idiosyncratic characteristics and not to observed demographic
variables. Although our list of covariates is certainly not exhaustive and espe-
cially lacks some typically mentioned household composition characteristics at
this point, it casts some doubt on study in the literature that attempt to control for
individual or household risk aversion by including its demographic correlates in
the estimation equations.
Turning to the Fechner error estimates in columns five and six of Table 5.3, we
also find that there is substantial variation with respect to demographic character-
istics. Men have a lower error rate than women and there is a monotonically rising
7 Education variables are not available for two persons. The sample size is reduced by an-
other 75 if we opt for the full specification that includes household income and information on
who handles the household finances in column three.
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Tab. 5.3: Results of Random Coefficients Logit Models Allowing for Individual Hetero-
geneity in Risk Aversion
Variable Spec (1) Spec (2) Spec (3) Spec (1) Spec (2) Spec (3)
γ γ γ τ τ τ
baseline 0.1079∗∗ 0.1012∗∗ 0.1077∗∗ 3.3430∗∗ 3.2722∗∗ 3.5181∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0072) (0.0080) (0.0166) (0.0313) (0.0391)
order 1 0.0204∗∗ 0.0201∗∗ 0.0210∗∗ −0.057∗∗ 0.0073 0.0032
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0202)
hypothetical −0.048∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.047∗∗ 8.7854∗∗ 8.8381∗∗ 9.5789∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0667) (0.0981) (0.1186)
high incentive −0.052∗∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.051∗∗ 7.9950∗∗ 7.8647∗∗ 8.7070∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0593) (0.0875) (0.1104)
female 0.0334∗∗ 0.0340∗∗ 0.4528∗∗ 0.5093∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0202) (0.0226)
age 35-44 0.0053 0.0058 0.3115∗∗ 0.3664∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0285) (0.0318)
age 45-54 0.0079 0.0086 0.3998∗∗ 0.4792∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0281) (0.0318)
age 55-64 0.0153∗ 0.0180∗ 0.6597∗∗ 0.8414∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0320) (0.0375)
age 65+ 0.0174∗ 0.0191∗ 1.2328∗∗ 1.3895∗∗
(0.0078) (0.0081) (0.0389) (0.0451)
higher sec. educ. −0.028∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −1.131∗∗ −1.175∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0253) (0.0287)
vocational train. −0.005 −0.005 −0.348∗∗ −0.294∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0262) (0.0298)
higher voc. train. −0.024∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.850∗∗ −0.798∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0230) (0.0258)
university educ −0.041∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −1.024∗∗ −0.982∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0104) (0.0261) (0.0294)
income22-40k −0.016∗∗ −0.431∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0232)
income40k+ −0.023∗∗ −0.648∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0286)
finadmin 0.0047 −0.126∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0217)
σγ 0.0906∗∗ 0.0887∗∗ 0.0885∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Number of Individuals 1,789 1,787 1,712
Log Likelihood -43626.7 -43097.8 -41199.2
Note: All specifications are based on (5.1) to calculate ∆CE. Coefficients shown are baseline
estimates and deviations from these.
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age effect. It is especially pronounced for the oldest group. While part of this may
be simply related to difficulties with handling the computer resources, it is likely
to reflect a decline of financial numeracy levels at these ages that has been shown
elsewhere (Banks and Oldfield 2006). Note that it remains unclear to what ex-
tent this it is cohort or age effects that stand behind this finding. Not surprisingly,
choices are significantly more consistent for the better educated. With the excep-
tion of people in higher secondary education, the effect gets stronger with higher
education categories. Finally, people in higher income groups also commit less
errors, just as those who handle a household’s financial affairs. The latter could
be interpreted as evidence in favour of learning and (or) efficient task allocation
within households, although the effect is small. To get an idea of the magnitude of
the effect, the most consistent group in the high incentive treatment (young men
with higher secondary or university education who handle the financial affairs of
households with an annual income above 40,000 Euros) has a predicted error rate
of 5 % for errors that cost the utility equivalent of 30 Euros. On the other hand,
this rate is about twice as high among the most error-prone group (elderly women
with primary or lower secondary education living in households with less than
22,000 Euros annual income and do not handle financial matters).
5.6 Conclusions
We characterised decision behaviour in a risky choice experiment by means of
structural econometric estimations. While we were not yet able to exploit the
full generality admitted by our model, some important findings emerged. First,
our results on the demographic correlates of risk attitudes as well as those on
the loss aversion parameter are consistent with the previous literature. Even after
conditioning on an extensive set of demographic characteristics, the remaining
idiosyncratic variation in choice behaviour is very large. The nature of our choice
task allowed us to estimate the monetary costs behaviour that is inconsistent with
the estimated individual-level utility function. We found such errors to be much
more important in our data than what is typically found in laboratory experiments.
Hence it seems important to allow people to make such mistakes – in other words,
conclusions based on a single measurement may be seriously misleading by hiding
a large amount of imprecision that may be inherent to somebody’s behaviour.
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5.7 Certainty Equivalents
The certainty equivalent (CE) for a lottery pi in terms of period one utility, is given
by:
V(CE) = h(v(CE))
= V(pi).
Solving this for the certainty equivalent leads to:
CE = v−1
(
h−1
[
V(pi), ρ
]
, γ, λ, ρ
)
.
In our particular framework, we have the following:
h−1(y, ·) = −S (−S y)ρS
v−1(y, ·) =
 −
ln(−γy)
γρS
for y ≥ −1/γ
− ln(λ−1−γy)−ln(λ)
γρS
for y < −1/γ
The certainty equivalent of a gamble pi is hence given by:
CE(pi) =

− ln
(
γ S (−S V(pi))ρS
)
γρS
for V(pi) ≥ −1/γ
− ln
(
λ−1+γ S (−S V(pi))ρS
)
−ln(λ)
γρS
for V(pi) < −1/γ
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6.1 Introduction
Standard models of portfolio choice assume that the assets’ risk and return, risk
aversion, and the timing of the households’ consumption expenditure guide the
households’ choices among different assets. In their simplest, representative-agent
formulation, these models are typically soundly rejected by the data. An enormous
amount of literature has suggested various explanations for why the model appears
to be at odds with the data. These include taste heterogeneity, market frictions,
and failure of the life-cycle model, among other things. Campbell (2006) provides
a broad take and many references on the subject. In this paper, we are predom-
inantly concerned with the role that varying attitudes towards risk and time have
to play for household portfolio allocations.
Using financial market decisions of households alone, the researcher can at
best identify a distribution of tastes from revealed preference type arguments.
Usually this involves rather strong auxiliary assumptions on expectations and mar-
ket completeness. Even if the validity of such assumptions is accepted, a test of the
underlying model will have to be confined to violations of its most basic principles
– estimation of the preference parameters will generally absorb all available de-
grees of freedom. These difficulties have inspired attempts to measure preferences
directly in more controlled settings, most notably through decisions in hypothet-
ical tasks or experiments (e.g. Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) and
Holt and Laury (2002), respectively), and behaviour in uncertain or dynamic envi-
ronments with a more simple structure than the environment of interest to the re-
searcher (Brown, Farrell, Harris, and Sessions 2006). The preference parameters
thus obtained have been shown by these and other authors to vary systematically
with demographic characteristics.
Yet this is only one side of the story. Just as much as preferences impact upon
economic decisions, they may be influenced by them (Becker andMulligan 1997).
This interdependence is probably most salient with respect to wealth and risk pref-
erences. On the one hand, a long line of research has attempted to describe the
dependence of risk tolerance on wealth – the literature is rich in lively debates on
the use of CARA, HARA, CRRA, or other functionals for this purpose (see for
example Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) and the references cited therein). On the
other hand, theory predicts individuals who are more tolerant towards risk to hold
a larger share of their portfolio in risky assets. The resulting risk premium will
lead to higher wealth levels on average, see Carroll (2002) for a related theoretical
argument and empirical evidence. However, there may also be an effect in the
opposite direction. Precautionary saving leads the more prudent to have higher
savings rates, leaving them with higher wealth in a dynamic setting – see Halias-
sos and Michaelides (2003) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) for models that
generate such a pattern.
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In this paper, we attempt to weave these threads into a unified model. We use
a host of indicators on wealth, risk attitude, and impatience, combining them by
means of a factor-analytic measurement model inspired by psychometric methods.
We treat these indicators as error-ridden measurements of true wealth and attitudes
and model the underlying constructs as latent variables. They may depend on
each other both directly and through unobserved factors. Furthermore, they may
in turn be determined by a set of socio-demographic characteristics. We then
analyse the impact of wealth, risk attitude, impatience, and observable variables
on households’ asset choices.
Before moving on to the analysis, let us clarify our terminologies. We denote
the latent individual traits that underly the measurement model by “risk attitude”
and “impatience”. Our model is structural in the sense that we explicitly acknowl-
edge their joint determination with wealth and only then analyse the impact they
have on the choice of portfolio components. It is not our intention to investigate
the functional form of preferences with respect to wealth or consumption or even
to determine the correct form of the individual utility function. Instead, we use
endogenous latent traits as a flexible tool to approximate the unknown functional
form of the individuals’ preferences and thus to better explain households’ asset
choice. We use the term “portfolio choice” to describe the continuous choice of
the portfolio share of an asset, and “asset choice” to describe the discrete decision
whether to hold an asset or not.
The data for our analysis is presented in Section 6.2 along with the bivariate
relationships among the key variables. This sets the scene for a verbal description
of our modelling approach in Section 6.3.1. We then turn to a formal analysis of
identification in and estimation of the structural equation model. Section 6.4 con-
tains the empirical results. We close with some concluding remarks and directions
for further developments of this paper.
6.2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
Datasets which contain detailed information on respondents’ portfolio composi-
tions, a variety of measures relating to behaviour under uncertainty and in a tem-
poral setting, and sufficient background characteristics are rare to find. We make
use of the German SAVE study, which provided a unique opportunity to incor-
porate several items in the questionnaire with our modelling setup in mind. The
SAVE study is a household panel that is designed to gain a broad understand-
ing of savings and investment behaviour of households. It is described in detail
by Schunk (2007a). In total, 2305 households participated in the 2005 wave.
Item nonresponse is dealt with by a multiple imputation algorithm developed by
Schunk (2007b).
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Here we begin with describing the main outcomes of interest, the asset com-
ponents of households’ portfolios. We then turn to the three key explanatory vari-
ables, namely wealth, risk attitude, and impatience. Motivating the analysis to
come, we include figures depicting the connections between them and the port-
folio components. Finally, we list the observable determinants of asset choice,
preferences, and wealth.
6.2.1 Definition of Assets
The SAVE questionnaire addresses the member of the household who is informed
best about the household finances and asks for the household’s possession of any
of 18 assets and current asset holdings. We aggregate these into five categories,
distinguishing them by their riskiness, liquidity, and insurance aspects. In this
version of the paper, we limit our ambitions in excluding housing and mortgages
from the asset classes and from wealth. Essentially, the probability to own a house
is almost perfectly predicted by total wealth holdings – of 616 households who re-
port to possess assets worth more than 200,000 Euros, only 10 do not own any real
estate property. Only 53 of 518 households with reported zero or negative wealth
occupy their own house. Not surprisingly, this pattern provoked the probit func-
tion linking wealth and the probability to own housing property to approximate a
step-wise function, dominating all other estimates. Nevertheless, the analysis in
its present form yields some insights into the relationship among wealth, prefer-
ences, and asset choice behaviour.
Tab. 6.1: Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Asset Variables
Name Definition Mean
savacc Savings accounts, building society savings contract 0.67
retinsur Pension / endowment insurance, employer- or government-sponsored pension plan 0.41
bonds Government or company bonds, bond funds 0.08
stocks Stocks, mutual funds, derivatives, business assets 0.24
loans Consumer credit loans, family loans, other loans. 0.21
Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations
Table 6.1 gives the definition of each of the five assets and overall ownership
rates. Like in other countries, the percentage of the population holding risky as-
sets is generally low. The most prevalent savings vehicle are savings accounts and
buildings society savings agreements with ownership rates of about two thirds.
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Possession of risky assets1 is confined to a little more than a fourth of the house-
holds (overlap between bond and stock holdings is quite high). We now turn to
describing our measures of wealth and preferences and how these variables are
related to asset holdings.
6.2.2 Definition of Wealth
As explained above, the SAVE 2005 survey contains detailed questions on 18 dif-
ferent asset types. Among other things, the value of the respective portfolio com-
ponent as of the end of 2004 is included in the questionnaire.2 We sum up all these
values (excluding housing and related loans / mortgages) to obtain our measure-
ment of total wealth. We trim it at |2.5| million Euros because of some outliers
with up to 26 million Euros net worth which may impact all too strongly upon
our analysis. This way we delete 5 households from our sample, leaving us with
N = 2, 300 for the rest of the analysis.
Figure 6.1 contains a nearest-neighbour-smoothed plot of asset holdings by
wealth. Restricting attention to the area with a relevant number of observations
we display only values between -25,000 Euros and one million Euros.3 Starting
with the savings accounts, there is a very pronounced rise in holdings from about
50 % at the origin to roughly 80 % at a wealth level of 200,000 Euros. The profile
becomes flat at higher levels of wealth. A similar but somewhat less distinct pat-
tern can be found for retirement insurance contracts. The rise in stocks and bonds
holdings, respectively, is more evenly spread across the range under consideration.
These slopes level off eventually, too, although part of this is related to rather low
numbers of observations in the higher wealth regions and the nearest-neighbour
nature of the estimates. Finally and not surprisingly, loans are most prevalent at
very low levels of wealth. They then reach a roughly stable level of slightly below
20 % for the more affluent households.
Wealth is a rather complex construct and it is notoriously difficult to measure
(Juster, Smith, and Stafford 1999). Recall error, poor understanding of financial
concepts, little motivation to allocate cognitive effort, among other things, may
lead to misreports and item nonresponse. Valuations of illiquid assets such as real
1 I.e. possession of risky assets which is not mediated through retirement insurance. Typical
German endowment policies participate in the performance of insurers’ portfolios. However, risk-
return structures are quite different from direct or funds-based holdings of stocks and bonds. There
are substantial minimum interest rate guarantees and any yield beyond these is smoothed over
several years, leading to a relatively stable performance.
2 Note that the SAVE survey is fielded during late spring and early summer when most people
are filing their tax returns for the previous year. Accordingly, this number should be the one which
is most readily available.
3 Estimates are based on a the full 2,300 observations. The only reason to shrink the support of
the graph did not want to devote two thirds of graph space to two percent of the observations.
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Fig. 6.1: Mean Asset Holdings by Wealth
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Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations. Wealth is measured in millions of Euros as the
sum of all asset holdings except for housing and related loans and mortgages.
estate or business wealth are best characterised by an impossibility to price them
precisely. We take this explicitly into account by modelling wealth as a latent
variable of which the just-described measured wealth is just one indicator.
In addition to this, we make use of two further variables that are indicative of
financial wealth. The first is a binary marker which is one if a household states
to have any income from interest, dividends, or rents. The use of this variable is
motivated by the SAVE questionnaire since the sections asking about income and
wealth are separated by a substantial amount of items related to old-age provision.
The income questions are yes or no questions (later on there is a question on total
net income) while the wealth questions ask for the amount held immediately after
a respondent indicated possession of the respective asset. Earlier findings suggest
that this type of question may lead to some underreporting (Juster and Smith 1997)
and we expect to ameliorate this by including the income from wealth indicator.
Second, high wealth holdings lead to a considerable increase in the complexity of
income tax returns. This and the fact that potential gains from exploiting details
of the tax law rise with wealth increase the probability to employ a tax advisor for
filing income tax returns. We include a binary variable on this issue as the third
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indicator of the latent variable total wealth. Descriptive statistics can be found in
Table 6.7 in the Appendix.
6.2.3 Measuring Risk and Time Preferences
The canonical economic model has clear concepts of how individuals and house-
holds behave under risk and of how they allocate consumption and savings over
time (Gollier 2001). It makes sharp predictions on behaviour in such circum-
stances. However, once this model is taken to the data and individual variation
in preference parameters is acknowledged, there is a fundamental identification
problem. In general, auxiliary assumptions such as rational expectations or com-
plete markets have to be invoked in order to identify individual-level preferences
based on market data alone.
The questionability of such assumptions has led researchers to make attempts
at eliciting these parameters directly from behaviour in hypothetical settings and
(or) experiments. The approaches differ widely in many respects, ranging from
large-scale hypothetical choices (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997),
Kapteyn and Teppa (2003), Guiso and Paiella (2004)) to comparatively simple
experiments with varying stakes and subject pools (Holt and Laury (2002), Har-
rison, Lau, and Williams (2002)). Middle grounds or combinations of these in-
clude Donkers, Melenberg, and van Soest (2001) or Dohmen et al. (2005). Fi-
nally, researches have used behaviour in other settings characterised by uncer-
tainty to make predictions about the economic decision of interest (Brown, Far-
rell, Harris, and Sessions 2006). All of these approaches have their advantages
and disadvantages on which we comment shortly. While hypothetical choices of-
ten ask about behaviour in a situation which is precisely the one of interest for
the real-world application, the mental effort for respondents needed to put them-
selves in the imagined place may be substantial. Parameter findings are sometimes
difficult to reconcile with real-world counterparts, see for example the conclud-
ing remarks in Kapteyn and Teppa (2003). Asking for certainty equivalents and
similar rating tasks leads to well-known problems of focal point responses that
may reflect other things than true valuations (Green, Jacowitz, Kahneman, and
McFadden 1998). On the other hand, while preference elicitation experiments
usually suffer less from these issues, they are not easily included in large house-
hold surveys (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005) for
example consider only a small subsample of the German Socio-Economic Panel
in the experimental part of their paper) and it is not perfectly clear how behaviour
in small-stake gambles carries over to situations with more meaningful economic
quantities. Rabin (2000) shows in a theoretical argument that the standard ex-
pected utility model cannot be expected to provide a translation mechanism. The
experimental design of Holt and Laury (2002) could provide data to make such
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inferences, however the authors only consider aggregate behaviour. Using be-
haviour in other risky circumstances may be stretching the extrapolation argument
rather far, as results from the experimental literature on the importance of context
for a wide range of tasks suggest (Harrison and List 2004).
In this paper, we combine the various approaches, similar in spirit to Arrondel
and Masson (2005) but quite different in the econometric implementation. We
make use of five relatively simple lottery choice and temporal resource allocation
tasks that we describe shortly. For the purposes of this section, they are easily
aggregated to crude measures of risk attitudes and impatience. We continue the
graphical analysis considering the relations to asset choice and wealth. In addition
to these items, our model in Section 6.3 incorporates self-reported risk behaviour
(smoking and drinking) as well as self-rated personality traits. While we discuss
the measurements here, we leave their relation to wealth and asset choice to the
formal model.
The SAVE 2005 questionnaire contains two sets of three hypothetical lottery
tasks devoted to measuring risk preferences. Each of these six items consisted
of a choice between a lottery with equal probabilities and a sure outcome. The
probabilities were framed as a coin toss. In the first set of choices, the sure out-
come was always 1,000 Euros, the lower lottery payoff yielded nothing. The high
lottery payoff went up from 2,000 Euros in the first task to 2,500 Euros in the
second and 3,000 Euros in the third task. The second set of choices had zero as
its sure outcome and a loss of 100 Euros as the low outcome of the gamble. The
high outcome varied from 200 to 300 and 400 Euros, respectively. A third lottery
was similar but included a time preference component. The sure option would
pay 500 Euros immediately, while the coin toss – leading to payoffs of nothing or
750 Euros / 1,200 Euros / 1,800 Euros – would take place six months later. In this
section, we simply aggregate the number of safe choices in these nine imaginary
situations. For the subsequent analysis of the full model, we generate a variable
with four ordered outcomes for each of the three sets of lotteries. It takes on the
value zero (three) if the risky (safe) option is chosen in all tasks. Values one and
two are defined accordingly.4 Note that this coding implies higher risk aversion
among those people with higher scores on the choice tasks. Table 6.7 has the
descriptive statistics.
Figure 6.2 contains the asset holding trajectories by the number of safe choices
in the gambles, aggregated to three categories. Savings accounts – the most con-
servative asset class – are the only category that rises with risk aversion. The
means of all other portfolio components are highest among those who display the
4 Some 3.7 % of respondents exhibited non-monotonic patterns. We handled these by taking
the option where the subject showed the highest risk tolerance as a reference point, ignoring all
safe choices at gambles with higher expected values. A robustness check is to follow here, but we
do not expect substantial sensitivity to the assumption do to the small number of relevant cases.
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Fig. 6.2: Mean Asset Holdings by a Simple Risk Attitude Measure
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Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations. Risk Attitude is derived from the number of
safe choices in the three×three lottery tasks. We group them into three categories:
Up to 5 safe choices (category 1 – most risk-tolerant), between 6 and 8 safe choices
(category 2), all safe choices (category 3 – most risk averse).
most risk tolerance in the lottery tasks. This is both consistent with our expec-
tations and along the lines of findings by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro
(1997) and Guiso and Paiella (2004). However, it is merely a motivation for the
analysis to come – the graphics may largely be picking up the influence of wealth
or the effects may better attributed to positive socio-economic correlates of both
risk attitude and asset choice.
In order to assess individual-level time preference we make use of two key
measurements. These are behaviours in hypothetical choice tasks similar in nature
to the imaginary gambles that we just described. In particular, subjects were asked
whether they would rather obtain 1,000 Euros right away, or 1,130 Euros (1,200,
1380 Euros) in ten months. In order to minimise a possible confounding with
risk attitudes related to the fact that the delayed payment may be uncertain, we
framed it as an income tax refund. We classify respondents the more patient the
more often they choose the delayed payment. The second set of discounting tasks
is just the converse – respondents are asked to state what they would do if they
had to make a payment to the tax authority. This consisted of either 800 Euros
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Fig. 6.3: Mean Asset Holdings by a Simple Measure for Impatience
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Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations. The impatience measure is derived from
counting the number of “patient” choices in the two × three delayed payment tasks
and the three tasks from lottery 3. We group them into three categories: Less than 2
“patient” choices (category 1 – most impatient), between 2 and 4 “patient” choices
(category 2), more than 4 “patient” choices (category 3 – most patient).
now or 825 / 870 / 990 Euros. Here subjects who choose the immediate payment
option are viewed as more patient than those who choose the delayed one. For
later chapters, we generate four-dimensional ordered variables similar to those on
risk attitudes. Here, high values signify more patient choices. They can also be
found in Table 6.7. In this section, we aggregate the number of patient choices,
including those in the delayed lottery task.
Figure 6.3 is the analogue to Figure 6.2, containing mean asset holdings by a
three-dimensional indicator for patience. Except for loans, all portfolio compo-
nents decrease with patience. The slope for loans is as one would expect a ceteris
paribus effect since housing-related loans and mortgages are excluded from the
analysis and consumer credit and similar loans are likely to result from a high
preference for the present. Except for the most illiquid and longest-horizon com-
ponent, retirement insurance contracts, the priors on the other asset classes are not
so clear. We comment on these some more in Section 6.3.1.
The three bivariate relationships among the two preference parameters and
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Fig. 6.4: Relations Among the Endogenous Variables
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Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations. Wealth is measured in millions of Euros as
the sum of all asset holdings except for housing and related loans and mortgages. The
number of safe choices refers to the number of safe options chosen in the three × three
lottery tasks. Accordingly, the number of “patient” choices is the number of “patient”
options chosen in the two × three delayed payment tasks and the three tasks from
lottery 3.
wealth are displayed in Figure 6.3. Again, there are theoretical reasons for rela-
tions to go in any direction and we find relatively flat profiles. The mean number
of save choices, depicted by the blue line in the first panel of Figure 6.3, declines
only very slightly in wealth. There is a notable rise in patience in the lower wealth
categories (up to 200,000 Euros roughly) which levels off afterwards. The sec-
ond panel containing the relation between risk attitude and impatience is shown
more for completeness reasons – the decline that can be seen there is actually
an artefact of the inclusion of the delayed lottery choice task in both preference
equations. The profile is completely flat otherwise. However, this demonstrates
the need for a joint modelling approach that is reinforced through the rest of our
indicators.
The last set of indicators of risky behaviours is derived from self-reported risk
behaviours and self-rated personality traits. First we use a question on alcohol
consumption over the last six months. We collapse the seven categories to three,
with persons who drank alcohol never or less than once a month in category zero
and those who drank alcohol on at least five days per week in category two. Sec-
ond, we construct a variable on smoking which is zero if the respondent smokes
regularly; one if he quit doing so; and two if he never smoked more often than
occasionally. The hypotheses are clear: People who smoke and (or) drink more
are expected to be more risk tolerant and to discount the future more heavily than
those who abstain from these stimulants.
People were asked to rate their own personality with respect to planning on a
ten-point scale between living for the day (coded 0) and making precise plans for
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the future (coded 10). We merge the eleven outcomes to three categories (0-4=0,
5-7=1, 8-10=2). Similarly, they were asked for a rating of their own decision-
making behaviour, zero meaning fast and impulsive decision-making and ten sig-
nifying long pondering over choices. Again we obtain a three-outcome variable by
the same mapping as for planning. While these are certainly not perfect predictors
of risk attitude or impatience, we anticipate planners and slow decision-makers to
be less risk tolerant and more oriented towards present. The descriptive statistics
relating to these variables complete Table 6.7.
6.2.4 Determinants of Asset Choice, Wealth and Preferences
Our data universe is completed by a set of socio-economic characteristics that
may influence asset choice, wealth, and preferences. See Table 6.8 in the Ap-
pendix for a full listing of the variables, short verbal descriptions, and summary
statistics. We are guided mostly by standard considerations. Among the demo-
graphic variables, we include four age categories, gender, marital status, whether
any of the household members has any children and whether one or more of them
live in the household, region of residence (East/West), and German citizenship of
the respondent. We generate an education variable in three categories based on
the highest degree obtained. The category with low education consists of respon-
dents with primary education (Haupt- or Realschulabschluss) and no vocational
training. High education individuals are those with a university or technical col-
lege degree (Fachhochschulabschluss). In addition to this, we generate a similar
variable for the highest degree of the respondent and his or her partner. We only
consider the high education variable of that type because there were very few
households in the low education group which led to numerical difficulties.
On the economic side, we utilise labour market status and type of employ-
ment, defining a retired household as one where either the respondent or the part-
ner is currently retired and none of them is currently working. For a household to
fall into the unemployed, self-employed, or temporary job categories, it is suffi-
cient for one member to do so. We further include monthly net household income
(squared) and interact it with retirement. We do so because as labour income drops
to zero we expect the relation between income and wealth to become quite differ-
ent after retirement. With respect to expectations regarding income and labour
market status, we include two questions asking for the probabilities for an in-
crease in household income and for at least one household member to become
unemployed, respectively, within the next year. Finally, we include a binary vari-
able indicating credit constrained households. It is one if a household has been
denied credit in the past five years; or if he did not apply for a credit because he
expected the request to be turned down.
In our structural model, we will need instruments for the preference parame-
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ters. We recur to questions on childhood behaviour and ratings of the respondent’s
parents’ behaviour. All these items are elicited on a 10-point scale. With respect
to risk attitude, we include a variable on whether the respondent was ready to play
risky games as a child and whether father and mother, respectively, used to be
very adventurous persons. We expect risk-taking behaviour at young ages as well
as adventuresome parents to be positively correlated with current risk tolerance.
Turning to impatience, we employ a variable on whether the respondent used to
spend his or her pocket money immediately as a child and questions on whether
the parents used to plan the future in great detail. Again, we anticipate children
of planners to be more patient just as those who used to spent very quickly the
money they had at their disposal.
6.3 Model and Empirical Strategy
In the last section we showed that in the raw data, wealth, risk tolerance and
patience are positively associated with risky asset holdings. Bivariate relations
between the two preference parameters and between preferences and wealth ex-
hibited a rather flat profile. All these findings continue to be valid if we employ
partially linear models to control for the covariates described in 6.2.4, leaving the
functional form of the key explanatory variable unspecified.
These results provide the motivation to investigate the relationships among
wealth and preferences and their influence on asset choice in more detail. It is
easy to find reasons why any of these eight variables may be endogenous to one
or more of the equations determining the others. This calls for a unified model
that is explicit about which effects are admitted and which are restricted. Accord-
ingly, we now construct a structural equation model where the key variables are
not directly observed. Given the complexity that this will entail, we first sketch
the structure and intuition of the model informally in Section 6.3.1. Following
this, Sections 6.3.2 to 6.3.4 translate it into a mathematical formulation. We first
consider identification of the structural parameters under the assumption that all
dependent variables were continuous. Next, we turn to identification of the co-
variance matrix elements before extending the identification arguments to the case
where we have limited dependent variables. Finally, we describe our estimation
strategy in 6.3.5.
6.3.1 Wealth, Preferences and Asset Choice: A Structural Approach
A number of recent papers have shown that subjective assessments of risk-tolerance
and behaviour in hypothetical choice tasks are useful predictors of everyday fi-
nancial behaviour (see Arrondel and Masson (2005), Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and
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Shapiro (1997), Bertaut (1998), Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and
Wagner (2005), Guiso and Paiella (2004), and Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) for a
certainly non-exhaustive list). The approach taken has usually been to use the de-
rived preference parameters as explanatory variables in an equation determining
the outcome of interest.
Apart from a standard measurement error argument, the main shortcoming of
this strategy is related to the fact that it is essentially a reduced form of a model
for preferences and portfolio choice. As with any reduced form, the researcher is
unable to tell – for example – direct wealth effects from those mediated through
preferences. In our modelling approach, we distinguish explicitly between ex-
ogenous determinants of wealth, preferences, and asset choice on the one hand;
and variables that are the outcomes of processes depending on these parameters
on the other hand. This way we are very explicit about the assumed directions of
causality. As usual, the exogeneity assumption is certainly debatable with respect
to some of the variables we listed in Section 6.2.4. Many economic models for ed-
ucational choices, labour market participation, or marriage behaviour depend on
risk and (or) time preferences. However, while in principle nothing would inhibit
us from extending our model by incorporating these among the endogenous vari-
ables, even the current formulation appears to be approaching the limit of our data.
Hence we concentrate on the causation mechanisms that appear most important to
us.
Figure 6.5 contains a graphical representation of our model. Starting from
the left with Panel I, it contains the observable determinants of our key variables.
The exogeneity assumption that we just stated is depicted by the fact that no ar-
rows lead towards it. The parameter matrices associated with the connections to
Panels IV and V cannot be completely unrestricted, we will comment on the nec-
essary exclusion restrictions below. The two oval panels in the middle contain the
model’s core, namely the eight latent variables wealth, risk attitude, impatience,
and the five utilities relating to the asset classes. They consist of an observable
component (the appropriate elements of Panel I mediated through the respective
parameters) and an unobservable one (E(1) and E(2) in Figure 6.5). The variables in
Panel IV may depend arbitrarily upon each other, which is depicted by the arrow
starting from and leading back to it. This generality is important for a variety of
reasons. We expect wealth to influence risk attitude towards more risk tolerance,
at least in situations with fixed stakes. The reason for this is the larger buffer lead-
ing to the decreasing absolute risk aversion typically found in between-subject
studies. It is difficult to sign the impact of risk attitude on wealth a priori. On the
one hand, the more risk tolerant may hold a larger share of risky assets that, on
average, earns them a risk premium. On the other hand, the more prudent can be
expected to save more, leading to higher wealth on average. If we observed past
behaviour long enough and for a sufficient number of subjects, we could in princi-
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Fig. 6.5: A Structural Model of Behavioural Traits, Wealth, and Asset Choice
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ple distinguish these effects. Since we do not, they will both be picked up by our
risk attitude variable. Similar arguments can be made with respect to wealth and
impatience: The more patient can be expected to have a higher savings rate, lead-
ing to higher wealth. For the other direction, we would expect the more affluent
to show more patient behaviour, as they will not be affected as much by market
frictions such as credit constraints.
The main parameters of interest are associated with the downward arrow that
leads from Panel IV to Panel V. It stands for the utility associated with holding
any of the five portfolio components. We expect that, conditional on the socio-
demographic variables in Panel I and the two preference parameters, the more
wealthy will have a higher propensity to hold any of the assets, except for loans.
The reason for this is the standard optimality of diversification result combined
with fixed cost of holding one of the asset classes. Second, again conditional upon
the socio-economic determinants of asset choice, wealth and impatience, the more
risk-loving should hold a higher share of risky assets for obvious reasons. Finally,
under the adjusted conditioning statement, we expect the more patient to possess
a higher share of illiquid assets.
This generality in the model core comes at a price – we will see in the fol-
lowing section that we need exclusion restrictions in the equations determining
wealth, attitudes, and utilities from asset holdings. As noted above in 6.2.4, we
assume that behaviour at very young ages and the rating of parents’ personality
traits have an impact on the associated preference parameter only. While these
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are certainly rather soft instruments, we do not see any important direct effects
that these variables should have on wealth or asset choice. The ones that we use
for wealth are certainly more controversial. First, we take the dummy variable
for being divorced. A marriage break-up is certainly associated with a change
in wealth that is arguably not related to preferences or utilities from asset hold-
ings. Note that the direction is not quite clear since we control for being married.
Comparing the divorced with those who never married, the marriage episode may
have either led to an increase or a decrease in wealth, depending on the own and
the ex-spouse’s endowment. The second variable that we exclude from all other
equations is income in the four forms described above. Many economic mod-
els emphasise the role of idiosyncratic labour income risk on portfolio choice
(see for example Heaton and Lucas (2000) or Viceira (2001)). We acknowledge
this by including type of employment – i.e. whether any household member is
self-employed or holds a temporary job – among the determinants as well as the
self-perceived probability to become unemployed within the next year.
Next to this structural approach, the explicit consideration of measurement er-
ror is a major component of our model. While the approach of using different
noisy indicators to reduce or even eliminate problems associated with measure-
ment error is not new (see for example Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) or
Wansbeek and Meijer (2000)), we appear to be the first to apply it in this context.
On each of the latent wealth and attitude parameters we observe several measure-
ments as outlined in 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 and contained in Panel II of Figure 6.5. All
of these are measures of one or more of the (appropriately scaled) latent variables
together with an error, denoted by the vector V . Finally, we do not observe the util-
ity from asset holdings directly, but only a set of binary indicators that completes
Figure 6.5 through Panel III.
Finally, let us summarise the structure of our data. We observe three sets of
variables: First, the determinants of asset choice, wealth, and preferences (Panel I
in Figure 6.5). Second, twelve measurements on wealth and attitudes (Panel II).
Third, five indicators on the presence of every single asset class in a household’s
portfolio (Panel III). With these observations at hand, we seek to identify five sets
of parameters. First and most importantly, the ones that govern the relationships
among the endogenous variables. Second, the parameters on the socio-economic
determinants of asset choice and wealth. Third, the way the measurements in
Panel II are generated from the underlying constructs in Panel IV. Fourth, the
variances and covariances of the idiosyncratic components of wealth, attitudes,
and utilities from asset holdings (V[(E(1), E(2))′]). Fifth, the variances of the mea-
surements on wealth and preferences (V[V]). Before turning to the estimation, we
first demonstrate that these parameters are indeed identified.
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6.3.2 Identification in the Model with Continuous Outcomes
We cast the model depicted in Figure 6.5 into the standard LISREL form (Jöreskog
1969, 1970, 1977) . Our model also borrows from the extended heterogeneous
logit models and general modelling approaches of Börsch-Supan, McFadden, and
Schnabel (1994), Ben-Akiva et al. (1999), Harris and Keane (1999), and Ben-
Akiva et al. (2002). The core of our model is a structural equations system with
eight unobserved variables: Wealth, risk attitude, impatience, and the utility corre-
sponding to each of the five asset types (Panels IV and V in Figure 6.5). We collect
them in the L−vector Z∗ =
(
w∗, r∗, t∗, u∗1, u
∗
2, u
∗
3, u
∗
4, u
∗
5
)′
and describe the relations
among them by a parameter matrix Λ. The K determinants of Z∗ from Panel I in
Figure 6.5 make up the vector X which we observe directly. Their influence on Z∗
is governed by the K×L parameter matrix B. Finally, we stack E(1) and E(2) in one
vector E with elements εl, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} of error terms corresponding to Z∗.
Hence the core of our model looks as follows:
Z∗ = Λ · Z∗ + B′X + E.(6.1)
All the variables in Z∗ are not directly observed, but at least in part for different
reasons. For wealth and the preference parameters, we have several error-ridden
measurements which are influenced by each of these variables (Panel II in Fig-
ure 6.5). We analyse them in a factor structure. For the utility variables, we
do not observe them directly but a set of binary asset choice indicators depicted
in Panel III. Similar problems of limited dependent variables recur in some of
the measurements. Identification arguments with respect to the latter point are
straightforward in our setup (see Nelson and Olson (1978) or Wansbeek and Mei-
jer (2000) for a textbook treatment). We separate the issues of factor analysis and
limited dependent variables and treat the latter in Section 6.3.4. For now, we treat
u∗1 to u
∗
5 and all indicators of w
∗, r∗, and t∗ as observed and continuous.
We collect the M(1) measurements on the factors described in Section 6.2 and
theM(2) utilities of the asset types in theM−vector Y∗ =
(
y∗1, y
∗
2, . . . , y
∗
M(1) , y
∗
M(1)+1, . . . , y
∗
M
)
.
The measurement model can then be written down as:
Y∗ = A · Z∗ + V.(6.2)
Accordingly, A is a M×L-matrix with elements αml and V a vector of measurement
errors with elements νm, m = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. In order to express the system
in terms of observables and disturbance terms, we derive the reduced form of
Equation (6.1) and then plug it into Equation (6.2):
Z∗ = (IL − Λ)−1 [B′X + E](6.3)
Y∗ = A · (IL − Λ)−1 [B′X + E] + V(6.4)
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Tab. 6.2: Indicator Variables and Restrictions on the Loadings in the Factor Model
Element Element of Matrix of Factor Loadings A Element
Measurement of Y∗ w∗ r∗ t∗ u∗1 u
∗
2 u
∗
3 u
∗
4 u
∗
5 of V
∗
measwealth y∗1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
1
incwealth y∗2 α2w 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
2
taxadvisor y∗3 α3w 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
3
lottery1 y∗4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
4
lottery2 y∗5 0 α5r 0 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
5
discount1 y∗6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
6
discount2 y∗7 0 0 α7t 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
7
lottery3 y∗8 0 α8r α8t 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
8
drink y∗9 0 α9r α9t 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
9
smoker y∗10 0 α10r α10t 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
10
planner y∗11 0 α11r α11t 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
11
impulsive y∗12 0 α12r α12t 0 0 0 0 0 ν
∗
12
savacc y∗13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
retinsur y∗14 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
bonds y∗15 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
stocks y∗16 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
loans y∗17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
IL denotes the L−dimensional identity matrix. Under the additional assumptions
of mean independence of the joint error terms E
[
A · (IL − Λ)−1 E + V | X
]
= 0 and
E [X′X] having full rank, we can derive the following equation:(
E
[
XX′
])−1 E [XY∗′] = B(I9 − Λ)−1′A′(6.5)
= Π
The goal is to identify the parameters of B,Λ, and Awhich is clearly an impossible
task without appropriate exclusion restrictions and normalisations. We start with
the matrix of factor loadings A and list Equation (6.2)’s components along with
their verbal descriptions in Table 6.2.
Normalising the first nonzero element of each column in A to one is without
loss of generality since the scale is not identified in factor models. Taking reported
wealth as the first indicator leaves the wealth factor with its natural interpretation.
We do not have such straightforward scalings available for the other factors and
the choice of normalisation is arbitrary.
In contrast to typical factor models, the factors in our model are not indepen-
dent. Instead, the relations among them are described by the matrix Λ. These
assumptions lead us to impose restrictions on A which appear to be more restric-
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tive than the triangular structure imposed by independent factor models (see for
example Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003)). However, the differences boil
down to a different view of the underlying mechanisms. Take wealth and risk
as an example and assume that we had a lower triangular structure of A and that
λrw = λwr = 0. A ceteris paribus change in true wealth would not change any-
thing about the factor risk attitude, however the measurements relating to the lat-
ter would change through, e.g., α4w. In our case, this loading is restricted to zero.
Still, we would expect the measurements on risk attitude to change because in our
setup the risk factor itself changes through the parameter λrw. Our approach can
be viewed as somewhat more modest in the sense that we do not claim to be able
to identify a risk attitude parameter that is independent from wealth. We acknowl-
edge that we always observe preferences and wealth together and that these may
be influencing each other as outlined above in 6.3.1. We can then estimate the
averages of these influences. In the independent factor model, one has to take up
a stance on the direction in which factors influence the measurements dedicated
to other factors. In other words, A has to be triangular while we can get by with a
full interdependence structure in Λ.
The K×M-matrix Π has at most L < M independent columns. The depen-
dence structure becomes clear from inspecting the matrix A. The second and third
columns of the LHS of (6.5) are equivalent to the first column multiplied by α2w
and α3w, respectively. Similarly, the fifth (seventh) column is equal to the fourth
(sixth) scaled by α5r (α7t). Columns nine to thirteen are the sums of column four
scaled by αmr and column seven scaled by αmt, m = 9, 10, . . . , 13. Finally, we
do not have a measurement model for the utilities and they are identical to the
corresponding elements of Y∗ (note that the last six elements of V are zero).
The argument in the preceding paragraph yields identification of the free pa-
rameters in A conditional upon the elements of B(I9 − Λ)−1′ being identified. Ne-
glecting A′ and the corresponding columns on the RHS of Equation (6.5), we are
left with a system of eight linear equations that has a long history in econometrics
(Koopmans, Rubin, and Leipnik 1950). We first turn to the restrictions we impose
upon the matrix Λ governing the relations amongst the endogenous variables:
Λ =

0 λwr λwt 0 0 0 0 0
λrw 0 λrt 0 0 0 0 0
λtw λtr 0 0 0 0 0 0
λu1w λu1r λu1t 0 0 0 0 0
λu2w λu2r λu2t 0 0 0 0 0
λu3w λu3r λu3t 0 0 0 0 0
λu4w λu4r λu4t 0 0 0 0 0
λu5w λu5r λu5t 0 0 0 0 0

(6.6)
148 Chapter 6. Risk Attitude, Impatience, and Asset Choice
This translates the verbal description and intuition outlined in Section 6.3.1. There
is a fully flexible interdependence structure among the wealth and preference vari-
ables. They impact upon the utilities relating to the different asset types, but there
are no repercussions from or direct relations among the asset variables. As noted
before, we need to impose certain exclusion restrictions on the parameters in B.
While we could get by with one instrument for each of the three latent variables,
we chose to use a set of three or more instruments for each of them (see the verbal
outline in 6.3.1, they also become apparent from the table of results 6.11 in the
Appendix). With all the parameters in A, B, and Λ at hand, we can now turn to
identification of the parameters in the covariance matrices relating to E and V .
6.3.3 Identification of the Covariance Parameters
We start with some notation. Let Ψ = E[EE′] be the variance-covariance matrix
of the structural errors and Θ = E[VV ′] be the variance-covariance matrix of the
measurement errors relating to the indicators. We leave Ψ completely unrestricted
at this point. Clearly we could not identify its parameters nor those of Θ if the
latter was not subject to any restrictions, either. We follow the literature on factor
analysis in assuming that the elements of V are pairwise uncorrelated. Hence, Θ
is a diagonal matrix. Furthermore, remember that we do not have a measurement
model for the utility variables, so the last six diagonal elements of Θ are zero.
Last, we assume that E and V are uncorrelated, so that measurement errors are
not related to the disturbances of the structural equations (6.1).
The identification arguments are based on the variance-covariance matrix of
the entire disturbance terms. Under the assumptions that we just stated, they can
be written as follows:
V
[
A (I9 − Λ)−1 E + V
]
= A (I9 − Λ)−1 Ψ (I9 − Λ)−1′A′ + Θ(6.7)
= Ω(6.8)
Because of the structure inherent to Λ, all E[εiε j], i, j ∈ {w∗, r∗, t∗} appear in
all equations. Hence we need a system of six independent equations from Ω that
does not involve any unknowns except for these terms. In order to have two inde-
pendent equations that involve any ε2i but no ν
2
m corresponding to measurements
affected directly by factor i, we need at least two indicators devoted exclusively
to one factor. This criterion is just fulfilled for r∗ and t∗ and overfulfilled for w∗.
As an example, we could then use the first two intersections by measurements on
the same factor Ω2,1, Ω5,4, Ω7,6 together with those elements of Ω where the nor-
malised elements of A intersect, that is Ω4,1, Ω6,1, Ω6,4 to identify these variables.
Now all parameters of Θ are identified from the first M(1) diagonal elements
of Ω. Since the last M(2) elements of Θ are zero, the ε2-terms corresponding to the
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utilities of asset types can be inferred directly from the appropriate diagonal ele-
ments ofΩ. Finally, since there is no feedback from utility of assets to preferences
or wealth, the corresponding covariances can be inferred one by one from the
intersection of one respective measurement and the asset utility. The same argu-
ment holds for the covariances of the disturbances of the utilities themselves. This
closes the discussion of identification under the presence of continuous measure-
ments and we now turn to the additional issues raised by observing only limited
dependent variables in most cases.
6.3.4 Identification in the Presence of Discrete Measurements
Of the nineteen outcomes that we measure (13 indicators on wealth and prefer-
ences; holdings of 6 types of assets), only two are continuous. Eight are of binary
nature and the remaining nine outcomes are ordinal variables that take on three or
four values. We follow the exposition in Wansbeek and Meijer (2000). We specify
the following observation rules for the indicator variables:
ym = Hm(y∗m, τm), m = {1, 2, . . . ,M}(6.9)
Each Hm(·) is a known deterministic function that maps the unobserved mea-
surement y∗m onto the observed variable ym, depending additionally on a parameter
vector τm. For the two continuous indicators, Hm(·) is the identity function and τm
is empty. For the other indicators, we have the ordered response model:
ym =

0 if y∗m ≤ τm,1
1 if τm,1 < y∗m ≤ τm,2
...
J if τm,J < y∗m
(6.10)
The scale of y∗m, m = {3, 4, . . . ,M} is not identified and we set the variances of
the respective diagonal elements in Ω to one. This is equivalent to restricting the
respective measurement error variancesΘm,m, m = {3, 4, . . . ,M(1)} to be functions
of elements of Λ, A, and Ψ; hence they are not identified. Finally, remember that
all structural equations contain an intercept, so we need to normalise one of the
thresholds τm,i per latent variable which does not have a continuous indicator. We
do so by setting τm,1 = 0 for the first element of each column in A.
Before turning to our estimation approach, we close this section with a note
on nature of the discrete variables. It is crucial for our analysis that all endoge-
nous variables are continuous and that it is not the discrete outcomes which carry
structural meaning. Most importantly, it would not be possible to specify an inter-
dependent system of equations for the latent variables. Instead there could only
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be a triangular structure. See, for example, Schmidt (1981) on this issue. On
the one hand, it is not at all restrictive that it is the latent, continuous wealth and
the preference variables which carry structural meaning. Indeed, this is the main
point of the measurement models. On the other hand, it inhibits us from consid-
ering potential repercussions from asset holdings to wealth that we mentioned in
Section 6.2.
6.3.5 Estimation of the Structural Model
Our estimation strategy is based on the assumption that all random errors follow
a joint normal distribution with the above-mentioned restrictions on the variances
and covariances inΨ andΘ that translate into restrictions on the covariance matrix
Ω of the joint error terms. We employ a full information maximum likelihood
approach. Before moving on to the likelihood, it is useful to partition Y , Π, and
Ω according to whether the corresponding outcome variable is of continuous or
discrete nature:
Y = (Yc,Yd)′
Π = (Πc,Πd)
Ω =
(
Ωc,c Ωc,d
Ωd,c Ωd,d
)
.
We can write the likelihood for observation i as:
Li = φ
(
Yc,i − Π′cXi ; Ωc,c
) ·(6.11)
τ3,1+Y3,i∫
τ3,Y3,i
· · ·
τM,1+YM,i∫
τM,YM,i
φ
(
s − µd,i|c ; Ωd|c ) dsMdsM−1 · · · ds3
where φ(µ ; Ω) denotes the multivariate normal density function with mean µ and
variance matrix Ω and
s = (s3, s4, . . . , sM)′
µd,i|c = Π′dXi + Ωd,c(Ωc,c)
−1 (Yc,i − Π′cXi)
Ωd|c = Ωd,d −Ωd,c(Ωc,c)−1Ωc,d .
The integral to evaluate is of dimension 16 and does not have an analytical so-
lution. Hence we resort to simulated maximum likelihood estimation, employing
the GHK simulator (Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 1993). For the core part of
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the model, we make use of the Fortran code supplied with Hajivassiliou, McFad-
den, and Ruud (1996),5 taking 200 random draws per observation. To maximise
the logarithm of the likelihood function (6.12), we utilise the BFGS method with
numerical gradient approximations. Standard errors are computed from the in-
verse outer product of scores matrix. As there are many parameters in the model
(Table 6.9 in the Appendix gives a concise overview), computation time is con-
siderable even with up-to-date parallel facilities.
6.4 Results
We divide the discussion of our results in three parts. First, we present the pa-
rameter estimates from the measurement model for wealth and attitudes. Second,
we report on the impact of the exogenous factors on these variables and asset
choice. Finally, we come to the core of our model, i.e. the relationships among
the endogenous variables, in particular the influence of attitudes and wealth on the
choice of portfolio components.
6.4.1 Measuring Wealth and Attitudes
Table 6.3 contains the matrix of factor loadings A. We describe it column-wise.
Looking at the first column it is evident that our binary variables “income from
wealth” and “employment of a tax advisor” are indicators of a high level of wealth
indeed. The magnitude of the coefficients appears to be plausible, too. To see this,
we consider the marginal effects implied by the coefficients. For a baseline wealth
of 140,000 Euros (the unconditional average of reported wealth), which is asso-
ciated with an 18% probability to report income from wealth. A positive wealth
shock of 100,000 Euros would lead to an increase of this number to 36%. The
same exercise with respect to the tax advisor variable gives numbers of 24% and
27%, respectively. Hence there is more information in the “income from wealth”
variable. Finally, the presence of three indicators of one unobserved variable al-
lows us to separately identify the standard deviation of latent wealth and the stan-
dard deviation of the measurement error inherent to each of the indicators (unless
they are normalised as for the binary variables), see Section 6.3.3. We estimate the
idiosyncratic component of (latent) wealth in millions of Euros to have a standard
error of .097 (s.e. .112), see Table 6.4. The estimate of the standard deviation
of the measurement error in reported wealth is .193 (s.e. .026). According to
these results, measurement error would be about twice as important as idiosyn-
cratic variation in true wealth. This appears to be rather large, but not entirely
implausible in the light of the difficulties in measuring wealth.
5 Available at http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/vassilis/pub/simulation/fortran/.
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Tab. 6.3: Results from the Measurement Model
Variable w∗ r∗ t∗
measwealth 1.000
incwealth 5.693∗∗
(0.445)
taxadvisor 1.035∗∗
(0.246)
lottery1 1.000
lottery2 0.567∗∗
(0.056)
discount1 1.000
discount2 0.762∗∗
(0.156)
lottery3 1.042∗∗ −0.379∗∗
(0.097) (0.142)
drink 0.194∗∗ −0.921∗∗
(0.054) (0.142)
smoker 0.227∗∗ 0.882∗∗
(0.056) (0.131)
planner 0.008 0.828∗∗
(0.053) (0.118)
impulsive 0.280∗∗ 0.215∗
(0.039) (0.095)
Note: Estimated elements of the matrix A as defined in Sec-
tion 6.3. The first element of each column is normalised to
one. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, asterisks indi-
cate significance at the 5% and 1%-level. Source: SAVE 2005,
own calculations.
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We code all measurements of risk attitude such that higher values are associ-
ated with more risk averse behaviour. From the normalisation α4w = 1 we then ex-
pect positive coefficients throughout column 2, which is what we find. All effects
except for the self-rating with respect to planning the future are highly signifi-
cant. The first thing we examine are the relative magnitudes of the idiosyncratic
variation in risk attitude and the measurement errors in the indicators associated
with it. Remember that the latter are normalised to 1 for all 7 measurements.
The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component is estimated to be 1.002
(s.e. .252). This highlights two things: On the one hand, idiosyncratic variation
in risk preferences beyond those related to demographic characteristics and eco-
nomic variables is substantial. On the other hand, measurement error in typically
employed direct indicators of risk attitude is very important. In regressions where
such measures are directly employed, coefficients can be expected to suffer from
a severe attenuation bias.
The magnitudes of the coefficients are not directly comparable because of the
different thresholds, which are shown in Table 6.10 in the Appendix. We therefore
compare marginal effects directly. Such comparisons reveal that lotteries 1 and 3
show the largest reaction to variation in true risk attitude by one standard devia-
tion. For lottery 2, there is some variation in the extremes, but probabilities for the
two middle categories do not change much over the bulk of the distribution of r∗.
This may be related to the fact that the gambles involve negative outcomes. If loss
aversion is important, explaining the behaviour by risk attitude alone would lead
to a downward bias in α5r. Marginal effects with respect to drinking, smoking,
and impulsive decision-making are relatively small. Again, most of the action is
in the extreme categories as opposed to the middle one. Finally, as could be ex-
pected from the estimated coefficient, planning the future is not indicative of risk
tolerance.
The coding of the indicators for impatience is such that higher values of t∗ are
associated with more patient behaviour. A priori, we would expect all coefficients
in the last column of Table 6.3 to be positive except for the one on lottery 3.
As it happens, the risk-avoiding choices in that task are the ones with immediate
payments while risky choices and delayed gratification are aligned in all other
indicators. We find all variables to be significant. With the exception of drinking
frequency, they all point in the expected direction. Measurement errors are about
four times as high as the idiosyncratic variation in time preference, which is only
imprecisely estimated. The favourable interpretation of this would be that after
controlling for the covariates (which we emerges to be important as illustrated by
the next section), there is little idiosyncratic variation left to explain. The less
favourable view is that time preference is difficult to grasp psychologically (see
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) who argue against the economic
approach of modelling attitudes to time by means of a single parameter. Arrondel
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Tab. 6.4: Correlation Matrix of Structural Errors
Variable w∗ r∗ t∗ u∗savacc u∗retins u
∗
bonds u
∗
stocks u
∗
loans
w∗ 0.097 0.172 0.149 −0.061 −0.096 −0.278 −0.055 −0.305∗∗
(0.112) (0.203) (0.377) (0.137) (0.116) (0.195) (0.120) (0.117)
r∗ 1.002∗∗ −0.971 0.015 0.253∗ 0.108 0.111 0.092
(0.252) x) (0.157) (0.124) (0.203) (0.125) (0.118)
t∗ 0.199 0.452 −0.151 0.078 0.107 −0.262
(0.352) (0.392) (0.173) (0.305) (0.197) (0.177)
u∗savacc 1.000 0.245∗∗ −0.024 0.035 −0.008
(0.067) (0.121) (0.071) (0.072)
u∗retins 1.000 0.301
∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.089) (0.053) (0.061)
u∗bonds 1.000 0.320
∗∗ 0.003
(0.073) (0.101)
u∗stocks 1.000 0.002
(0.086)
u∗loans 1.000
Note: Estimated elements of the correlation matrix associated with Ψ as defined in Section 6.3. Diagonal elements
denote standard deviations, off-diagonal elements correlations. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, asterisks
indicate significance at the 5% and 1%-level. x) no meaningful standard error. Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations.
and Masson (2005) also have more difficulties to pin down impatience than risk
preferences.
Given the stronger relative importance of measurement error, marginal effects
on the indicators of impatience are much smaller than those for the measurements
of risk attitude. Their relative magnitudes are broadly aligned with the size of the
factor loading estimates. It is noteworthy that planning the future is so strongly
related to time preference in the light of the no-correlation result of Ameriks,
Caplin, and Leahy (2003). This suggests the measurement error interpretation of
some of their findings brought forward by Arrondel and Masson (2005): A high
propensity to plan may simply be a better indicator of patience than the single
hypothetical question Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) employ to measure dis-
counting behaviour.
We conclude from this exercise that measurement error is a potentially serious
issue in attempts to elicit time preference directly. In particular, given its relative
importance we would not expect many significant results to emerge from a sin-
gle indicator on it, which may explain some of the negative conclusions in, for
example, Kapteyn and Teppa (2003). However, even with our battery of indica-
tors, we cannot pin down idiosyncratic preference parameters very well. In the
next section, we examine whether observable variables have explanatory power
for them.
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6.4.2 The Determinants of Wealth and Attitudes
Before turning to the influences of observable characteristics on wealth and prefer-
ences, we begin with describing the relations among them. Table 6.5 displays the
elements of the nonzero components of Λ. In this section, we are only concerned
with the top three rows.
First, consider the relations among wealth and risk preference. On the one
hand, we find the point estimate of risk aversion on wealth to be positive but
insignificant. On the other hand, risk aversion is decreasing strongly and sig-
nificantly in wealth. The marginal effect of an increase in baseline6 wealth by
100,000 Euros would lead to a decrease in risk aversion by almost a fourth of
a standard deviation (−.23). Patience and wealth are positively related in both
directions. First, a one standard deviation difference in patience at baseline is as-
sociated with a 40,000 Euros wealth difference. This effect is likely to be mediated
in large parts through higher savings rates in the past which we cannot control for.
Second, 100,000 Euros more wealth than at baseline come along with a patience
parameter that is about two fifth of a standard deviation higher than at baseline.
The coefficients relating the preference parameters to each other (i.e. λwr and
λrw, respectively) are difficult to interpret. The reason lies in the correlation of the
idiosyncratic parameters which is strongly negative and appears to be approaching
the boundary of the parameter space. It is extremely imprecisely estimated. While
covariance matrix estimation is a difficult task in general, we have not yet made
out the precise reason for why this happens in our particular case. One may worry
that the large absolute value of the correlation coefficient could drive some of the
results. This does not appear to be the case: Estimates with Ψ being restricted to
a diagonal matrix in many respects do not differ substantially from those reported
here. Tables are available from the authors upon request.
Because of its sheer size, we move the matrix of coefficients determining the
preference parameters to the Appendix in Table 6.11. Here we stick to highlight-
ing its most salient features as self-contained as possible. Note that, except for the
above-mentioned exclusion restrictions that appear in rows 2–11 of Table 6.11,
none of the restrictions imposed on B is of substantive importance. We introduced
them merely to limit the number of parameters.
We start with the observable determinants of wealth. We find the typical con-
cave relationship between income and wealth. Over the bulk of the support of the
income distribution, the slope is steeper for retired households. A divorce appears
to affect income negatively as compared to single households, although the effect
is not significant. If at least one household member holds a college or equivalent
degree, household wealth is predicted to be about 27, 000 Euros higher. Since we
6 Unless stated otherwise, in the subsequent discussion we refer to the baseline specification as
one where all observed variables are set to their median. Unobservables are set to zero.
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Tab. 6.5: Relations Among Wealth, Preferences, and Asset Choice
Variable w∗ r∗ t∗
w∗ 0.006 0.157∗∗
(0.015) (0.036)
r∗ −3.657∗∗ 1.750∗∗
(1.146) (0.537)
t∗ 1.079∗∗ 0.131∗
(0.342) (0.054)
u∗savacc 2.264∗ 0.026 1.068∗∗
(0.950) (0.116) (0.407)
u∗retins 2.245
∗ −0.326∗∗ 0.409
(0.909) (0.098) (0.319)
u∗bonds 2.031 −0.204 1.679∗
(1.451) (0.162) (0.672)
u∗stocks 2.770
∗∗ −0.211∗ 0.787∗
(0.984) (0.098) (0.356)
u∗loans 0.632 −0.123 −0.173
(0.992) (0.097) (0.326)
Note: Estimated elements of the matrix Λ as defined in Sec-
tion 6.3. Empty elements are normalised to zero. Standard er-
rors are shown in parentheses, asterisks indicate significance at
the 5% and 1%-level. Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations.
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control for the influence of education on wealth that is mediated through prefer-
ences, this hints at the importance of information processing or similar influences.
As expected, wealth rises in age, although the difference to the left-out category
of respondents between 31 and 45 years of age is only significant for those aged
between 46 and 60. Finally, wealth of the self-employed is about 100,000 Euros
higher on average.
Turning to risk attitude, the two instruments that emerge as being significant
(playing risky games as a child, adventuresome father) point into the expected
direction: For both questions, higher scores are linked with higher degrees risk
tolerance. The parameter estimate on the third instrument, the respondent’s rating
of his or her mother being adventuresome, is small, insignificant, and points into
the opposite direction than the other two. We find females to be significantly more
risk averse than men, which is in line with many findings in the literature. The
estimates on education and age are particularly pronounced. The risk attitude of
respondents with low education is about half a standard deviation lower on average
than in the middle education category. Effects are about 20% lower (higher) than
this for respondents between 46 and 60 (more than 60) years of age. Wealth levels
in East Germany are substantially lower than in the West.
With respect to impatience, estimates on all our instruments point in the ex-
pected direction and are statistically significant. Saving one’s pocket money as a
child and rating one’s parents as planning the future precisely are all associated
with higher levels of patience. Females are more impatient on average, while
married respondents appear to be more patient. Note, however, that this effect
will be counterbalanced by the effect of having children. This will be relevant for
many of the married respondents and it points in the opposite direction, displaying
about the same precision and magnitude. We estimate a strong and monotonous
effect of the respondent’s education. Higher education is associated with more pa-
tient behaviour. Finally, the self-employed appear to more impatient than tenured
employees while East Germans are more patient than their Western counterparts.
6.4.3 The Determinants of Asset Choice
Before turning to the influence of the three latent variables, we describe the im-
pacts of the exogenous variables on asset holdings. We find married households to
be more likely to hold savings accounts and also to have loans in their portfolio.
The young are less likely to have retirement insurance contracts or own stocks.
This is in line with a preference for liquid assets at younger ages which could re-
sult from borrowing constraints. The negative association of retirement insurance
contracts with the oldest age group and the retired is trivial since only contracts in
the accumulation phase enter the definition. Consistent with the life-cycle model,
their portfolios are also much less likely contain loans. Respondents who expect
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their household income to increase within the next year hold a larger share of
risky assets and retirement insurance contracts. The effects of credit constraints
are surprising at first glance, with households who report being credit constraint
holding less savings accounts and retirement insurance contracts, but more loans.
Among these effects, only the lower propensity to save in a retirement insurance
contract appears sensible because of the illiquidity of such contracts. We suspect
the clue to this apparent paradox to be in the definition of the credit constraints
variable. At present we are using whether a credit request has not been granted at
all or not been granted to its full extent. We suspect the effects to be sensitive to
the inclusion of the last category and will check this in future versions.
Turning to the effects of wealth and preferences on asset choice displayed in
the lower part of Table 6.5, we find that almost all of them point in the expected
direction. Greater wealth leads to significantly higher probabilities to own sav-
ings accounts, retirement insurance contracts, and stocks. The effect on bonds is
insignificant but positive as expected, whereas the point estimate on loans is oppo-
site to our priors. However, note the strong negative correlation in the errors from
Table 6.4 which reestablishes the observed negative correlation between wealth
and loans in the population. Higher levels of risk aversion are associated with
lower holdings of stocks and retirement insurance contracts. The first finding is
intuitively clear – being the most risky asset category, all else being equal their
possession should be positively associated with risk tolerance. The effect on re-
tirement insurance contracts could be explained by a preference of precautionary
savers for liquid assets. Finally, the last column of Table 6.5 reveals that the patient
are more likely to hold savings accounts, bonds and stocks. Especially the last two
effects are well in line with our priors, given the relative illiquidity of these asset
classes. As a last point, the results in the right bottom corner of Table 6.4 show
a strong positive correlation among the errors of retirement insurance contracts,
bonds, and stocks. The unobserved factor driving this could be, for example, fi-
nancial education since all three asset categories mean complicated investments
relative to savings accounts. Another factor driving these results could be their
relative illiquidity if our controls for credit constraints are less than perfect.
Finally we display the marginal effects of changes in wealth and preferences
on asset holding probabilities in Table 6.6. Again, we use baseline values with all
variables at their median. We then consider changes in asset holding percentages
with respect to increases in wealth, risk tolerance, and impatience by one stan-
dard deviation each. We only consider direct effects since many of the indirect
effects involve dynamic arguments.7 Marginal effects for wealth are largest for
savings accounts. This is is a reflection of the skewed distribution of wealth and
7 For example, we would expect the positive effect of patience on wealth to be mediated largely
through the savings rate. Looking at instantaneous marginal effects does not seem sensible.
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Tab. 6.6: Marginal effects of Changes in Wealth and Preferences on Asset Holdings
Baseline ∆∗w ∆∗r ∆∗t
P(savacc = 1) 0.617 0.083 -0.010 0.078
P(retins = 1) 0.171 0.063 0.095 0.022
P(bonds = 1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
P(stocks = 1) 0.070 0.046 0.033 0.024
P(loans = 1) 0.186 0.017 0.035 -0.009
Note: Marginal effects relative to the baseline specification with all
variables set to their median. Only direct effects are considered for
marginal effects, i.e. the first three rows in Λ are set to zero. ∆w∗ = .1,
∆r∗ = −1.002, ∆t∗ = .199, Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations.
risky asset being held predominantly at wealth levels well above the median. This
becomes most evident for bonds. Here, baseline rates and marginal effects are ex-
tremely small. The population share of bond holdings (8%) appears to be almost
exclusively generated by the (very) rich, risk tolerant, and patient. Wealth effects
are sizeable for the retirement insurance contract and stock holdings. Influences
of preferences on portfolio choice are significant in magnitude, too. For example,
increasing risk tolerance by one standard deviation will lead to 50% increases in
both stock and retirement insurance contract holdings. At the same time, hold-
ings of savings accounts are predicted to decrease slightly, although this effect
is insignificant. Looking at impatience, the marginal effect is once more most
pronounced for savings accounts due to the reasons explained before. Effects on
propensities to own stocks and retirement insurance contracts are also significant.
They do not reach the same magnitude as the effects of risk tolerance though.
6.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a structural model of portfolio choice behaviour. It is
predominantly aimed at estimating the influences of wealth, individual risk atti-
tudes and impatience on households’ asset choices. In pursuing this aim, we were
explicit about what we consider to be observable determinants of wealth, prefer-
ences, and asset choice on the one hand; and what we model as outcomes driven
by these latent variables on the other hand. Accordingly, a core part of the ap-
proach is concerned with measuring the preference parameters and wealth, much
in line with psychometric methods.
Our key results can be summarised as follows. We find the measurement
160 Chapter 6. Risk Attitude, Impatience, and Asset Choice
model to be extremely important in pinning down the preference parameters. In
particular, our results suggest that some of the disappointing results obtained in
previous attempts to use individual preferences in portfolio choice models are
likely to be due to the impact of measurement error. For example, we find id-
iosyncratic variation in risk attitude to be about as large as the measurement error
in the best indicators that we have for it. The picture is even worse for time pref-
erence. Hence, we would not expect a single measure on either trait to produce
consistent results. However, the preference parameter estimates obtained from
the more comprehensive measurements turned out to have a significant impact
on portfolio choice decisions in the expected directions. Allowing for the joint
determination of wealth and preferences also emerged as an important ingredient
to our model. This highlights the importance of employing a structural model of
the type considered here; as opposed to reduced form approaches. The results for
the observable determinants of wealth, preferences, and asset choice are broadly
consistent with the previous literature.
The analysis in this paper has shown a fruitful approach to incorporate individ-
ual preference parameters in models of portfolio choice. Yet there are several open
issues left that call for further analyses and possible extensions. Most obviously,
the model should be able to accommodate housing wealth given the large share
it occupies in total households’ net worth. Second, we could move beyond mere
probabilities to hold assets towards more comprehensive measurements of portfo-
lio characteristics. Finally, there are some open issues with respect to estimation
of the covariance parameters of the unobserved traits.
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6.6 Additional Tables
Tab. 6.7: Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Indicator Variables
Name Definition Min Max Mean SD
measwealth Total measured household wealth, sum of all asset holdings, in mill. Euros -.45 2.5 0.14 0.24
riskindex Compound index from 9 different questions on risky behaviours .61 10 6.11 1.29
incwealth Household income from wealth. 0 1 0.28 0.45
taxadvisor Employs tax advisor for doing tax returns 0 1 0.24 0.43
lottery1 Choice: 50-50 Lottery between 0 – 2000/2500/3000 vs. sure 1000 0 3 2.60 0.87
lottery2 Choice: 50-50 Lottery between -100 – 200/300/400 vs. sure 0 0 3 2.20 1.24
discount1 Choice: Get paid 1100 now vs. 1130/1200/1380/ in 10 months 0 3 1.04 1.11
discount2 Choice: Pay 825/870/990 in 10 months vs. 800 now 0 3 2.27 1.08
lottery3 Choice: 50-50 Lottery betw 0 – 750/1200/1800 in 6 months vs. sure 500 now 0 3 2.54 0.82
drink Respondent drinks alcohol: very frequently / regularly / seldom-never 0 2 1.40 0.70
smoker Respondent: smokes / quit smoking / never smoked 0 2 1.13 0.85
planner Respondent lives for the day / plans the future precisely 0 2 1.26 0.70
impulsive Respondent decides impulsively / thinks a lot about decisions 0 2 1.06 0.76
Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations
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Tab. 6.8: Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of the Covariates
Name Definition Min Max Mean SD
incnotret Total net HH income in thousands of Euros, interacted with being not retired 0 40 1.92 2.57
inc2notret Total net HH income squared / 108 , interacted with being not retired 0 16 0.10 0.67
incret Total net HH income in thousands of Euros, interacted with being retired 0 28 0.48 1.38
inc2ret Total net HH income squared / 108 , interacted with being retired 0 7.8 0.02 0.21
divorced Divorced from spouse 0 1 0.11 0.31
riskgamkid Was ready to play risky games as a child 0 10 2.57 3.25
advmoth Mother was an adventurous person 0 10 1.98 2.73
advfath Father was an adventurous person 0 10 2.71 3.09
pockmonsp Spent pocket money immediately as a kid 0 10 3.02 3.41
planmoth Mother used to plan the future meticulously 0 10 5.07 3.26
planfath Father used to plan the future meticulously 0 10 5.25 3.38
female Female 0 1 0.50 0.50
married Married or partner living in HH 0 1 0.66 0.47
educhihh Highest educactional degree in HH: high education 0 1 0.20 0.40
educlow Respondent: low education 0 1 0.11 0.32
educhi Respondent: high education 0 1 0.15 0.36
age1830 Age between 18 and 30 years 0 1 0.13 0.33
age4660 Age between 46 and 60 years 0 1 0.26 0.44
age61plus Age above 60 years 0 1 0.31 0.46
kids Respondent and/or spouse has kids 0 1 0.79 0.41
kidsinhh Children living in the household 0 1 0.38 0.49
retiredhh At least one HH member retired, none currently working 0 1 0.19 0.39
unempnowhh At least one HH member currently unemployed 0 1 0.13 0.33
selfemphh At least one HH member self-employed 0 1 0.09 0.29
tempjobhh At least one member of HH: has temporary job 0 1 0.08 0.26
east Lives in eastern germany 0 1 0.30 0.46
german Respondent is German citizen 0 1 0.97 0.18
incincprob Probability for an increase in HH income 0 100 19.98 31.55
unempprob Probability for at least one HH member to become unemployed 0 100 14.59 28.69
creditconstr Household credit constrained 0 1 0.11 0.32
Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations
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Tab. 6.9: Number of Parameters in the Structural Equations Model
Symbol # Parameter Description
Λ 21 Slope coefficients, endogenous variables
B 138 Slope coefficients, exogenous variables
A 14 Factor loadings of measurement model
Ψ 31 Covariance parameters structural equations
Θ 1 Covariance parameters measurement equations
τ 23 Cutoff points for observation rules
228 Total
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Tab. 6.10: Estimated Thresholds in Ordered Probit Models
Variable τ0 τ1 τ2
incwealth 1.721∗∗
(0.110)
taxadvisor 0.866∗∗
(0.062)
lottery1 0.258∗∗ 0.929∗∗
(0.031) (0.053)
lottery2 0.252∗ 0.373∗∗ 0.641∗∗
(0.104) (0.104) (0.105)
discount1 0.672∗∗ 1.201∗∗
(0.028) (0.038)
discount2 −1.053∗∗ −0.614∗∗ −0.197∗∗
(0.049) (0.045) (0.043)
lottery3 −0.410∗∗ 0.694∗∗ 1.291∗∗
(0.148) (0.156) (0.166)
drink −0.949∗∗ 0.169
(0.121) (0.116)
smoker 0.073 0.782∗∗
(0.121) (0.120)
planner −0.905∗∗ 0.380∗∗
(0.115) (0.116)
impulsive −0.050 1.071∗∗
(0.088) (0.086)
Note: Estimated threshold parameters τm,i associated with the
observation rules defined in Section 6.3.4. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses, asterisks indicate significance at the 5%
and 1%-level. Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations.
6.6. Additional Tables 165
Tab. 6.11: Determinants of Wealth, Preferences, and Asset Choice
Variable w∗ r∗ t∗ u∗savacc u∗retins u
∗
bonds u
∗
stocks u
∗
loans
constant −0.003 1.849∗∗ −0.190 −0.048 0.129 −2.208∗∗ −0.577∗ −0.817∗∗
(0.048) (0.270) (0.135) (0.317) (0.272) (0.704) (0.278) (0.280)
incnotret 0.032∗∗
(0.004)
inc2notret −0.088∗∗
(0.012)
incret 0.063∗∗
(0.009)
inc2ret −0.228∗∗
(0.036)
divorced −0.020
(0.013)
riskgamkid −0.062∗∗
(0.012)
advmoth 0.009
(0.008)
advfath −0.032∗∗
(0.009)
pockmonsp −0.008∗∗
(0.002)
planmoth 0.006∗
(0.002)
planfath 0.009∗∗
(0.003)
female 0.317∗∗ −0.111∗∗
(0.083) (0.028)
married 0.005 −0.042 0.117∗∗ 0.259∗ 0.161 −0.249 0.012 0.259∗
(0.016) (0.129) (0.045) (0.126) (0.105) (0.193) (0.108) (0.117)
educhihh 0.027∗ 0.186 −0.115 −0.098 0.085 0.092
(0.012) (0.121) (0.100) (0.135) (0.086) (0.111)
educlow 0.513∗∗ −0.268∗∗
(0.163) (0.049)
educhi −0.220 0.122∗∗
(0.114) (0.042)
age1830 −0.027 −0.177 0.031 −0.057 −0.493∗∗ −0.296 −0.327∗ −0.112
(0.022) (0.151) (0.055) (0.142) (0.119) (0.270) (0.141) (0.118)
age4660 0.040∗∗ 0.398∗∗ −0.061 −0.000 −0.111 0.049 −0.211 −0.159
(0.014) (0.115) (0.044) (0.123) (0.106) (0.176) (0.108) (0.100)
age61plus 0.025 0.600∗∗ −0.064 0.230 −0.655∗∗ 0.058 −0.193 −0.622∗∗
(0.017) (0.130) (0.048) (0.154) (0.139) (0.211) (0.129) (0.141)
kids 0.000 0.259 −0.134∗∗ −0.152 0.174 0.054 0.076 0.128
(0.015) (0.136) (0.044) (0.133) (0.113) (0.185) (0.110) (0.127)
kidsinhh −0.116 0.005 −0.348∗ −0.056 0.121
(0.110) (0.086) (0.150) (0.086) (0.092)
retiredhh −0.043 −0.153∗ −0.227 −0.506∗∗ 0.049 −0.082 −0.346∗
(0.025) (0.075) (0.144) (0.115) (0.177) (0.114) (0.137)
unempnowhh −0.017 0.065 −0.115∗ −0.295∗ −0.178 0.045 −0.097 −0.128
(0.020) (0.146) (0.052) (0.134) (0.114) (0.253) (0.129) (0.113)
selfemphh 0.098∗∗ 0.234 −0.137∗ −0.416∗ −0.200 −0.005 0.160 −0.265
(0.015) (0.189) (0.065) (0.170) (0.144) (0.244) (0.143) (0.148)
tempjobhh −0.011 −0.232 0.034 −0.228 −0.001 0.222 −0.043 0.049
(0.024) (0.173) (0.062) (0.152) (0.133) (0.240) (0.138) (0.141)
east −0.086∗∗ −0.302 0.161∗∗ −0.122 0.129 −0.078 0.033 0.282∗
(0.012) (0.162) (0.046) (0.141) (0.121) (0.209) (0.127) (0.129)
german 0.058 0.187 −0.036 0.140 −0.025 0.606 −0.301 0.001
(0.031) (0.230) (0.080) (0.223) (0.165) (0.575) (0.183) (0.196)
incincprob 0.000 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗∗ −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
unempprob −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
creditconstr −0.426∗∗ −0.223∗ −0.384 −0.108 0.277∗∗
(0.113) (0.097) (0.320) (0.108) (0.092)
Note: Estimated elements of the matrix B defined in Section 6.3. Empty elements are restricted to zero. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses, asterisks indicate significance at the 5% and 1%-level. Source: SAVE 2005, own calculations.
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